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Abstract




Professor Thomas J. Chemmanur, chair
My Ph.D. dissertation consists of three essays. The rst essay examines the ef-
fect of hedge funds on target shareholder gains in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). I nd that
the initial buyout premium is increasing in the preannouncement presence of hedge
funds, measured as the fraction of target equity held by hedge funds before the an-
nouncement. Using a geographic instrument for the presence of hedge fund, I nd that
this relationship persists even after controlling for endogeneity. I further show that this
effect holds only for active hedge funds and long-term hedge funds, and is stronger
for management-led LBOs than for third-party LBOs. Overall, the ndings suggest
that hedge funds protect target shareholder interests in LBOs by using their hold-out
power.
The second essay examines the relation between expected market volatility and
the demand for liquidity in open-end mutual funds. The empirical results are consis-
tent with precautionary motives for holding liquid assets, i.e., fund managers tilt their
holdings more heavily toward liquid stocks when the market is expected to be more
volatile. This dynamic preference for liquid stocks is more pronounced among small
fund families, low-load funds, funds whose past performance has been unfavorable,
funds with high return volatility, growth-oriented funds, and high-turnover funds. I fur-
ther show that this type of behavior is valuable for fund investors during high volatility
periods because it has led to signicantly (both statistically and economically) higher
subsequent abnormal returns.
The third essay, co-authored with Thomas Chemmanur and Gang Hu, directly
tests Brennan and Hughes' (1991) information production theory of stock splits by
making use of a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data. We com-
pare brokerage commissions paid by institutional investors before and after a split, and
relate the informativeness of institutional trading to brokerage commissions paid. We
also compute realized institutional trading protability net of brokerage commissions
and other trading costs. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, both com-
missions paid and trading volume by institutional investors increase after a stock split.
Second, institutional trading immediately after a split has predictive power for the
rm's subsequent long-term stock return performance; this predictive power is con-
centrated in stocks which generate higher commission revenues for brokerage rms
and is greater for institutions that pay higher brokerage commissions. Third, insti-
tutions make positive abnormal prots during the post-split period even after taking
brokerage commissions and other trading costs into account; institutions paying higher
commissions signicantly outperform those paying lower commissions. Fourth, the in-
formation asymmetry faced by rms decreases after a split; the greater the increase in
brokerage commissions after a split, the greater the reduction in information asymme-
try. Overall, our results are broadly consistent with the implications of the information
production theory.
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1Chapter 1
Hedge Funds and Shareholder Wealth
Gains in Leveraged Buyouts
1.1 Introduction
Hedge funds have become increasingly important players in the market for corporate
control. In particular, by taking large, non-controlling, and relatively long-term posi-
tions in underperforming rms, hedge funds have actively pressured managers to sell
part of or even the entire rm, become involved in takeover negotiations, and blocked
acquisition offers.1 While Greenwood and Schor (2007) show that blockholdings by
hedge funds increase the probability of a rm being taken over, little is known con-
cerning the effect of hedge funds on target shareholder gains when a takeover does
occur. In this paper, I examine whether the presence of hedge funds in target rms as
shareholders affects shareholder wealth gains in leveraged buyouts (LBOs).
There are two reasons why LBOs provide an interesting setting to examine
the effect of hedge funds in corporate control transactions. First, since LBOs are
generally characterized by a high potential for agency conicts between target man-
agement and target shareholders, the need for shareholder monitoring is particularly
1 See, for example, Kahan and Rock (2006) for takeover cases where hedge funds play an active
role.
2high.2 While internal governance mechanisms and the legal system may protect pub-
lic shareholders from expropriation by private equity bidders, outside shareholders
may also play a role since the consummation of the transaction requires shareholder
approval. If hedge funds are informed monitors as suggested by the recent literature
on hedge fund activism (see, for example, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008),
one would expect hedge funds to play an active role to protect target shareholder
interests in LBOs. Second, as Gillan and Starks (2007) point out, the difculty in
assessing the causal effect of shareholder activism on corporate performance is exac-
erbated by long-term performance measures. LBOs, like interrm takeovers, avoid
this complication since the premium paid by the bidder represents the long-term rm
value.
Using a sample of 237 buyout proposals involving U.S. public corporations
during the 19902007 period and a hand-collected dataset on hedge fund holdings, I
nd evidence that hedge funds have a positive effect on target shareholder wealth in
LBOs. Specically, I show that preannouncement equity holdings by hedge funds in
the target rm are associated with enhanced target shareholder gains in LBOs. A one
standard deviation increase in the fraction of equity held by hedge funds in the target
rm before the announcement is associated with an increase of 3:6 percentage points
2 An apparent conict of interest in LBOs which involve management participation is that incum-
bent managers play the dual role of purchaser of the public shares and agent for selling public share-
holders. Even if they do not participate in the transaction, target managers, because of job security
and compensation concerns, may still have a strong incentive to pursue LBOs. In such situations,
self-interested managers may compromise the interests of outside shareholders by negotiating less
favorable buyout terms. See, for example, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) and Kaplan and Strömberg
(2008) for discussions on potential sources of gains from buyouts.
3in the initial premium, or a dollar gain of $24million per deal for target shareholders.
This result is robust to controls for target rm characteristics (such as rm size, free
cash ow, tax liability, growth prospects, and industry membership), shareholder
investment horizon, board characteristics, and so on. In contrast, the presence of
traditional institutions, such as public pension funds and mutual funds, does not have
a signicant effect on the initial premium. Further, I nd that for offers with a low
initial premium, net buying by hedge funds during the offer increases the probability
of a bid revision.
These ndings are consistent with the active shareholder theory proposed by
Gomes (2001). Under the theory, active investors, such as hedge funds, by taking
equity stakes (and hence voting rights) in a takeover target, could ex ante force the
bidder to offer a high preemptive bid. This situation arises because, by accumulat-
ing blocks of target shares both before and after the takeover announcement, active
shareholders can potentially use their voting power to hold out a transaction. The
threat of hedge funds to hold out a takeover will force the bidder to make a high pre-
emptive bid. The theory predicts that the initial premium should be increasing in the
preannouncement holdings by active shareholders. The theory also predicts that for
offers with a low initial premium, active shareholders can accumulate more shares
during the offer to enhance their hold-out power, which in turn forces the bidder to
increase the bid. I refer to this theory as the active shareholder hypothesis.
4An alternative interpretation of the results is that hedge funds have an infor-
mation advantage in predicting LBO offers and post-LBO rm value. Suppose that
hedge funds are informed about a prospective buyout and increase their holdings in
the target in advance.3 If hedge funds truly have superior information that the market
does not have, a positive relationship between preannouncement hedge fund pres-
ence and the initial buyout premium would be expected regardless of whether hedge
funds use their voting rights to hold out the transaction. I refer to this hypothesis as
the information hypothesis.4
The information hypothesis suggests a potential endogeneity issue for the esti-
mation. That is, hedge funds may choose to invest in stocks that have a high premium
in the event of an LBO. This will result in a reverse causality from the premium to
hedge fund presence. I use an instrumental variable approach to address this poten-
tial endogeneity effect. The instrument for the presence of hedge funds is geographic
intensity of hedge fund assets, dened as the ratio of assets under management by
hedge funds in a state to total market capitalization of listed rms in the state. This
instrument is similar in spirit to Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2008).5 I nd
that the above relationship between hedge fund presence and the initial buyout pre-
mium persists even after controlling for the endogeneity of hedge fund presence.
3 Acharya and Johnson (2007) nd evidence of insider trading before buyout announcements.
4 It should be noted that the information hypothesis suggests that hedge funds are informed about
the LBO and they do not exert an active inuence on the premium. This paper does not attempt to test
a general version of the information hypothesis that hedge funds have information regarding the LBO.
5 They use the ratio of the number of high net worth individuals in a state to the number of public
rms in the state to instrument the presence of outside blockholdings by individual shareholders.
5This nding suggests that the effect of hedge funds is not driven by hedge funds
self-selecting into high-premium LBOs.
I perform three additional tests to increase condence in the active shareholder
hypothesis. First, I show that the above relationship between hedge fund presence
and the initial buyout premium holds only for hedge funds that are likely to actively
confront rm managers as identied by 13D lings, and hedge funds with a long
investment horizon. These ndings are consistent with the active shareholder hy-
pothesis, because active hedge funds and long-term hedge funds are more likely to
hold out a transaction and therefore have more bargaining power vis-à-vis the bid-
der than do their counterparts. Second, I nd that this relationship is stronger in
management-led LBOs than in third-party LBOs. Since LBOs with management
participation presumably have a greater potential for manager-shareholder conicts
than do third-party LBOs, this evidence is again consistent with the active share-
holder hypothesis. Third, using a subsample of LBO targets in which a hedge fund
acquires a 5% block before the announcement of a buyout offer, I nd that target
shareholders realize higher returns in targets for which the hedge fund indicates an
activist agenda than those with a passive blockholding by the hedge fund. The re-
turn difference is about 16 percentage points in the 13-month period around an LBO
announcement. These results reinforce the hypothesis that hedge funds use their vot-
6ing power to enhance target shareholder gains in LBOs. The information hypothesis,
however, cannot fully explain these results.6
I also compare the trading behavior of hedge funds with that of mutual funds
and public pension funds around LBO offers. I nd that while hedge funds signif-
icantly increase their holdings after the announcement of a buyout offer, traditional
institutions signicantly decrease their stakes after the announcement. Thus, hedge
funds seem to be more actively involved with the buyout target and hence more likely
to affect the voting outcome of a deal than do mutual funds and public pension funds.
This nding echoes the aforementioned result that hedge funds have an effect on the
premium whereas traditional institutions do not.
Since hedge funds actively push for a high premium in LBOs, one may wonder
whether their presence deters potential private equity bidders. To address this con-
cern, I form a matching sample of non-LBO rms using the propensity score match-
ing method. I nd that LBO rms have a greater presence of hedge funds before the
announcement than do non-LBO rms. This evidence is consistent with Greenwood
and Schor (2008) that hedge funds put rms into play. It is also consistent with a
competitive market for private equity where private equity rms (as acquirers) and
hedge funds (as minority shareholders) compete for LBO targets.
6 It should be noted that the results do not necessarily contradict the notion that hedge funds may
have an information advantage in evaluating LBO offers. Instead, the additional evidence suggests
that the positive relationship between hedge fund presence and LBO premium is unlikely to be driven
by hedge funds passively speculating on LBOs.
7A related question is whether hedge fund presence foils an LBO attempt con-
ditional on receiving an offer. I nd that hedge fund presence in general does not
affect the likelihood of deal completion, although there is weak evidence that the
presence of active hedge funds is negatively associated with the probability of deal
consummation. Nevertheless, for failed LBOs, targets with greater hedge fund pres-
ence are associated with a higher abnormal return around withdrawal announcement
and a higher probability of being acquired subsequently. Thus, hedge funds seem to
play a strategic role by attracting LBO bids and ensuring a fair valuation.
While hedge funds seem to provide a public good that benets target sharehold-
ers in LBOs, a natural question to ask is: does such activism deliver abnormal returns
for hedge funds to overcome the free-rider problem? Since hedge funds have to ex-
pend costly efforts in their activism, such as identifying potential LBO targets, partic-
ipating in buyout negotiations, evaluating the offer, and so on, the returns to activism
must be sufcient to cover the cost of undertaking activism efforts. To address this
question, I construct a sample of potential LBO target stocks. I use a calendar-time
portfolio regression approach to examine the protability of hedge funds' investment
in these potential LBO candidates. I show that the stocks that hedge fund managers
buy signicantly outperform those that they sell in the subsequent six months, partic-
ularly during the post-1999 LBO boom. For example, an investment strategy based
on hedge fund trading in these potential LBO target stocks delivered an abnormal
8return, in excess of FamaFrenchCarhart four-factor model, of 17:4% per annum
during 19992006.
These ndings seem to echo anecdotal evidence that hedge funds play an active
and strategic role in LBOs. For example, an article in Institutional Investor (Alpha
Maelstrom, June 2006) comments that [i]ncreasingly ... active hedge funds are ob-
structing this stream of [buyout] deals ... [and] [m]ore often than not the outcome of
such episodes favors public market shareholders. In the attempted buyout of Titan
International by private equity rm One Equity Partners, hedge fund JANA Partners
increased its holdings of Titan from 5% before the announcement to 15% afterwards
and forced the bidder to withdraw its offer. The hedge fund's move to block the deal
seemed a wise one, particularly since the market price of Titan stock two years after
the offer was 50% higher than the offer price. Another example of confrontation be-
tween hedge funds and private equity bidders is the buyout of ShopKo Stores. Elliot
Associates, a hedge fund that held 8% of the buyout target, actively opposed the pro-
posed buyout from Goldner Hawn Johnson &Morrison. Elliot invited another private
equity rm, Sun Capital, to make a rival bid. A bidding contest ensued, and Sun Cap-
ital wound up acquiring the target with a much higher price. As a result, compared
to the initial bid, the closing offer increased the wealth of ShopKo shareholders by
20:8%, or $147:6 million.
9This paper is related to two strands of empirical literature, with the rst one be-
ing the literature on hedge fund activism.7 Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2006)
nd large positive abnormal returns when hedge funds rst disclose holdings larger
than 5% in their 13D lings. Greenwood and Schor (2007) show that these returns
largely come from the subset of events in which the activist ex post successfully
forces target rms into a takeover. In addition, Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi
(2008), in a case study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, show that the fund executes
shareholder activism primarily through private engagements. This paper extends pre-
vious research in two ways: (1) I nd evidence suggesting a causal link between
hedge fund activism and shareholder wealth gains in takeovers; (2) by using 13F
data and manually identifying hedge fund managers, I track the trading behavior of
hedge funds around takeover offers and relate it to target shareholder gains.
This paper also connects to the literature on the role of institutional investors
in takeovers, such as Stulz, Walkling, and Song (1990), Gaspar, Massa, and Matos
(2005), Hsieh and Walkling (2005), Larcker and Lys (1987), and Peck (1996). This
stream of literature, however, has not examined the role of hedge funds in takeovers
(including LBOs). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper to investigate
the role of hedge funds in takeovers.
7 More broadly, this paper is related to the literature on shareholder activism. See Karpoff (2001)
and Gillan and Starks (2007) for excellent surveys of this literature.
10
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1:2 discusses the
active shareholder hypothesis. Section 1:3 describes the data and summary statistics.
Section 1:4 presents empirical results and Section 1:5 concludes.
1.2 Main Hypotheses
The hypotheses I test in this paper arise from the active shareholder theory proposed
by Gomes (2001). Since the consummation of a takeover typically requires a certain
percentage of target shareholders to vote in favor of the transaction (in mergers) or to
tender their shares (in tender offers), shareholders with signicant equity stakes in the
target rm can have an effect on takeover premium. In Gomes (2001), a freeze-out
tender offer is modeled as a bargaining game between the bidder and active share-
holders. Active shareholders can accumulate blocks of target shares both before and
after the announcement of an offer, which empowers them to hold out a transaction.
In equilibrium, there is a positive relationship between the presence of active share-
holders before the offer and the initial takeover premium. Intuitively, the greater the
equity stake active shareholders hold, the greater their hold-out power will be. As a
result, the bidder has to make a high preemptive bid.
The active shareholder theory by Gomes (2001) also points out that the above
relationship should be stronger for targets with less liquid stocks. The intuition is
that active shareholders can accumulate blocks of target shares both before the an-
nouncement and after the announcement. In equilibrium, takeover premium is deter-
11
mined by the hold-out power of active shareholders, which comes from two sources:
the blocks that active shareholders hold before the announcement and the additional
blocks that active shareholders are expected to accumulate after the announcement.
For liquid targets, the preannouncement holdings by active shareholders are less im-
portant, because active shareholders can acquire more shares after the announcement
to enhance their bargaining power. In contrast, for targets with less liquid stocks, ac-
tive shareholders are less able to accumulate more shares after the announcement,
and thus less likely to enhance their hold-out power.8 As a consequence, the prean-
nouncement presence of active shareholders plays a greater role in determining the
equilibrium premium for less liquid targets.
The third prediction of the active shareholder theory of Gomes is that, in the
out-of-equilibrium event where the bidder makes a low initial bid, active shareholders
can improve target shareholder gains through postannouncement trading. In such
cases, active shareholders could enter after the announcement and accumulate more
shares to enhance their hold-out power, which could force the bidder to increase the
bid.
When applied to the role of hedge funds in LBOs, the active shareholder hy-
pothesis has the following predictions:
H1: The initial buyout premium is increasing in the preannouncement presence
of hedge funds.
8 Using the LBO sample, I nd evidence consistent with this notion. Specically, hedge fund net
buying during the announcement quarter is negatively related to stock liquidity. The results, not
reported, are available upon request.
12
H2: The above relationship between initial premium and hedge fund presence
is stronger for targets with less liquid stocks.
H3: For offers with a low initial premium, net buying by hedge funds during
the offer increases the probability and magnitude of a bid increase.
The active shareholder hypothesis also implies that there should be cross-funds
and cross-deal variations in the relationship between the presence of hedge funds and
the initial buyout premium. In particular, since hedge funds that are more confronta-
tional or of longer investment horizons are more likely to hold out a transaction, the
active shareholder hypothesis predicts that the effect of hedge fund presence on the
premium should come mainly from these two types of funds. Further, when incum-
bent managers participate in the transaction as the buyer or a part of the buyers group,
there is an inherent conict of interest between target managers and target sharehold-
ers since managers play the dual role of purchaser of the public shares and agent for
selling public shareholders. To the extent that LBO deals with management partici-
pation have a greater potential for manager-shareholder conicts than do third-party
LBOs, the active shareholder hypothesis predicts that this effect should be stronger in
management-led LBOs than in third-party LBOs. Intuitively, hedge funds are more
likely to play an active monitoring role when the potential for managerial self-dealing
is higher.
13
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
Data on stock holdings of hedge fund managers are retrieved from Thomson Finan-
cial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) Holdings Database. Although they are largely
unregulated, hedge funds managing over $100 million of 13F securities are required
to le 13F forms quarterly for all U.S. equity positions worth over $200; 000 or con-
sisting of more than 10; 000 shares.
Since the 13F database does not identify hedge fund managers, I manually con-
struct a list of hedge fund managers with Thomson Financial identiers (MGRNO). I
rst identify candidate hedge fund managers from 20022007 issues of Institutional
Investor magazine's annual Hedge Fund 100 list and match each candidate hedge
fund manager by name in the 13F database. This list is then supplemented by a list
of large fund managers from 13F. Since hedge fund managers are likely classied
into two types: independent investment advisor (type 4) and all others (type 5), I pick
fund managers in the two categories with dollar value of equity portfolio exceeding
$1 billion (in 2007 dollars) in any of the years from 1990 to 2007. This procedure
produces a list of 1641 fund managers. Following Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), I
identify a manager as a hedge fund manager if either of the following two conditions
is satised. First, the fund manager is not registered as an investment advisor with the
SEC, and the company website or web-based searches suggest that the manager is a
hedge fund. Second, if the manager is registered, I require that Form ADV show that
at least 50% of its clients are other pooled investment vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)
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or high net worth individuals, and it charges performance-based fees. There are 356
hedge fund managers in the sample. The hedge fund holdings database employed in
this paper is very similar to that in Grifn and Xu (2007), which is by far the most
comprehensive dataset on hedge fund holdings.
One limitation of the hedge fund data is that CDA/Spectrum only provides in-
formation on long equity positions of institutions. Thus, this paper does not consider
bond positions and more exible investment strategies by hedge funds such as deriv-
atives and short selling. Despite this, bonds and derivatives strategies do not seem to
be able to provide a complete explanation to the results.9
I retrieve LBOs announced during 1990 to 2007 from Securities Data Com-
pany's (SDC) Merger and Acquisition Database. I require that the target rm is
listed in NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ; that the target's CUSIP can be matched with
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) data; that deal value exceeds $10
million; that the acquirer do not include operating rms; and that the outcome of the
LBO is known (either completed or withdrawn). The nal sample consists of 237
LBO deals.
9 If hedge funds hold both bond and equity positions in the target before announcement, their incen-
tive might differ from that of equity-only shareholders. Hedge funds with a long position in pre-buyout
bonds are likely to obstruct the proposed LBO and vice versa, since LBOs typically result in value
losses for debtholders. Another concern is that hedge funds may use derivative and short positions to
decouple economic ownership and voting rights and engage in empty voting (Hu and Black, 2007).
Since the target typically experiences large positive return around the announcement, put/short posi-
tions in the target share would reduce the incentive of hedge funds to play an active role by pushing
up LBO premiums.
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Figure1: Timeline depiction of empirical analysis for LBOs and hedge fund
holdings
I calculate hedge fund ownership (HFO) for a specic stock in a given quarter
by summing the reported holdings of the sample hedge funds and dividing by the to-
tal shares outstanding for the rm. If a stock is not held by any reporting hedge fund,
then I set HFO to zero. The change in hedge fund holdings, or net buying by hedge
funds, is computed as the change in the fraction of shares held. The timing of activi-
ties is illustrated in Figure 1. Quarter t is the quarter in which the buyout transaction
is announced. I compute the change in hedge fund holdings for three windows, which
are one year prior to buyout announcements, two quarters prior to buyout announce-
ments, and the announcement quarter. For example, hedge fund trading during the
announcement quarter (HFOt 1!t) is calculated as the difference between hedge
fund holdings at quarter t  1 (HFOt 1) and those at quarter t (HFOt).
To compare hedge funds with traditional institutions, I construct ownership by
public pension funds and mutual funds in a similar fashion. I obtain a list of public
pension funds members of the Council of Institutional Investors and search for the
names in CDA/Spectrum. I was able to identify 15 public pension funds. I use 13F
database to construct ownership by mutual funds.
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I retrieve security characteristics, such as stock returns, price, and industry
classication, for the sample LBO target rms from the CRSP stock le. I obtain
accounting information from the Compustat le. The premium is calculated as the
initial offer price divided by the target's closing price 20 trading days prior to the
announcement date minus one. Cumulative abnormal announcement return is the
cumulative CAPM-adjusted return over the three-day window around the announce-
ment date.10 Following Lehn and Poulsen (1989), I construct some measures that are
related to the buyout premium and the likelihood of a rm going private. These mea-
sures include excess cash ow divided bymarket equity (ExcessCashF low=Equity),
tax liability relative to equity (Taxes=Equity), and sales growth during the two years
immediately preceding the announcement.
Table 1 reports the distribution of LBOs by year. The LBO wave of the late
1990s is evident, and there is a trend of increasing deal size over time.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Summary statistics for the sample LBOs are presented in Table 2. I winsorize
all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the inuence of extreme obser-
vations. Deal value has a mean of $933:49 million and a median of $222:78 million,
suggesting a highly skewed distribution. The average premium is 29:86% and the
three-day announcement return is 20:97%. These numbers are comparable to the ex-
10 I estimate CAPM betas using stock returns from day  379 to day  127 relative to the announce-
ment day as in Schwert (1996).
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isting literature.11 LBO targets tend to be poorly performing rms, as evidenced by
the fact that target stocks underperform the market by 5:34% during the one-year pe-
riod before announcement. Target managers participate in 48:52% of the transactions
as buyers.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
1.4 Empirical Results
This section presents empirical results. Section 1:4:1 compares the trading behavior
of hedge funds and traditional institutional investors around buyout announcements.
Section 1:4:2 presents results on the active shareholder hypothesis. Section 1:4:3
conducts a series of additional tests to increase condence in the active shareholder
hypothesis. Section 1:4:4 examines whether the presence of hedge funds deters or
foils an LBO. Section 1:4:5 investigates whether the strategy of investing in potential
LBO candidates delivers abnormal returns for hedge funds.
1.4.1 Trading Behavior of Hedge Funds and Traditional
Institutions around Buyout Announcements
As the rst step of my empirical work, I characterize the trading behavior of hedge
funds around LBO offers and compare it with traditional institutions. Table 3 shows
that the average hedge fund ownership at the time of announcement is 4:88%. Hedge
11 See, for example, Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2007) and Guo, Hotchkiss, and
Song (2007).
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funds increase their holdings signicantly over the one-year period before the an-
nouncement by 0:97 percentage points, which represents an increase of 25% from
their holdings at the start of the one-year period (from 3:91% to 4:88%). Further-
more, the increase in hedge fund ownership seems spread evenly across the rst and
second half of the preannouncement one-year period (0:43% in quarter t  5 to t  3
versus 0:54% in quarter t   3 to t   1). In contrast to hedge funds, mutual funds
signicantly decrease their holdings and public pension funds do not change their
positions during this pre-bid period.
There is a substantial difference between the trading behavior of hedge funds
and that of traditional institutions after the announcement (from quarter t   1 to
t). While hedge funds signicantly increase their holdings after the announcement,
mutual funds and public pension funds are signicant net sellers of target shares. For
example, the average net buying by hedge funds during the announcement quarter
is 2:02% of the outstanding shares of the target, whereas that by mutual funds and
public pension funds is  2:15% and  0:07%, respectively. Interestingly, non-hedge
fund institutional blockholders signicantly decrease their holdings as well by almost
4%. Rather than holding out until the resolution of a deal to receive the full benet,
traditional institutions choose to exit after the announcement possibly because of the
concern that the deal may fail.12 This nding parallels that in Parrino, Sias, and Starks
12 As Table 2 shows, there is a 29% chance that a buyout deal will fail.
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(2003) that institutions tend to vote with their feet by selling rather than exert costly
monitoring efforts.
Overall, the differences in trading patterns of hedge funds and traditional insti-
tutional investors suggest that hedge funds are more actively involved with the LBO
targets than are traditional institutions. Thus, private equity bidders should take into
account the presence of hedge funds when making a bid, because hedge funds are
more likely to stay to inuence the outcome of the transaction.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
1.4.2 Results on Active Shareholder Hypothesis
Preannouncement Hedge Fund Presence and Initial Buyout Premium
The active shareholder hypothesis predicts that the initial buyout premium
is increasing in the preannouncement presence of hedge funds. I use four mea-
sures to proxy for preannouncement hedge fund presence: (1) hedge fund owner-
ship at the quarter-end immediately before buyout announcement (HFOt 1), (2)
change in hedge fund ownership during the two quarters before the announcement
(HFOt 3!t 1), (3) a Herndahl index of hedge fund ownership concentration at
quarter t   1,13 and (4) the number of hedge funds holding a 5% block in the target
at quarter t  1.
13 I calculate the Herndahl index of hedge fund ownership as the sum of the squares of the propor-
tion of shares outstanding held by each hedge fund. This is similar to Hartzell and Starks (2003).
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Figure 2 plots the average cumulative abnormal return by preannouncement
hedge fund presence from 20 days before buyout announcement to 20 days after-
wards. I partition the sample LBOs into two groups based on the median ofHFOt 1.14
The average abnormal return during the [ 20; 20] window is 27:0% for targets with
high HFOt 1 and 18:9% for those with low HFOt 1. The difference between the
returns of the two groups is both economically and statistically signicant (p-value
= 0:047). The results for HFOt 3!t 1 are similar. This evidence suggests that
hedge fund presence is associated with enhanced target shareholder wealth in LBOs
(H1).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
I also run OLS multivariate regressions to examine the relationship between
preannouncement hedge fund presence and the initial buyout premium. Specically,
I estimate the following model:
Premiumj = 0 + 1HFOj + 2MFOj + 3PPFOj +
P
i=4;k
iXi;j + "j (1.1)
where HFO, MFO, and PPFO are the fraction of target shares held by hedge
funds, mutual funds, and public pension funds, respectively. I consider two groups
of control variables. The choice of the rst group is based on the LBO literature that
rms having excess cash ows, high tax liabilities, and low growth prospects are as-
14 Since hedge fund ownership varies across year, industry, and other stock characteristics, I use a
measure of adjusted hedge fund ownership in this test. Specically, I adapt a regression model of
Gompers and Metrick (2001) from the mutual fund literature. The adjusted HFO is obtained as the
residual from a regression of the rawHFO on year and industry dummies, and several stock-specic
characteristics such as market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, lag return, price, turnover, and
stock volatility.
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sociated with high buyout premiums. It is possible that hedge fund managers use such
information to identify potential buyout targets and increase their holdings in these
rms prior to an announcement. I also include deal characteristics, such as whether
the deal has management participation, or has prior news announcements.15 The sec-
ond group of variables is used to control for the effect of target shareholder attributes
on takeover premiums. I choose the following variables: shareholder turnover, and
industry exposure of hedge funds. Following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005), I
measure shareholder turnover of a target rm as the weighted average of the total
portfolio turnover rates of its institutional shareholders over four quarters prior to the
announcement quarter. To control for the possibility that hedge funds have an infor-
mation advantage for some particular industries, I follow Gaspar, Massa, and Matos
(2005) by including industry exposure of hedge funds, measured as the average per-
centage of hedge fund shareholders' portfolios that are invested in the industry the
target rm belongs to.16 I also include rm size and past return as controls, since the
pool of LBO target rms is tilted towards larger and better-performing rms in recent
years.
Panel A of Table 4 shows the results for the baseline multivariate regressions
where the dependent variable is the initial buyout premium. The coefcients for
15 I search Factiva for news stories indicating that the rm sought a buyer, was in merger talks, or
received a takeover proposal in the year prior to the buyout announcement. There are prior news
announcements in 18:6% of the deals.
16 As suggested by Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005), the measure is meant to capture the informa-
tional effect of shareholders, because an investor who is heavily invested in an industry is likely to
have an information advantage for that industry.
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HFOt 1, Herfindahl(HFO)t 1, and # of Blockholderst 1 are signicant and
positive, suggesting that hedge fund presence in the target rm before the announce-
ment enhances target shareholder wealth (H1). To get some sense of economic sig-
nicance, note that one standard deviation of HFOt 1 is 6:79%. Thus, a one stan-
dard deviation increase inHFOt 1 is associated with an increase of 3:62 percentage
points in the initial premium. Given that the average market capitalization of the sam-
ple rms is $670:8 million, this translates to a dollar gain of $24:28 million per deal
for target shareholders. Similarly, the initial premium increases by 10:5 percentage
points for each unit increase in the number of hedge fund blockholders.
In contrast to the ndings on hedge funds, the coefcients on PPFOt 1 and
MFOt 1 are negative and insignicant.17 This result seems reasonable given the
previous result that public pension funds and mutual funds tend to sell their shares
after the announcement of an offer. Since these traditional institutions seem less
likely to inuence the outcome of the deal, it is not surprising that they do not have
a signicant effect on the premium paid by private equity bidders. Ofcer, Ozbas,
and Sensoy (2008) show that, in a sample of LBOs sponsored by two or more private
equity rms, institutional ownership is associated with higher premiums. My ndings
suggest that their result might be driven mainly by hedge funds.
Panel A of Table 4 also reveals a number of other interesting ndings. Share-
holders receive 46% less in premium, although not statistically signicant, when
17 For robustness, I use the change in public pension fund ownership (PPFOt 3!t 1) and that in
mutual fund ownership (MFOt 3!t 1) before announcement to proxy for their preannouncement
presence. The results, not reported, are qualitatively similar.
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target managers are part of the buyer's group. The initial premium for target rms
with prior news announcements is about 22% lower, suggesting that the stock price
has already incorporated the possibility of a buyout offer before the announcement.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Controlling for Endogeneity
Endogeneity is a potential issue in the estimations. That is, hedge funds may
choose to invest in stocks that have a high premium in the event of an LBO (the
information hypothesis), thus resulting in a reverse causality from the premium to
hedge fund presence. To address this potential endogeneity effect, I use an instru-
mental variable approach in which I run a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis.
The instrument for the presence of hedge funds is geographic intensity of hedge fund
assets, dened as the ratio of assets under management by hedge funds in a state
to total market capitalization of listed rms in the state. This instrument is inspired
by Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2008). They use the ratio of the number of
high net worth individuals in a state to the number of listed rms in the state as an
instrument for the presence of outside blockholdings by individual shareholders. In
the institutional investor context, a large body of empirical research has shown that
institutions (including hedge funds) tend to invest disproportionately more in local
rms because of lower monitoring and information acquisition costs.18 Thus, this ge-
18 For example, Teo (2009) nd that hedge funds investing in local rms outperform those that invest
in distant rms.
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ographic intensity variable is likely to be correlated with the presence of hedge funds
(the validity condition). On the other hand, it seems reasonable that this state-level in-
tensity variable does not affect LBO premiums other than through its effect on hedge
fund presence (the exclusion condition).
Accordingly, in the rst stage, I regress hedge fund ownership on geographic
intensity and other exogenous variables. In the second stage, I run a regression of the
initial premium on the tted values from the rst stage regression as the instrument
for hedge fund presence. Specically, I estimate the following 2SLS model:
First Stage: HFOj = 0 + 1Geographic Intensity +
P
i=2;k
iXi;j + j (2a)
Second Stage: Premiumj = 0 + 1\HFOj +
P
i=2;k
iXi;j + j (2b)
Table 5 report the results from the 2SLS model. Column 1 and 2 of Table 5
reports the results of the rst-stage regression with the dependent variable being the
preannouncement holdings by hedge funds (HFOt 1) and the number of hedge fund
blockholders (# of Hedge Fund Blockholderst 1), respectively. Consistent with
economic intuition, the coefcient estimates of geographic intensity of hedge fund
assets are positive and signicant.19
Column 3 and 4 of Table 5 report the second-stage results with the initial buyout
premium as the dependent variable. Interestingly, the hedge fund presence measures
remains signicant (at the 5% level) with a coefcient larger than the OLS results
19 A one standard deviation increase in the geographic measure is associated with an increase of
0:85% in the holdings by hedge funds. Given that the average ownership by hedge funds is 4:88%,
this increase is economically signicant as well.
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in Panel A of Table 4. The economic signicance becomes larger as well: a one
stardard increase in the instrumented HFOt 1 is associated with an increase of 7:19
percentage points in the initial premium. This OLS bias towards zero could be due to
attenuation bias as a result of measurement error. Overall, the IV regression results
suggest that the effect of hedge funds on the premium is not driven by hedge funds
self-selecting into high premium rms.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
1.4.3 The Effect of Stock Liquidity
The active shareholder hypothesis suggests that the positive relationship between pre-
announcement hedge fund presence and initial buyout premium should be stronger
for rms with less liquid stocks. To examine this liquidity effect, I include a liquidity
measure and an interaction term combining the liquidity measure and preannounce-
ment hedge fund presence in the multivariate regressions. I use Amihud (2002) illiq-
uidity ratio as a liquidity proxy. For each target rm, the illiquidity ratio is measured
as the three-month average of the monthly Amihud illiquidity measure over the quar-
ter preceding the announcement.20
20 One may wonder whether target stock liquidity changes after an LBO announcement and, if so,
how it affects the results. To address this concern, I also calculate Amihud illiquidity ratio over
the announcement quarter. The ratio is strongly persistent in the sample. For example, the Amihud
illiquidity ratio measured in quarter t  1 has a cross-sectional correlation of 0:77 with that in quarter
t (the announcement quarter). The regression results are qualitatively unchanged if I use the latter
measure.
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Panel B of Table 4 shows that the coefcients of the interaction terms are pos-
itive and highly signicant. The economic magnitude is substantial as well. For
example, a one standard deviation increase in HFOt 1, combined with a one stan-
dard deviation increase in stock illiquidity, is associated with an increase of 10:7
percentage points in the premium. The evidence is consistent with the prediction
of the active shareholder hypothesis that preannouncement hedge fund presence is a
stronger determinant of the premium when the stock is less liquid (H2).
Hedge Fund Trading During the Offer and Bid Revisions
The active shareholder hypothesis also predicts that hedge funds increase their
holdings in LBOs with a low initial bid during the offer and force the bidder to
increase the premium. For this test, I restrict the sample to LBO deals with the
announcement date and the effective/withdrawal date not in the same quarter. Since
hedge fund holdings data are available on a quarterly basis, this requirement ensures
that the trading activity of hedge funds during the announcement quarter precedes
bid revisions and deal completion/termination.21 Twenty-four buyout transactions
are excluded from the sample because the announcement date and the resolution date
are in the same quarter.
21 SDC does not provide the date of bid revisions, thus I assume that bid revisions are close to deal
completion or cancellation.
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Table 6 reports regression results on bid revisions.22 The dependent variable
in Model 1 is a binary variable that equals 1 if the initial buyout premium is revised
upward (closing bid > opening bid) and 0 otherwise.23 In addition to the controls
in previous specications, I also include initial premium, hedge fund trading during
the announcement quarter, an interaction term combining initial premium and hedge
fund trading, and spread. Spread is calculated as (initial offer price  Pt)=Pt, where
Pt is the target rm's stock price on the last day of the announcement quarter. To
the extent that the spread captures the market-assessed probability of bid revisions,
controlling for the spread would rule out the possibility that hedge funds simply use
market information to bet on an increase in the bid. Model 2 uses the same set of
independent variables to predict the magnitude of bid revision for the subsample that
the bid is revised.
The results show that the coefcient estimates of the interaction terms in the
two models are negative, suggesting that for low-premium offers, the increase in
hedge fund holdings of the target shares during the offer is associated with a greater
likelihood and a larger magnitude of an upward revision in the bid (H3). The coef-
cient estimate of the interaction term in Model 2 is insignicant, possibly because
of a small sample size.24 The evidence is consistent with the prediction that hedge
22 For the regressions on bid revisions (Table 7) and deal completion (Table 9), I do not include
industry xed effects. One-third of the observations will be dropped if I include industry xed effects,
because some industry dummies perfectly predict outcomes. Nevertheless, the results are qualitatively
unchanged if I include industry xed effects.
23 The unconditional probability of bid revision is 23:5% (17:3% upward revision and 6:2% down-
ward revision).
24 Only 47 LBO deals receive a revision in the bid.
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funds demand higher premiums by actively increasing their stakes in offers with a
low initial premium.
An alternative explanation is that hedge fund trading is positively correlated
with the emergence of competing bidders, which in turn forces the initial bidder to
revise the bid upward. To test this possibility, I re-run the tests using the subsample
of LBOs that have only one bidder. The results, reported in the last two columns
of Table 6, show that the coefcients of the interaction terms remain negative and
signicant. Thus, the results do not seem to be driven by bidder competition.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Robustness Checks
In this section, I perform various robustness checks on the results. In particu-
lar, I examine whether the results are robust to the inclusion of controls such as board
characteristics, outside blockholders, and acquirer xed effects. I focus on the results
on the prediction that the initial buyout premium is increasing in the preannounce-
ment presence of hedge funds (H1). The results on the other two predictions (H2 and
H3), not reported, are qualitatively unchanged.
Board Characteristics
Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) and Moeller (2004) nd evidence that
takeover premiums are higher for targets with more effective boards and greater
shareholder control (for example, larger holdings by outside blockholders). If hedge
funds tend to invest in better governed rms, or to pressure rms to institute better
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governance, one would expect a positive relationship between hedge fund presence
and buyout premiums. To test this possibility, I collect target board characteristics
from RiskMetrics25 and by manually searching SEC lings. In particular, I consider
three board characteristics: board independence (the fraction of independent outside
directors on the board), board size, and CEO-chairman duality. I use the holdings by
non-hedge fund blockholders to proxy for the presence of outside blockholders.
The rst two columns in Table 7 report the results when the board charac-
teristics and outside blockholdings are included as controls.26 The effect of board
independence on initial premium is positive but insignicant. Smaller boards seem
to be associated with higher premiums. Non-hedge fund blockholders do not affect
the premium. Most importantly, the coefcient of HFO remain positive and signi-
cant, suggesting that hedge fund presence enhances shareholder gains directly, rather
than indirectly through the board or other outside blockholders.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Acquirer Fix Effects
A potential concern is that the results are driven by some private equity buyers
that are attracted to targets with hedge fund presence and able to pay a high premium.
To test this possibility, I control for acquirer x effects. There are 119 distinct acquir-
25 RiskMetrics was previously known as IRRC.
26 To conserve space, I only report the robustness check results for which HFOt 1 is used as the
hedge fund presence measure. The results for the other three measures are qualitatively similar to
those reported in Panel A of Table 4.
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ers in the sample. The results, reported in the third column in Table 7, show that the
coefcient of HFO remains positive and is 10% signicant.
Alternative Measures of Shareholder Gains
In most of the tests, I measure premium as the percentage difference between
the offer price and the market closing price 20 days prior to the announcement. For
robustness, I use two alternative measures of shareholder gains: the premium mea-
sure in Schwert (1996) and cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CARs). The
results, reported in the last two columns of Table 7, are qualitatively unchanged.
1.4.4 Additional Tests on the Effect of Hedge Funds
In this section, I conduct several additional tests to increase condence in the infer-
ence of the results. Specically, I examine whether there is cross-fund and cross-deal
heterogeneity regarding the effect of hedge funds on the premium. I then turn to a
subsample of LBOs in which hedge funds acquire a 5% block and examine whether
shareholder gains differ between targets with and without activist intentions.
Disaggregating Hedge Fund Ownership
The active shareholder hypothesis indicates that the effect of hedge funds on the
premium should come mainly from active hedge funds and long-term hedge funds,
because these two types of funds are more likely to hold out a transaction.
I classify hedge funds into an active and a passive group based on their po-
tential to confront rm managers. A hedge fund is identied as an activist if it les
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a Schedule 13D (on any rm) at least once during the 5-year period before the of-
fer and a passivist otherwise.27 13D lings are commonly used in the shareholder
activism literature as activism events (see, for example, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and
Thomas, 2008). Investors, who acquire benecial ownership of more than 5% of a
class of equity securities and have specic plans or intentions to inuence the rm,
must le a Schedule 13D with the SEC. By manually tracking 13D lings by hedge
funds through the SEC's Edgar database, I disaggregate hedge fund ownership into
ownership by active hedge funds (ActiveHFO) and that by passive hedge funds
(PassiveHFO). One hundred and forty-two (or 42:9% of the sample) hedge funds
have led 13D at least once during the sample period. In the LBO sample, 73:0%
of the deals have at least one activist shareholder before announcement. Thus, active
hedge funds seem to participate disproportionately more frequently in LBO deals.
To identify hedge funds of different investment horizons, I calculate, for each
hedge fund in each deal, a measure of portfolio turnover rate following Gaspar,
Massa, and Matos (2005).28 I classify hedge funds with a below-median portfolio
turnover rate as long-term hedge funds and vice versa for short-term funds. Similar to
the decomposition of hedge funds into active and passive components, I decompose
27 As will be discussed in Section 4:3:3, I also examine the subsample of LBOs that hedge funds le
a 13D or 13G on the target.
28 The median portfolio turnover rate for the sample hedge funds is 0:55. Thus, the median hedge
fund holds an average stock in his portfolio for a period of around 11 months. To put this number in
perspective, the investment horizon for the median 13F institution is about 15months (Gaspar, Massa,
and Matos, 2005).
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hedge fund ownership into ownership by long-term hedge funds (LongTermHFO)
and that by short-term hedge funds (ShortTermHFO).
I replaceHFOt 1 in Equation (1) by its two components, ActiveHFOt 1 and
PassiveHFOt 1, and LongTermHFOt 1 and ShortTermHFOt 1. The results,
reported in Panel C of Table 4, show that the effect of hedge fund presence on the
initial premium is explained by active hedge funds and by long-term hedge funds.
These ndings are consistent with the implications of the active shareholder hypoth-
esis that active hedge funds and long-term hedge funds have signicant bargaining
power vis-à-vis private equity bidders.
Management-led LBOs versus Third-party LBOs
The active shareholder hypothesis implies that hedge funds are more likely
to play an active role in management-led LBOs than in third-party LBOs since the
potential for manager-shareholder conicts is higher in LBOs with management par-
ticipation. I run multivariate regressions to test this prediction. I include interaction
terms combining the dummy for management participation with the hedge fund pres-
ence variables.
The results, reported in Panel D of Table 4, show that the coefcients for the
interaction terms are positive and generally signicant, suggesting that hedge funds
play a greater role in inuencing the premium in management-led LBOs than in
third-party LBOs. This evidence strengthens the hypothesis that hedge funds are
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more likely to play an active monitoring role when there is a greater potential for
conicts of interest between managers and shareholders.
Hedge Fund Blockholding Sample
In this section, I focus on LBO targets in which hedge funds acquire a 5%
block during the one-year period before the announcement and examine whether
shareholder wealth gains differ between targets that hedge funds indicate an activist
intention and those that they do not. I refer to this subsample as the hedge fund
blockholding sample. Since institutions which acquire a 5% block in a rm must
le either a 13D form, if they have an activist agenda, or a 13G form, if otherwise,29
this sample provides an interesting setting to examine whether active hedge funds,
through their blockholdings, create more shareholder value than do passive hedge
funds, ceteris paribus. Out of the 237 LBOs, 27 have hedge fund block acquisitions
during the one-year interval before the announcement.
I split this blockholding sample into an activist group (13 deals), for which
hedge funds le a 13D, and a passivist group (14 deals), for which hedge funds le
a 13G. I then examine the cumulative abnormal returns of the two groups during the
29 SEC regulation 13D requires that [a]ny person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the
benecial ownership of any equity security of a class, [. . . ] is directly or indirectly the benecial
owner of more than ve percent of the class shall, within 10 days after the acquisition, le with the
Commission, a statement containing the information required by Schedule 13D (§240.13d101). On
the other hand, SEC regulation 13G requires that [a] person who would otherwise be obligated [. . . ]
to le a statement on Schedule 13D (§240.13d101) may, in lieu thereof, le with the Commission,
within 10 days after an acquisition [. . . ], a short-form statement on Schedule 13G (§240.13d102).
Provided, That the person: (1) Has not acquired the securities with any purpose, or with the effect
of, changing or inuencing the control of the issuer, or in connection with or as a participant in any
transaction having that purpose or effect [. . . ].
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13-month period around the announcement (from trading day 252 to+21). Figure 3
plots the average cumulative abnormal returns of the two groups around the offer. The
average abnormal return during the [ 252; +21] window is 26:24% for the activist
group and 10:39% for the passivist group. The return difference is mainly driven by
price runup during the pre-bid period. The announcement return, however, is lower
for the activist group. This is not surprising, since the stock price has incorporated the
information that the rm is likely to be acquired due to the presence of active hedge
funds (Greenwood and Schor, 2007). The results on the long term shareholder gains
are again consistent with the active shareholder hypothesis that hedge fund activists
enhance target shareholder gains in LBOs.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
To summarize, the effect of hedge funds on the premium is driven mainly by
active hedge funds and long-term hedge funds, and is stronger in management-led
LBOs than in third-party LBOs. These ndings are consistent with the active share-
holder hypothesis, suggesting that the presence of hedge funds, through their hold-
out power, poses a credible threat to private equity bidders and hence increase share-
holder gains in LBOs.
The information hypothesis, however, cannot fully explain these ndings. In
particular, under the information hypothesis, one would expect the positive relation-
ship to be driven by short-term hedge funds since existing literature has shown that
short-term institutions have better information abilities (see, for example, Yan and
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Zhang, 2009). Moreover, there is no obvious reason why hedge funds would have
more information on management-led buyouts over third-party ones.
1.4.5 Does Hedge Fund Presence Deter or Foil LBO Attempts?
Since hedge funds seem to actively pressure for a high valuation in LBOs, it is inter-
esting to examine whether their presence deters or foils LBO attempts. In this section,
I examine how hedge fund presence affects the likelihood of receiving an LBO offer
and, conditional on the receipt of an LBO offer, the likelihood of deal consumma-
tion. I also examine how hedge fund presence affects withdrawal returns in failed
LBO deals and the subsequent probability of being taken over after the withdrawal
of the initial bid.
The Likelihood of Receiving an LBO Offer
To examine the effect of hedge fund presence on the probability of receiving
an LBO offer, I construct a control sample of non-LBO rms using propensity score
matching. The propensity score matching method can help eliminate the bias due
to selection on observables. I use one-to-many nearest neighbor matching approach.
To estimate a propensity score for each LBO, I estimate a logistic regression for
each rm year, where the dependent variable is an indicator variable which equals
1 for rms that receive an LBO offer in the subsequent year and 0 otherwise. I
exclude rms that receive an inter-rm takeover offer in the two-year period around
announcement. I use the following independent variables: excess cash ow, tax
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liabilities, sales growth, rm size, past abnormal returns, and industry dummies. For
each LBO rm, the n matching rms are the n non-LBO rms in the same year with
the closest propensity scores to the LBO rm.
Table 8 reports the results from nearest neighbor matching with n = 5 and 10.
For all four hedge fund measures, we see that LBO targets consistently have a greater
presence of hedge funds than similar rms that do not receive an LBO offer. For
example, the difference in hedge fund holdings (HFOt 1) is over 1%. This nding
is consistent with the ndings of Greenwood and Schor (2007). They document that
when hedge funds acquire more than 5% of the outstanding shares of a rm, the rm
is more likely to be acquired subsequently than a matched rm without hedge fund
blockholdings.
This result appears counterintuitive, since private equity bidders would prefer
to acquire targets that have little hedge fund presence if hedge funds tend to push
up the premium and make the deal too expensive for bidders. However, this result
is consistent with a competitive market for private equity. Consider the case where
both private equity bidders, as acquirers, and hedge funds, as minority shareholders,
actively search for potential LBO targets. Since a buyout transaction involves more
due diligence and negotiation than acquiring a minority stake in a potential target
rm, it is reasonable that hedge funds could build a position before private equity
bidders strike a deal. Thus, private equity bidders tend to pursue targets that are
already held by hedge funds, despite a potentially high premium. Put differently, if
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hedge funds do not have a stake in a rm, the rm may not be an attractive target for
private equity bidders.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The Probability of Deal Completion
To examine the effect of hedge fund presence on the likelihood of deal comple-
tion, I run probit regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if the offer succeeds
and 0 otherwise. As in Table 6, I require that the announcement date and the effec-
tive/withdrawal date not be in the same quarter and use the same set of control vari-
ables. I use three proxies for the inuence of hedge funds: hedge fund net buying dur-
ing the announcement quarter (HFOt 1!t), hedge fund holdings at the end of the
announcement quarter (HFOt), and a decomposition of HFOt 1!t into net buy-
ing by activists (ActiveHFOt 1!t) and that by passivists (PassiveHFOt 1!t).30
Table 9 presents the results. The coefcients onHFOt 1!t andHFOt are insignif-
icant, which suggests that hedge funds neither hinder nor facilitate the completion of
an LBO.
Interestingly, when I decompose hedge fund net buying into net buying by ac-
tive hedge funds (ActiveHFOt 1!t) and that by passive hedge funds (PassiveHFOt 1!t),
the results show that net buying by activists during the announcement quarter is neg-
atively associated with the probability of deal consummation, at the 10% signicance
level.
30 The denition of active and passive hedge funds follows that in Section 4:3:1.
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[Insert Table 9 about here]
Announcement Returns at Withdrawal and Subsequent Probability of Being
Taken Over
Since there is evidence, albeit weak, that the presence of active hedge funds
is negatively associated with the likelihood of deal completion, one may wonder
whether hedge funds destroy target shareholder wealth by blocking a buyout. To
address this concern, I examine abnormal returns around the announcement of LBO
proposal withdrawals and the probability of being taken over following the failed
LBO attempt.
Figure 4 plots the average cumulative abnormal return by hedge fund trad-
ing during the announcement quarter from 20 days before withdrawal announce-
ment to 20 days afterwards. I partition the withdrawn LBO offers into two groups
based on the median net buying by hedge funds during the announcement quar-
ter (HFOt 1!t). The average abnormal return during the [ 20; 20] window is
 3:46% for targets with highHFOt 1!t and 19:54% for those with lowHFOt 1!t.
Thus, although active hedge funds seem to block LBO attempts, share price does not
drop signicantly for targets with high hedge fund presence. This situation could
arise because the probability of a new bid emerging remains high due to the presence
of hedge funds. I test this possibility by examining the probability of being taken
over in the subsequent two years. I nd that the probability is almost 250% higher
for targets with high HFOt 1!t than for targets with low HFOt 1!t (52:38%
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versus 15%). Thus, hedge funds seem to play a strategic role in cancelled LBOs by
facilitating future takeovers.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
1.4.6 The Protability of Hedge Fund Trading in Potential LBO
Candidates
Since hedge funds perform a valuable function for target shareholders in LBOs, it
is interesting to ask whether their activism efforts deliver abnormal returns. In this
section, I employ a calendar-time portfolio regression approach to examine the prof-
itability of hedge funds' investment in potential buyout candidates. As discussed
earlier, stock performance, free cash ow, tax liabilities, and industry afliation are
among the most important predictors of rms' likelihood of going private. I use these
characteristics to identify potential LBO candidates.
Specically, at the end of each quarter of the sample period (19902006), I
sort all stocks in the CRSP-Compustat universe with hedge fund presence based on
past six-month stock performance, excess cash ow to market equity ratio, and tax
liability to market equity ratio. A stock is considered a potential LBO target if it
meets the following conditions: (1) its past six-month return is in the bottom third
of the distribution for the entire universe; (2) its excess cash ow is in the top third
of the distribution for the entire universe; (3) its tax liability is in the top third of
the distribution for the entire universe; and (4) it is afliated with one of the eight
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industries using FamaFrench 12 industry classication.31 This process generates a
sample of potential buyout candidates with 10; 031 rm/quarter observations.
At each quarter-end during 19902006, I form two portfolios, with the rst
being a passive portfolio of all potential buyout target stocks. I keep the stocks in
a portfolio for a six-month holding period following the event quarter. I rebalance
quarterly to add new rms that fall in the category of potential LBO candidates and
drop the rms that have just reached the end of their holding period. Following
Mitchell and Stafford (2000), I exclude multiple observations of the same rm that
appears within the same holding period.
I form a second portfolio to examine hedge funds' protability in investing in
buyout candidates. In particular, I form a longshort portfolio of potential LBO target
stocks based on hedge fund trading during the six-month period over which the stock
returns are measured. The long component consists of the top quintile rms and
the short component consists of bottom quintile rms in terms of hedge fund trading.
Similar to the passive portfolio of all potential buyout candidates, stocks in the spread
portfolio are held for six months and rebalanced quarterly. I test whether the spread
portfolio generates signicant abnormal returns.
Table 10 reports the results for both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfo-
lios. Panel A reports the estimates when the excess return of the passive portfolio of
all potential LBO candidates is regressed on the FamaFrenchCarhart four factors
31 These industries are consumer nondurables, consumer durables, manufacturing, business equip-
ment, wholesale and retail, healthcare and medical equipment, nance, and others. Firms in these
industries make up 90% of the LBO sample.
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using the full sample. Over the six-month holding period, the value-weighted port-
folio of all potential LBO candidates generates a positive abnormal return of 0:46%
per month, or 5:5% per annum. Using equal-weighted return delivers similar results.
Panel B of Table 10 shows the results for the spread portfolio of stocks that
hedge funds buy minus stocks that they sell. The alpha of the spread portfolio is
positive and signicant, suggesting that hedge funds earn abnormal returns from in-
vesting in potential LBO target stocks. The value-weighted portfolio exhibits an ab-
normal return of 0:73% per month, or 8:8% per annum. The equal-weighted results
are weaker but still signicant at the 10% level.
To shed further light on the protability of the strategy of investing in poten-
tial LBO candidates, I split the sample into two subsamples based on LBO intensity.
Because the 19992006 period is characterized by an LBO boom, I expect hedge
funds' investment in LBO candidates be more protable during this subperiod. Panel
C and D of Table 10 report the 19992006 subperiod results for the passive portfolio
of all potential LBO targets and for the spread portfolio based on hedge fund trad-
ing, respectively.32 Two patterns emerge from the table. First, the naïve strategy of
holding all LBO candidates delivers marginally signicant abnormal returns. Sec-
ond, the active strategy based on hedge fund trading generates abnormal returns of
12:9% and 17:4% per annum for equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, re-
32 The results for the 1990  1998 subperiod are not reported. The abnormal returns of the portfolios
during the period are insignicant, which makes sense since there were not many buyout activities in
the early 1990s.
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spectively. Thus, investing in potential buyout target stocks during the LBO boom
pays off for hedge funds.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
1.5 Conclusion
This paper is the rst to examine the shareholder wealth effect of hedge funds in
takeovers. By manually identifying hedge fund managers in the 13F database, I track
the trading behavior of hedge funds around LBO offers and relate it to shareholder
gains.
I show that hedge funds exhibit different trading patterns than traditional insti-
tutions both before and after buyout announcements. While hedge funds signicantly
increase their holdings in the target rm both before and after the announcement, mu-
tual funds and public pension funds tend to decrease or maintain their holdings before
the announcement and signicantly decrease their positions after the announcement.
This difference in trading behavior suggests that hedge funds are more actively in-
volved with LBO targets, and thus are more likely to inuence the outcome of a deal.
Consistent with the active shareholder theory of Gomes (2001), I nd that the
initial buyout premium is increasing in the preannouncement holdings of hedge funds
in the target rm. Using a geographic instrument for the presence of hedge funds, I
show that this effect holds even after controlling for endogeneity. Consistent with the
theory, I also nd that the above relationship is stronger for targets with less liquid
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stocks. I also nd that for LBO offers with a low initial premium, net buying by
hedge funds during the offer increases the probability of a bid revision. I further
show that the effect of hedge funds on the premium is concentrated among active
hedge funds and long-term hedge funds, and is stronger in management-led LBOs
than in third-party LBOs. These ndings provide additional support for the active
shareholder hypothesis.
Contrary to the concern that hedge funds might deter or foil an LBO attempt
because of their activism efforts, I nd that the presence of hedge funds is positively
associated with the emergence of an LBO offer. This nding suggests that the par-
ticipation of hedge funds facilitates competition in the private equity market. Private
equity bidders, despite their preference for targets with little presence of activists,
end up pursuing the same target as hedge funds do. I also nd that the investment
strategy of hedge funds in potential LBO targets delivers signicant abnormal re-
turns, particularly during the second half of the sample when there is an LBO boom.
The evidence suggests that hedge funds are compensated for their activism efforts,
thereby overcoming the free-rider problem.
Of particular interest to academics and policymakers is that hedge funds seem
to provide a useful counterweight to offset the concern of shareholder expropriation
by private equity bidders. Contrary to what some critics have claimed, private eq-
uity market seems to be competitive because of the participation of hedge funds (as
minority shareholders in the target rm). Since LBO targets are characterized by
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poor performance and high potential for conict of interest on the part of managers,
the ndings suggest that hedge funds play an important economic role in corporate
control transactions where other institutions follow the Wall Street Walk.
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Abnormal returns around LBO announcement by preannouncement hedge fund presence  
This figure plots average cumulative abnormal returns during a 40-day interval 
around the announcement of buyout offer (day 0).  I partition the sample LBOs into two groups 
based on the median of preannouncement hedge fund presence.  The solid (dashed) line is for LBO 
targets that the preannouncement presence of hedge funds is high (low).  I use two proxies for 
preannouncement hedge fund presence: the adjusted HFO (Panel A) and change in HFO (Panel B).  
The adjusted HFO is obtained as the residual from a regression of the raw HFO on year and 
industry dummies, and several stock-specific characteristics, such as market capitalization, book-
to-market ratio, lag returns, price, turnover, and stock volatility.  Abnormal returns are calculated 





















Abnormal returns around LBO announcement for the hedge fund blockholding sample 
This figure plots average cumulative abnormal returns during a 270-day window 
(250 days before the announcement and 20 days afterwards) around the announcement of buyout 
offer (day 0).  I partition the subsample of LBOs (27 deals) in which a hedge fund acquires a 5% 
block into two groups based on whether the hedge fund files a 13D or a 13G.  13D filings indicate 
that the hedge fund has an active agenda with respect to the business strategies or governance-
related issues of the target firm, whereas 13G filings indicate passive investment.  The solid 
(dashed) line is for LBO targets for which a hedge fund files a 13D (13G) during the year before 



















Abnormal returns around announcement of LBO proposal withdrawals by hedge fund trading 
during the announcement quarter 
This figure plots average cumulative abnormal returns during a 40-day interval 
around the announcement of LBO proposal withdrawals (day 0).  I partition the withdrawn LBOs 
into two groups based on the median of hedge fund trading during the announcement quarter 
(∆HFOt-1Æt).  The solid (dashed) line is for LBO targets that hedge fund trading during the 
announcement quarter is high (low).  Abnormal returns are calculated using Fama-French three 





















Distribution of leveraged buyouts, January 1990 to December 2006 
 Table 1 reports the distribution of the sample of leveraged buyouts and the mean 
statistics of deal- and target-related variables.  Deal value is the total consideration that the acquirer 
paid for the percentage of the target plus any liabilities assumed.  Initial Premium is calculated as 
the initial offer price divided by the target’s closing price 20 trading days prior to the 
announcement date minus one.   The last row reports the total number of LBO deals in the full 
sample and mean statistics for deal value and initial premium.  
 
Year No. of deals Percentage of Sample (%) Deal value ($mil) 
Initial Premium 
(%) 
90-95 18 7.59 774.19 38.56 
1996 5 2.11 157.83 23.96 
1997 7 2.95 202.27 15.31 
1998 17 7.17 182.24 28.61 
1999 29 12.24 272.22 27.72 
2000 28 11.81 360.37 43.61 
2001 10 4.22 253.50 64.12 
2002 15 6.33 347.50 32.15 
2003 9 3.80 510.72 34.17 
2004 11 4.64 901.82 22.76 
2005 20 8.44 759.55 25.92 
2006 33 13.92 1,752.75 20.33 
2007 35 14.77 2,534.79 22.12 







Summary statistics for the LBO sample 
 Table 2 reports summary statistics on the LBO sample.  Deal Value is the total 
consideration that the acquirer paid for the target plus any liabilities assumed.  Initial Buyout 
Premium is calculated as the initial offer price divided by the target’s closing price 20 trading days 
prior to the announcement date minus one.  CAR3 is the cumulative CAPM-adjusted return over the 
three-day window around the announce-ment date.  Pr(Bid Revision) is the probability of an upward 
revision in the bid.  E(Bid Revision) is measured as closing bid divided by opening bid minus 1 for 
LBOs that the bid is revised.  Deal Completion is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal succeeds.  
Spread is calculated as (initial offer price – Pt )/ Pt, where Pt is the target firm’s stock price on the last 
day of the announcement quarter.  Toehold is measured as the acquirer’s holdings of the target’s stock 
before the announcement.  Management Participation is an indicator variable which equals 1 if 
management is part of the buyer’s group and 0 otherwise.  Target Firm Characteristics are measured 
at the most recent fiscal year prior to the announcement date.  Size is measured as stock price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (item #199 * item #25) plus book value of debt (item 
#9 + item #34).  Past Abnormal Return is measured as the six-month market-adjusted buy-and-hold 
return prior to the announcement quarter.  Excess Cash Flow is measured as income before 
depreciation (item #13) minus income tax (item #16 – change in item #35) minus interest expense 
(item #15) minus common and preferred dividends (item #21 + item #19) divided by Market Equity.  
Taxes is measured as income tax divided by Market Equity.  Sales growth is measured as the average 
increase in net sales during the two years preceding the buyout announcement.  I winsorize all 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of extreme observations.  
 
 







Deal Value ($mil) 933.49 222.78 70.75 770.85 1,926.93 
Initial Premium (%) 29.86 24.78 16.83 36.84 22.54 
CAR3 (%) 20.97 18.51 10.40 28.34 15.37 
Pr(Bid Revision) (%)  16.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.77 
E(Bid Revision) (%) 5.93 5.88 2.22 13.56 11.95 
Pr(Deal Completion) (%) 71.31 100.00 0.00 100.00 45.33 
Spread (%) 5.69 3.37 1.29 7.69 11.08 
Toehold (%) 21.18 17.55 9.00 32.70 13.50 
Mgmt Participation (%) 48.52 0.00 0.00 1.00 50.08 
Log(Size) 5.58 5.45 4.35 6.90 1.64 
Past Abnormal Return (%) -5.34 -13.74 -34.68 10.16 49.41 
Excess Cash Flow 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.18 0.20 
Taxes 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.05 





Institutional Ownership (and the Changes in Institutional Ownership) by Investor Type around 
Buyout Announcements (in %) 
Table 3 reports institutional ownership by investor type (hedge funds, mutual funds, 
public pension funds, and non-hedge fund institutional blockholders) before announcement and 
changes in institutional ownership around buyout announcements.  Non-hedge fund institutional 
blockholders are institutions, which are not in the hedge fund sample, holding a 5% block.  
Ownership by an investor type is the fraction of outstanding shares owned by the investor type.  
Changes in institutional ownership by investor type are calculated for three different windows, with 
quarter t being the announcement quarter.  Columns 5, 6, and 7 report the difference between 
ownership (and changes in ownership) by hedge funds and that by mutual funds, public pension funds, 
and non-hedge fund institutional blockholders.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Significance 






















Ownershipt-1 4.88*** 9.96*** 1.30*** 18.36*** -5.09*** 3.58*** -13.48***
 (10.69) (15.98) (10.53) (19.63) (7.38) (7.78) (13.42) 
∆Ownershipt-5Æt-1 0.97*** -1.04*** 0.02 1.59*** 2.01*** 0.94*** -0.63 
 (3.52) (3.36) (0.55) (2.78) (4.29) (3.40) -(0.94) 
∆Ownershipt-3Æt-1 0.54*** -0.68*** 0.03 1.03** 1.22*** 0.52*** -0.48 
 (2.98) (3.12) (0.54) (2.17) (4.06) (2.72) (0.91) 
∆Ownershipt-1Æt 2.02*** -2.15*** -0.07** -3.96*** 4.17*** 2.09*** 5.98***





Preannouncement hedge fund presence and target shareholder wealth in LBOs: OLS regression 
results 
 Table 4 reports multivariate regression results with initial buyout premium as the 
dependent variable.  Panel A shows baseline regression results on the relationship between 
preannouncement hedge fund presence and the initial buyout premium.  Panel B shows the results 
when preannouncement hedge fund presence measures are interacted with target stock liquidity 
measures.  Panel C shows the results when preannouncement hedge fund ownership is decomposed 
into active and passive components, and long-term and short-term components.  HFOt-1 is the fraction 
of shares owned by hedge funds at the end of quarter t – 1.  ∆HFOt-3Æt-1 is the change in hedge fund 
holdings from quarter t – 3 to t – 1.  Herfindahl(HFO) is the Herfindahl index of HFO at the end of 
quarter t – 1.  No. of HF Blockholderst-1 is the number of hedge funds with a 5% block in the target 
firm at the end of quarter t – 1.  ActiveHFOt-1 and PassiveHFOt-1 are the fraction of outstanding shares 
owned by active hedge funds (13D filers) and passive hedge funds (non 13D filers), respectively, at 
the end of quarter t – 1.  LongTermHFOt-1 and ShortTermHFOt-1 are the fraction of outstanding shares 
owned by long-term hedge funds (those that have a portfolio turnover rate lower than the median) and 
short-term hedge funds, respectively, at the end of quarter t – 1.  PPFOt-1 and MFOt-1 are public 
pension fund ownership and mutual fund ownership at the end of quarter t – 1, respectively.  Public 
pension funds are those belonging to the list of members of the Council of Institutional Investors.  
Shareholder Turnover of a target firm is the weighted average of the total portfolio turnover rates of 
its institutional shareholders over four quarters prior to the announcement quarter (following Gaspar, 
Massa, and Matos, 2005).  Industry Exposure is measured as the average percentage of hedge fund 
shareholders’ portfolios that are invested in the industry the target firm belongs to.  AmihudIlliq is the 
three-month average of the monthly Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio over the quarter prior to the 
announcement.  See Table 2 for the definition of other variables.  Year and industry dummies are 
included in all regressions.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-industry serial correlation.  Significance on a 10% (*), 5% 






Panel A: Baseline multivariate regression 
Dependent Variable: Initial Buyout Premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HFOt-1 0.613    
 (2.70)**    
∆HFOt-3Æt-1  1.048   
  (1.63)   
Herfindahl(HFO)t-1   4.078  
   (3.41)***  
No. of HF Blockholderst-1    0.105 
    (2.79)*** 
PPFOt-1 -0.556 -0.558 -0.436 -0.579 
 (0.51) (0.48) (0.40) (0.60) 
MFOt-1 -0.067 -0.086 -0.049 -0.030 
 (0.34) (0.46) (0.25) (0.14) 
Management Participation -0.051 -0.044 -0.053 -0.058 
 (1.35) (1.18) (1.39) (1.64) 
Shareholder Turnover -0.099 0.008 -0.085 -0.120 
 (0.68) (0.06) (0.60) (0.77) 
Industry Exposure 0.030 0.037 0.097 0.027 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.24) (0.06) 
Log(Size) -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.010 
 (1.19) (1.10) (0.91) (0.77) 
Past Return -0.065 -0.069 -0.069 -0.060 
 (2.20)** (2.27)** (2.26)** (1.91)* 
Toehold -0.141 -0.151 -0.137 -0.136 
 (1.50) (1.52) (1.44) (1.38) 
Excess Cash Flow -0.044 -0.014 -0.039 -0.047 
 (0.41) (0.13) (0.37) (0.45) 
Taxes -0.026 -0.021 0.007 0.006 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sales Growth -0.090 -0.097 -0.087 -0.084 
 (2.76)*** (2.99)*** (2.82)*** (2.65)** 
Prior News -0.231 -0.217 -0.219 -0.232 
 (6.78)*** (6.70)*** (6.17)*** (6.73)*** 
Constant 0.687 0.664 0.663 0.671 
 (2.21)** (2.18)** (2.17)** (2.16)** 
Year/Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 237 237 237 237 





Panel B: The effect of liquidity 
Dependent Variable: Initial Buyout Premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AmihudIlliq*HFOt-1 0.379    
 (4.03)***    
AmihudIlliq*∆HFOt-3Æt-1  0.865   
  (1.21)   
AmihudIlliq*Herfindahl(HFO)t-1   2.503  
   (2.98)***  
AmihudIlliq*No. of HF Blockst-1    0.034 
    (1.74)* 
HFOt-1 0.498    
 (1.91)*    
∆HFOt-3Æt-1  0.735   
  (1.17)   
Herfindahl(HFO)t-1   2.549  
   (1.54)  
No. of HF Blockholderst-1    0.094 
    (2.11)** 
AmihudIlliq 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.009 
 (0.78) (1.19) (0.84) (0.88) 
PPFOt-1 -0.510 -0.389 -0.383 -0.507 
 (0.49) (0.34) (0.37) (0.55) 
MFOt-1 -0.083 -0.115 -0.080 -0.064 
 (0.45) (0.64) (0.44) (0.33) 
Management Participation -0.040 -0.038 -0.044 -0.049 
 (1.09) (0.98) (1.14) (1.37) 
Shareholder Turnover -0.111 0.036 -0.093 -0.141 
 (0.75) (0.25) (0.64) (0.89) 
Industry Exposure -0.031 0.131 0.107 0.044 
 (0.11) (0.37) (0.36) (0.15) 
Log(Size) -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.28) (0.54) (0.19) (0.04) 
Past Return -0.065 -0.080 -0.068 -0.059 
 (2.08)** (2.69)** (2.13)** (1.80)* 
Toehold -0.125 -0.141 -0.122 -0.137 
 (1.28) (1.40) (1.24) (1.41) 
Excess Cash Flow -0.064 0.023 -0.048 -0.057 
 (0.72) (0.20) (0.55) (0.61) 
Taxes -0.100 -0.056 -0.052 -0.024 
 (0.21) (0.13) (0.11) (0.05) 
Sales Growth -0.080 -0.095 -0.078 -0.074 
 (2.29)** (2.45)** (2.40)** (2.22)** 
Prior News -0.231 -0.217 -0.222 -0.234 
 (6.41)*** (6.40)*** (5.96)*** (6.57)*** 
Year/Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 237 237 237 237 






Panel C: Decomposition of hedge fund ownership 
Dependent Variable: Initial Buyout Premium 
 (1) (2) 
ActiveHFOt-1 0.715  
 (2.35)**  
PassiveHFOt-1 0.426  
 (1.09)  
LongTermHFOt-1  1.155 
  (2.69)** 
ShortTermHFOt-1  0.174 
  (0.66) 
PPFOt-1 -0.547 -0.653 
 (0.50) (0.60) 
MFOt-1 -0.075 -0.081 
 (0.38) (0.42) 
Management Participation -0.051 -0.052 
 (1.36) (1.41) 
Shareholder Turnover -0.113 -0.182 
 (0.73) (1.10) 
Industry Exposure 0.043 0.041 
 (0.11) (0.10) 
Log(Size) -0.014 -0.013 
 (1.16) (1.15) 
Past Return -0.065 -0.067 
 (2.20)** (2.26)** 
Toehold -0.144 -0.133 
 (1.51) (1.38) 
Excess Cash Flow -0.046 -0.054 
 (0.42) (0.50) 
Taxes -0.051 -0.030 
 (0.13) (0.08) 
Sales Growth -0.091 -0.092 
 (2.75)*** (2.80)*** 
Prior News -0.232 -0.243 
 (6.89)*** (6.82)*** 
Constant 0.690 0.701 
 (2.22)** (2.23)** 
Year/Industry FEs Yes Yes 
Observations 237 237 





Panel D: Management-led LBOs vs. third-party LBOs 
Dependent Variable: Initial Buyout Premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mgmt Participation*HFOt-1 0.882    
 (1.73)*    
Mgmt Participation*∆HFOt-3Æt-1  0.663   
  (0.53)   
Mgmt Participation*Herfindahlt-1   5.170  
   (1.35)  
Mgmt Participation*No. of HFst-1    0.133 
    (2.26)** 
HFOt-1 0.260    
 (1.14)    
∆HFOt-3Æt-1  0.790   
  (1.02)   
Herfindahl(HFO)t-1   1.229  
   (0.80)  
No. of HF Blockholderst-1    0.043 
    (1.49) 
PPFOt-1 -0.459 -0.554 -0.375 -0.536 
 (0.44) (0.48) (0.35) (0.57) 
MFOt-1 -0.092 -0.085 -0.070 -0.011 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.35) (0.05) 
Management Participation -0.091 -0.048 -0.067 -0.083 
 (2.30)** (1.34) (1.81)* (2.39)** 
Shareholder Turnover -0.123 0.020 -0.115 -0.144 
 (0.83) (0.15) (0.74) (0.91) 
Industry Exposure -0.055 0.011 0.084 -0.032 
 (0.14) (0.03) (0.21) (0.08) 
Log(Size) -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.91) (1.00) (0.80) (0.63) 
Past Return -0.064 -0.069 -0.070 -0.059 
 (2.24)** (2.26)** (2.33)** (1.92)* 
Toehold -0.138 -0.150 -0.137 -0.136 
 (1.40) (1.50) (1.41) (1.27) 
Excess Cash Flow -0.037 -0.012 -0.030 -0.036 
 (0.34) (0.12) (0.28) (0.34) 
Taxes 0.051 0.013 0.031 0.141 
 (0.14) (0.03) (0.08) (0.40) 
Sales Growth -0.094 -0.099 -0.088 -0.085 
 (2.79)*** (2.96)*** (2.83)*** (2.65)** 
Prior News -0.211 -0.214 -0.210 -0.210 
 (5.64)*** (6.46)*** (5.70)*** (5.72)***
Constant 0.699 0.660 0.673 0.681 
 (2.32)** (2.17)** (2.22)** (2.26)** 
Year/Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 237 237 237 237 





Preannouncement hedge fund presence and target shareholder wealth in LBOs: Instrumental variable 
regression results 
 Table 5 reports instrumental variable regression results.  Column 1 and 2 report the 
results on the first-stage regression for the determinants of hedge fund ownership and # of hedge fund 
blockholders, respectively.  Column 3 and 4 report the results on the second-stage regression with the 
initial buyout premium as the dependent variable.  The fitted values of hedge fund ownership and # of 
hedge fund blockholders from the first-stage regressions are used as the instrument for the presence of 
hedge funds in the second-stage regression.  The instrument for hedge fund presence is Geographic 
Intensity, which is defined as the ratio of assets under management by hedge funds in a state to total 
market capitalization of listed firms in the state.  HFOt-1 is the fraction of shares owned by hedge funds 
at the end of quarter t – 1.  No. of HF Blockholderst-1 is the number of hedge funds with a 5% block in 
the target firm at the end of quarter t – 1.  PPFOt-1 and MFOt-1 are public pension fund ownership and 
mutual fund ownership at the end of quarter t – 1, respectively.  Public pension funds are those 
belonging to the list of members of the Council of Institutional Investors.  See Table 2 for the 
definition of other variables.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-industry serial correlation.  Significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), 








 First Stage Second Stage 
HFO # of HF Blocks Initial Buyout Premium Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fitted HFOt-1 3.576  
 (2.20)**  
Fitted # of HF Blockst-1  0.384 
  (2.20)** 
Geographic Intensity 0.201 1.876   
 (2.71)** (2.15)**   
PPFOt-1 -0.124 -0.828 -0.129 -0.254 
 (0.76) (0.41) (0.10) (0.20) 
MFOt-1 -0.027 -0.700 -0.001 0.171 
 (0.49) (1.57) (0.01) (0.76) 
Mgmt Participation   -0.057 -0.057 
   (1.60) (1.60) 
Shareholder Turnover   -0.014 -0.014 
   (0.10) (0.10) 
Industry Exposure   0.161 0.161 
   (0.40) (0.40) 
Log(Size) 0.009 0.031 -0.040 -0.021 
 (1.90)* (1.23) (2.24)** (1.63) 
Past Return -0.013 -0.132 -0.027 -0.024 
 (1.46) (1.66) (0.65) (0.57) 
Toehold   -0.108 -0.108 
   (0.77) (0.77) 
Excess Cash Flow 0.022 0.180 -0.104 -0.096 
 (1.58) (1.63) (1.04) (0.97) 
Taxes 0.065 -0.091 -0.165 0.103 
 (0.71) (0.13) (0.35) (0.22) 
Sales Growth 0.002 -0.043 -0.098 -0.073 
 (0.44) (1.66) (3.53)*** (2.54)** 
Prior News 0.021 0.103 -0.300 -0.264 
 (1.29) (1.11) (5.43)*** (5.94)*** 
Constant -0.041 -0.170 0.781 0.702 
 (2.44)** (1.99)* (2.77)*** (2.51)** 
Fixed Effects Year Year Year+Industry Year+Industry 
Observations 237 237 237 237 





Change in hedge fund holdings during the announcement quarter and bid revisions in LBOs 
 The first and the third columns report probit regression results, where the dependent 
variable is a binary variable which equals 1 if the buyout bid is revised upward (closing bid > opening 
bid) and 0 otherwise.  The coefficient estimates reported are marginal effects of independent variables.  
The second and the fourth columns report multivariate regression results with the magnitude of bid 
revision (closing bid/opening bid – 1) as the dependent variable for the subsample that the bid is 
revised.  ∆HFOt-1Æt is the change in hedge fund holdings from quarter t – 1 to t.  The sample is 
restricted to the subsample that the announcement date and the effective/withdrawal date are not in the 
same quarter.  See Table 2 for the definition of other variables.  Year dummies are included in all 
regressions.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-industry serial correlation.  Significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), 







 Full Sample Single-Bidder Sample 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Premium*∆HFOt-1Æt -4.617 -3.771 -2.810 -8.226 
 (3.61)*** (1.27) (1.99)** (1.55) 
Premium -0.286 -0.259 -0.268 0.004 
 (3.39)*** (2.41)** (3.73)*** (0.03) 
∆HFOt-1Æt 1.752 1.213 1.221 1.492 
 (3.41)*** (1.73)* (1.78)* (0.83) 
Spread -0.525 -0.760 -0.621 -0.713 
 (1.60) (2.35)** (2.04)** (5.21)*** 
∆PPFOt-1Æt 0.769 2.955 0.094 -8.378 
 (0.17) (0.72) (0.02) (1.68) 
∆MFOt-1Æt 0.465 -0.056 0.326 0.065 
 (1.34) (0.09) (0.95) (0.09) 
Mgmt Participation 0.136 0.032 0.146 0.081 
 (3.97)*** (0.59) (4.35)*** (2.12)** 
Shareholder Turnover -0.442 -0.111 -0.385 -0.087 
 (2.24)** (1.13) (2.50)** (0.62) 
Industry Exposure 0.488 0.066 0.571 0.504 
 (2.20)** (0.23) (3.13)*** (1.71) 
Log(Size) 0.011 0.002 0.012 -0.003 
 (0.90) (0.16) (1.27) (0.29) 
Past Return -0.026 0.034 -0.030 -0.039 
 (0.79) (1.46) (0.94) (0.84) 
Toehold 0.147 -0.032 0.161 0.050 
 (1.37) (0.17) (1.68)* (0.34) 
Excess Cash Flow -0.015 0.105 0.052 0.073 
 (0.21) (1.85)* (0.79) (1.50) 
Taxes -0.246 -0.077 0.023 0.282 
 (0.49) (0.26) (0.05) (1.65) 
Sales Growth -0.006 -0.014 -0.001 -0.057 
 (0.32) (0.60) (0.08) (2.54)** 
Prior News 0.001 0.005 0.031 -0.009 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.95) (0.23) 
Constant  0.118  0.115 
  (1.36)  (1.51) 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 198 45 175 39 





Preannouncement hedge fund presence and target shareholder wealth in LBOs: Robustness 
 Table 7 reports multivariate regression results for a series of robustness checks.  In Columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the 
initial buyout premium.  I control for board characteristics, the holdings by non-hedge fund blockholders, and acquirer fixed effects in the first three 
columns, respectively.  In the last two columns, the dependent variable is the premium in Schwert (1996) and cumulative abnormal announcement 
returns, respectively.  Board Independence is the fraction of independent outside directors on the board.  Log(Board Size) is the logarithm of the 
number of directors on board.  CEO-Chairman Dummy equals 1 if the titles of CEO and Chairman are vested in the same individual and 0 otherwise.  
HFOt-1 is the fraction of shares owned by hedge funds at the end of quarter t – 1.  PPFOt-1 and MFOt-1 are public pension fund ownership and mutual 
fund ownership at the end of quarter t – 1, respectively.  See Table 2 for the definition of other variables.  Year and industry dummies are included 
in all regressions.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-industry serial 
correlation.  Significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% level (***) is indicated. 
 
 
Initial Buyout Premium Schwert(1996) CAR3 Dependent Variable:  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HFOt-1 0.716 0.606 0.959 0.547 0.336 
 (2.31)** (2.60)** (1.73)* (1.88)* (1.80)* 
PPFOt-1 -0.305  1.158 0.708 0.013 
 (0.19)  (0.84) (0.74) (0.02) 
MFOt-1 -0.136  -0.187 -0.113 -0.241 
 (0.41)  (0.62) (0.51) (1.69)* 
Management Participation -0.071 -0.052 -0.054 -0.062 -0.039 
 (1.35) (1.39) (1.63) (1.18) (1.60) 
Shareholder Turnover -0.282 -0.096 -0.151 -0.045 0.031 
 (1.51) (0.67) (0.56) (0.27) (0.28) 
Industry Exposure 0.125 0.056 -0.027 -0.187 -0.334 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.10) (0.63) (1.27) 
Log(Size) -0.011 -0.020 -0.022 -0.012 -0.002 




Past Return -0.053 -0.064 -0.054 -0.008 -0.070 
 (0.70) (2.27)** (1.15) (0.18) (3.00)*** 
Toehold 0.029 -0.159 -0.023 -0.163 -0.015 
 (0.11) (1.70)* (0.30) (1.54) (0.14) 
Excess Cash Flow 0.105 -0.039 0.248 -0.100 0.067 
 (0.82) (0.37) (2.41)** (1.18) (1.17) 
Taxes 0.324 -0.026 -0.145 -0.458 -0.137 
 (0.72) (0.07) (0.46) (1.06) (0.54) 
Sales Growth -0.056 -0.089 -0.085 -0.043 -0.032 
 (1.08) (2.77)*** (2.01)** (1.33) (1.36) 
Prior News -0.179 -0.230 -0.205 -0.176 -0.178 
 (2.80)*** (6.56)*** (5.45)*** (3.34)*** (6.03)*** 
Board Independence 0.197     
 (1.49)     
Log(Board Size) -0.186     
 (1.63)     
CEO-Chairman Dummy 0.080     
 (1.38)     
Non-HF Inst. Blocks  -0.074    
  (0.52)    
Constant 0.629 0.713 0.348 0.735 0.279 
 (2.69)** (2.31)** (1.63) (4.54)*** (2.95)*** 
Year/Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 129 237 237 237 237 





Hedge fund presence and the likelihood of receiving an LBO offer: Propensity-score matched 
sample 
Table 8 reports estimates of the presence of hedge funds in LBO firms and non-LBO 
firms and the mean differences.  LBO firms are those that receive an LBO offer in the subsequent 
year.  Non-LBO firms are those that do not receive an LBO offer or an interfirm takeover offer in 
the subsequent year.  For the estimation of the propensity scope, I estimate unreported Probit 
regressions in which the dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
firm is an LBO firm, 0 otherwise.  The independent variables are excess cash flow, tax liabilities, 
sales growth, firm size, past abnormal returns, and industry dummies.  For each LBO firm, the n (n 
= 5, 10) matching firms are the n non-LBO firms in the same year with the closest propensity scores 
to the LBO firm.  HFOt-1 is the fraction of shares owned by hedge funds at the end of quarter t – 1.  
∆HFOt-3Æt-1 is the change in hedge fund holdings from quarter t – 3 to t – 1.  Herfindahl(HFO) is the 
Herfindahl index of HFO at the end of quarter t – 1.  No. of HF Blockholderst-1 is the number of 
hedge funds with a 5% block in the target firm at the end of quarter t – 1.  Significance on a 10% (*), 
5% (**), or 1% level (***) is indicated. 
 
 LBO Firms 
Non-LBO 
Firms Differences t-stats 
Panel A: Near Neighbor (n = 5) 
HFOt-1 (%) 4.91 3.83 1.07 2.34** 
∆HFOt-5Æt-1 (%) 0.97 0.34 0.63 2.06** 
Herfindahl(HFO)t-1 (x100) 0.34 0.23 0.12 1.22 
No. of HF Blockholderst-1 0.20 0.13 0.07 2.36** 
Panel B: Near Neighbor (n = 10) 
HFOt-1 (%) 4.91 3.73 1.17 2.82*** 
∆HFOt-5Æt-1 (%) 0.97 0.41 0.56 1.99** 
Herfindahl(HFO)t-1 (x100) 0.34 0.20 0.14 1.92* 






Hedge fund presence and the probability of deal completion in LBOs 
 Table 9 reports the probit regression results where the dependent variable is a binary 
variable which equals 1 if the deal succeeds and 0 otherwise using the LBO sample.  ∆HFOt-1Æt is 
the change in hedge fund holdings from quarter t – 1 to t (the announcement quarter).  
∆ActiveHFOt-1Æt (∆PassiveHFOt-1Æt) is the change in holdings  by activist (passivist) hedge funds 
from quarter t –1 to t.  HFOt is hedge fund ownership at the end of the announcement quarter t.  
∆PPFOt-1Æt (∆MFOt-1Æt) is the change in holdings by public pension funds (mutual funds) from 
quarter t – 1 to t.  See Table 2 for the definition of other variables.  Year dummies are included in all 
regressions.  The coefficient estimates reported are marginal effects of independent variables.  
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 







Dependent Variable: Deal Consummation Dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆HFOt-1Æt -0.572   
 (0.72)   
HFOt   0.460  
  (1.22)  
∆ActiveHFOt-1Æt   -2.236 
   (1.90)* 
∆PassiveHFOt-1Æt   1.755 
   (1.32) 
Spread -1.245 -1.183 -1.223 
 (3.42)*** (3.14)*** (3.33)*** 
∆PPFOt-1Æt -6.615 -6.053 -4.469 
 (1.13) (1.01) (0.75) 
∆MFOt-1Æt -0.413 -0.150 -0.624 
 (0.65) (0.24) (1.03) 
Management Participation -0.012 -0.197 -0.146 
 (0.19) (0.58) (0.43) 
Shareholder Turnover -0.124 -0.607 -0.462 
 (0.36) (0.66) (0.48) 
Industry Exposure -0.406 0.293 0.322 
 (0.44) (2.37)** (2.48)** 
Initial Premium 0.320 -0.040 -0.028 
 (2.57)** (1.67)* (1.15) 
Log(Size) -0.034 0.130 0.125 
 (1.33) (1.40) (1.34) 
Past Return 0.126 -0.033 -0.002 
 (1.35) (0.13) (0.01) 
Toehold -0.011 -0.100 -0.114 
 (0.04) (0.69) (0.75) 
Excess Cash Flow -0.112 0.321 0.302 
 (0.73) (0.63) (0.53) 
Taxes 0.371 -0.002 0.014 
 (0.70) (0.03) (0.18) 
Sales Growth 0.003 0.099 0.105 
 (0.03) (1.36) (1.45) 
Prior News 0.111 -0.012 0.006 
 (1.61) (0.18) (0.09) 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 211 211 211 





Profitability of hedge fund trading in potential buyout targets using calendar-time portfolio 
regression approach 
Table 10 reports estimates of the abnormal return of a passive portfolio of all 
potential LBO candidates and an active spread portfolio based on hedge fund trading.  At the end of 
each quarter of the sample period (1990-2006), I sort all stocks in the CRSP-Compustat universe 
with hedge fund presence based on past six-month stock performance, excess cash flow to market 
equity ratio, and tax liability to market equity ratio.  A stock is considered a potential LBO target if 
it meets the following conditions: (1) its past six-month return is in the bottom third of the 
distribution for the entire universe; (2) its excess cash flow is in the top third of the distribution for 
the entire universe; (3) its tax liability is in the top third of the distribution for the entire universe; 
and (4) it is affiliated with one of the eight industries using Fama-French 12 industry classification.  
At each quarter end, I form a portfolio of all potential buyout target stocks.  I also form a long-short 
portfolio of these stocks based on hedge fund trading during the six-month period over which the 
stock returns are measured.  The long component consists of the top quintile firms and the short 
component consists of bottom quintile firms in terms of hedge fund trading.  I keep the stocks in a 
portfolio for a six-month holding period following the event quarter.  I rebalance quarterly to add 
new firms that fall in the “bad stock” category and drop the firms that have just reached the end of 
their holding period.  Following Mitchell and Stafford (2000), I exclude multiple observations of the 
same firm that appears within the same holding period.  Panel A reports the estimates when the 
excess return of the portfolio of potential LBO candidates is regressed on the Fama-French-Carhart 
four factors using the full sample.  Panel B reports the results for the spread portfolio using the full 
sample.  Panel C and D report results for each portfolio using the subsample of 1999-2006.  





 Equal-weighted portfolios Value-weighted portfolios 
  Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Panel A: Portfolio of All Potential LBO Candidates (Full sample) 
α (x100) 0.411 2.39** 0.458 2.55** 
βRm–Rf 1.016 21.86*** 1.188 24.55*** 
βSMB 0.801 16.20*** 0.152 2.95*** 
βHML 0.668 10.94*** 0.569 8.96*** 
βUMD -0.481 -13.59*** -0.436 -11.83*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84  0.82  
N 204   204   
Panel B: Spread Portfolio Based on Hedge Fund Trading (Full sample) 
α (x100) 0.486 1.93* 0.731 2.28** 
βRm–Rf -0.021 -0.32 -0.102 -1.18 
βSMB 0.091 1.26 0.273 2.97*** 
βHML 0.095 1.07 0.117 1.03 
βUMD -0.087 -1.68* -0.227 -3.44*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.01  0.07  
N  204    204   
Panel C: Portfolio of All Potential LBO Candidates (Post-1999 sample) 
α (x100) 0.537 1.80* 0.564 1.85* 
βRm–Rf 0.897 11.02*** 1.073 12.93*** 
βSMB 0.804 10.46*** 0.117 1.49 
βHML 0.718 7.77*** 0.586 6.21*** 
βUMD -0.512 -10.21*** -0.422 -8.24*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.82 0.79  
N  96   96   
Panel D: Spread Portfolio Based on Hedge Fund Trading (Post-1999 sample) 
α (x100) 1.073 2.88*** 1.454 3.35*** 
βRm–Rf -0.119 -1.17 -0.293 -2.48** 
βSMB 0.132 1.38 0.295 2.64*** 
βHML 0.008 0.07 -0.004 -0.03 
βUMD -0.186 -2.98*** -0.367 -5.03*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.20 




Dynamic Liquidity Preferences of Mutual
Funds
2.1 Introduction
In the wake of the nancial crisis of 1998, Scholes (2000) underscored the need
for nancial institutions to build a dynamic liquidity cushion to manage liquidity
risk. This cushion is particularly valuable during volatile times when the demand
for liquidity is high. A recent case in point is the collapse of Bear Stearns amid
subprime crisis triggered by a run of its investors and lenders. Open-end mutual
funds are perhaps the dominant institutions in the equity market.33 Although the issue
of liquidity has received considerable attention in the mutual fund literature (See, for
example, Chordia, 1996; Edelen, 1999; Nanda, Narayanan, and Warther, 2000; and
Massa and Phalippou, 2005), little is known concerning the liquidity management of
mutual funds accross different market volatility states.
For mutual funds, periods of high market volatility could be associated with
high demand for liquidity through two channels. On the one hand, mutual funds are
more likely to experience large withdrawals during volatile periods. This can arise
because the probability that the performance of a fund falls below a certain thresh-
33 According to Investment Company Institute, mutual funds manage $11:4 trillion and hold 25% of
the U.S. equity market at the end of 2006.
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old increases with market volatility and such an event may prompt fund investors to
withdraw their funds.34 On the other hand, high volatility in equity markets might
not be a curse for fund managers when it presents more investment opportunities.
Anecdotal evidence from the popular press often links turbulent markets to invest-
ment opportunities for deep-pocket investors.35 Since market volatility is predictable
and high volatility tends to be followed by high volatility, fund managers could be
better positioned to meet these liquidity needs if they accumulate more liquid assets
in advance, i.e., during times when expected market volatility is high.
This dynamic liquidity preference is in the spirit of precautionary motives for
holding liquid assets. As Keynes (1936) originally discussed, a major incentive for
holding liquid assets is that it provide[s] for contingencies requiring sudden expen-
diture and for unforeseen opportunities of advantageous purchases. Keynes further
pointed out that uncertainty is the main explanation for this precautionary liquidity
preference. The greater the uncertainty, the more value a liquid balance sheet can add
to a rm since liquidity increases a rm's operating options.
This paper recasts the precautionary story in the mutual fund setting. Since mu-
tual funds provide investors with liquidity services through their open-end structure,
fund ows impose signicant costs on fund performance (Edelen, 1999). If a fund
does not have sufcient liquid assets to cover redemptions, it may be forced to liq-
34 Vayanos (2004) built a model based on the idea that withdrawals are more likely during volatile
times. The notion of performance-based withdrawals was proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
35 For example, an often-cited quote from Warren Buffett is that investors should be greedy when
others are fearful.
73
uidate good investments during inopportune times, which is very costly (Coval and
Stafford, 2007). To the extent that expected volatility is associated with future re-
demptions, fund managers could mitigate the adverse effects of fund ows by tilting
to a more liquid portfolio during times when expected volatility is higher. An impli-
cation of the redemption-driven liquidity preference is that the preference should be
stronger among funds with greater probability of investor redemptions. Furthermore,
liquid asset holdings during volatile times allow fund managers to capture alpha op-
portunities when they arise. This suggests that dynamic liquidity preferences should
be more prevalent among fund managers with better stock-picking abilities.
For fund managers, holding liquid stocks is preferable to holding cash during
periods of high expected volatility. First, liquid stocks offer higher risk-adjusted re-
turns than cash following high expected volatility periods.36 Second, equity fund
managers have less latitude in adjusting their cash position for various reasons. SEC
Rule 35d-1 requires that an investment company with a name that suggests that
the company focuses its investments in a particular type of investment...or in invest-
ments in a particular industry...invest at least 80% of its assets in the type of invest-
ment suggested by the name.37 This requirement puts an upper bound on a fund's
cash position. Even if they are not bounded by such regulations, maintaining a large
or uctuating cash position would compromise the managers' compensation, which
36 In the sample period studied in this paper (1990   2006), liquid stocks (bottom 5% in Amihud
illiquidity measure) earn a CAPM-adjusted abnormal return, before transaction costs, of 49:4 ba-
sis points in the rst month (excluding January) immediately subsequent to high expected volatility
quarter-ends. If January is included, the abnormal return is about 80 basis points.
37 Rule 35d-1 became effective March 31, 2001.
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usually depends on tracking and beating a benchmark. Additionally, since investors
of equity mutual funds expect their managers to hold equities, sitting on a pile of cash
would suggest that the manager has no stock ideas. These provide disincentives for
mutual funds to increase their cash holdings during volatile periods. Fund managers,
however, are not constrained in their holdings of liquid stocks. By denition, liquid
securities allow the holder to trade large quantities quickly, at low cost, and without
moving the price. Thus, these securities could be converted easily into cash during
market stress in order to satisfy heavy redemption requests and to take advantage of
investment opportunities without selling less liquid securities in the portfolio.38
The purpose of this paper is to examine the preferences of equity mutual funds
for liquid stocks across different expected market volatility states as well as the im-
pact of these dynamic preferences on fund performance. Specically, I ask three
questions. First, how do mutual funds' preferences for liquid securities vary across
different expected market volatility states? Second, how is this behavior related to
fund characteristics? Third, if fund managers invest a large fraction of their assets in
liquid stocks during periods of high expected volatility, does this behavior in fact add
value for investors?39
38 The disadvantage of holding liquid stocks instead of cash, however, is that it incurs transaction
costs. Thus, fund managers face a trade-off when deciding between using cash or liquid stocks to
fulll their liquidity needs. In this study, I view liquid stock holdings and cash holdings as substitutes
to each other. Massa and Phalippou (2004) and Yan (2006) present evidence that the cash holdings of
a mutual fund are signicantly and negatively related to the liquidity of the fund's equity portfolio. In
the Robustness Check section, I explicitly control for fund cash position and the results still hold up.
39 A related question is how fund managers' portfolio rebalancing (the change in liquid stock hold-
ings) during high volatility times affects subsequent fund performance. The current paper does not
examine this question. The reason is that the precautionary story hinges on the benet of the level, not
the change, of liquid asset holdings during uncertain times.
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Using a sample of all NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq common stocks and 1; 962
domestic equity mutual funds from 1990 to 2006, I examine the dynamic liquid-
ity preference of mutual funds as well as its implications for fund performance. I
rst show that higher expected volatility is followed by both a greater probability of
withdrawals and more investment opportunities. This evidence suggests that a liq-
uidity cushion is valuable for fund managers during periods of high expected volatil-
ity. The main ndings of this paper can be summarized as follows: First, in aggre-
gate, equity mutual fund managers hold a larger proportion of their assets in liquid
stocks when expected market volatility is higher. This nding is robust to controls
for fund-specic characteristics, and a number of specication checks and changes in
the sample. Additionally, difference-in-difference tests show that the stocks bought
(relative to those sold) by mutual funds during periods when expected volatility in-
creases (relative to periods when expected volatility decreases) are signicantly more
liquid. This suggests that fund managers reallocate their portfolios to achieve the op-
timal liquidity level in anticipation of market turmoil. Second, dynamic liquidity
preference is more prevalent among funds from small fund families, low-load funds,
funds with unfavorable performance, funds with high volatility, growth funds, and
high-turnover funds. Combined with the evidence that these fund characteristics are
associated with outows or investment opportunities during volatile times, the results
are consistent with the notion that the benets of precautionary liquidity holdings are
greater for these funds. Last, precautionary liquidity holdings during high expected
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volatility periods are associated with statistically and economically signicant abnor-
mal fund returns in the subsequent period.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the dynamic liq-
uidity preference ndings offer insights into the dynamics of the liquidity premium
in stock returns. As pointed out by Scholes (2000), the liquidity premium varies
considerably over time as a function of preferences. Since mutual funds are signi-
cant players in the equity market, this paper provides a necessary step toward a better
understanding of time-varying liquidity premiums. Second, the paper contributes to
our understanding of mutual fund liquidity management. While the existing liter-
ature takes mutual fund liquidity level as exogenous40, this paper shows that fund
managers actively change their liquidity when expected market volatility changes.
Last, the paper presents the rst evidence that liquid asset holdings under highly un-
certain environments create value. In their classic textbook Principles of Corporate
Finance, Brealey and Myers (2003) consider the value of liquidity to be among the
10 unsolved problems in nance (page 1002). The current paper presents evidence
that liquidity is valuable because of the options it provides.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2:2 reviews the
literature. Section 2:3 describes the data. Section 2:4 explores the link between
the expected volatility measure (the VIX) and future redemptions, and that between
the VIX and future investment opportunities. Section 2:5 uses both fund-level and
40 Massa and Phalippou (2004) is the only exception. Their paper, however, does not consider the
effect of market volatility on the liquidity demands of fund managers.
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stock-level analyses to examine the impact of expected market volatility on mutual
funds' preferences for liquid stocks. The effect of fund characteristics on the dynamic
liquidity preference is also examined therein. Section 2:6 tests the impact of mutual
funds' dynamic liquidity preferences on fund performance in the subsequent period.
Section 2:7 offers robustness checks and Section 2:8 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This study is closely related to three studies on the liquidity preferences of mutual
funds, with the rst being Vayanos (2004). In this model, investors are fund managers
and subject to performance-based withdrawals. The model generates a liquidity pref-
erence that is time-varying and increasing with volatility. A key premise to Vayanos
(2004) is that withdrawals become more likely during volatile times. The present
paper complements Vayanos' paper by empirically showing the following: (1) with-
drawals increase following high expected volatility periods, (2) fund managers in-
crease their preferences for liquid stocks during times when expected volatility is
high, and (3) mutual funds with large liquid stock holdings perform better during
times of high volatility. Chordia (1996) theorizes that the cash holdings of open-end
funds are positively related to uncertainty about redemptions, which arises because
redemptions impose signicant costs on mutual funds. Using redemption variance
as a proxy for redemption uncertainty, he provides evidence that funds with greater
redemption uncertainty hold more cash. Massa and Phalippou (2005) empirically ex-
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amine how mutual fund managers choose the liquidity level of their portfolio. They
show that portfolio size, trading frequency, and portfolio concentration are among
the most important determinants of portfolio liquidity. They also nd that liquid
funds outperform illiquid ones during periods of low market liquidity and vice versa,
which they interprete as consistent with the view that liquid stocks deliver higher
returns during illiquid times. The present paper differs from Massa and Phalippou
(2005) by focusing on the dynamic aspect of liquidity management.
This paper is also related to the extensive literature on mutual fund performance
and timing abilities. The central message of Jensen (1968) and the subsequent liter-
ature is that on average the portfolio management skills provided by mutual fund
managers are of little value to investors. Edelen (1999) attributes mutual funds' un-
derperformance to the liquidity service that fund managers provide investors. In
particular, to avoid large and random uctuations in the cash position of the fund,
fund managers must engage in liquidity trading, which contributes to negative per-
formance. The present paper suggests that the adverse effect induced by fund ows
could, to some extent, be moderated by fund managers' active management of their
liquid stock holdings. By hoarding liquid stocks in response to an increase in ex-
pected future market volatility, fund managers could be better positioned to with-
stand ow shocks while maintaining a stable cash balance. Busse (1999) documents
that mutual funds' volatility timing, i.e., reducing market exposure during times of
high expected market volatility, leads to higher risk-adjusted returns in the contem-
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poraneous period, suggesting that mutual funds provide investors with a valuable
volatility hedge. This paper complements Busse's study by showing a different form
of volatility hedge, which is also valuable for investors.
There is a parallel literature in corporate nance investigating the precaution-
ary cash holdings of publicly traded rms. Several papers use cash ow volatility
proxies constructed from accounting data and present evidence that a rm's invest-
ment in liquid assets increases with its cash ow uncertainty (Kim, Mauer, and Sher-
man, 1998; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999). These papers share the
common feature that they examine the static cross-sectional implication of the pre-
cautionary liquidity motives, i.e., rms with different cash-ow uncertainty proles
tend to choose different cash-holding policies. The time-series implication, i.e., rms
increase their liquid asset holdings in response to increases in expected uncertainty,
is not examined in the literature. The present paper lls this void by applying the
idea to the mutual fund context. Instead of using accounting information to construct
volatility measures, I use the implied volatility from index options. The implied
volatility measure is forward-looking and can be easily measured at a relatively high
frequency.
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
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2.3.1 Data
The primary data source on mutual funds is the merged CRSP Survivor-Bias Free
Mutual Fund Database and Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Mutual Fund Hold-
ings Database (Wermers, 2000). This database merges information about individual
fund managers and the quarterly stock holdings of each fund. The original source
of the holdings data is Form N-30D, which U.S. mutual funds are required to le
with the SEC at the middle and end of their scal years. I collect the holdings data
for the time period starting from the rst quarter of 1990, when the CBOE VIX in-
dex became available, through the last quarter of 2006. Quarterly holdings data are
available for 62:46% of the sample while 31:99% of the holdings are observed semi-
annually. To focus my analysis on open-end domestic equity mutual funds, for which
the holdings data are most complete and reliable, I eliminate balanced, bond, money
market, international, and unclassied funds. I also exclude funds which hold less
than 10 stocks. In addition, I exclude index funds in order to focus on actively man-
aged mutual funds.41 Following Chen et al. (2004), I require a fund to have a TNA
greater than $15 million and to have at least one year of reported returns. Finally,
I aggregate different share classes of a mutual fund into one single fund, instead of
discarding them as redundant observations, in order to minimize the loss of infor-
mation.42 There are 1; 962 distinct fund entities and a total of 45; 583 fund-quarter
41 A fund is identied as an index fund if its fund name provided by Thomson Financial has the word
index.
42 Specically, I sum the TNA of each share class to obtain the TNA for the fund. I use the inception
date of the initial fund class to calculate fund age. For other fund characteristics, such as turnover,
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observations in the analysis. The number of mutual funds included in the sample
ranges from 402 in 1993Q3 to 1; 119 in 2000Q2.
To measure expected market volatility, I use the S&P500 Volatility Index (VIX)
constructed by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The VIX provides a
snapshot of expected stock market volatility over the next 30 calendar days. Com-
pared to volatility estimates calculated based on historical data, the VIX has the ad-
vantage that it is a quantity backed out from an option-pricing model and does not
suffer from sampling errors. Additionally, since an option resembles an insurance
policy, the option premium (and hence the VIX) captures the perception of market
participants about future volatility. In their review paper, Poon and Granger (2003)
comment that option implied volatility appears to have superior forecasting capabil-
ity, outperforming many historical price volatility models.
Ideally, one would like to use the VIX on the last day of the quarter so that it
is the most up-to-date forecast for the next period's volatility. However, considering
that fund managers are likely to adjust their positions slowly to reduce price impact,
I calculate the expected volatility of each quarter as the average VIX of the last 21
trading days in that quarter. The results are robust to using a shorter window, e.g.,
the last 3 trading days of each quarter. The mean level of the quarterly VIX series
is 18:9%, and its standard deviation is 6:4%. To examine the effect of changes in
expected volatility on mutual funds' trading behavior, I also construct an innovation
expenses, and load, I use the TNA-weighted average across all share classes.
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in the VIX series by tting an AR(3) model to the VIX, and measure innovations
relative to the AR(3) specication.43 The VIX innovation series has a mean of 0:1%
(statistically indistinguishable from 0) and a standard deviation of 4:4%. Figure I
plots the VIX series (Panel A) and the VIX innovation series (Panel B), with the bars
indicating quarters where the VIX level or the innovation in VIX is higher than the
median. Throughout this paper, I refer to quarters with higher than median VIX as
high VIX periods and those with lower than median VIX as low VIX periods.
High and low VIX innovation periods are dened similarly.
[Insert Figure I about here]
2.3.2 Mutual Fund Characteristics
For the fund-level analysis, I consider various fund characteristics suggested by the
literature as controls. I retrieve TNA and fund returns from the CRSP Mutual Fund
monthly le and other characteristics from the quarterly le. Since the holdings in-
formation is available only at a quarterly frequency, I measure fund characteristics
at the end of each quarter. Fund size is the total net assets (TNA) of the fund, while
fund family size is measured as the log of one plus the cumulative TNA of the other
funds in the fund's family. Net ow is the percentage of new fund ow into the mu-
tual fund over the past year (described below). Variance of net ows is measured as
the variance of the previous 12 months of net ows. Total load is the sum of front-
and rear-end load fees. Turnover is dened as the minimum of aggregate purchases
43 The AR(3) model for the VIX series is chosen based upon the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC).
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or sales of securities during the year, divided by the average TNA. Age is the num-
ber of years since the initiation of the fund. Expense ratio is the percentage of total
investment that shareholders pay for the fund's operating expenses. Portfolio con-
centration is the inverse of the number of stocks held by the fund. Liquid stock beta
is the average beta of liquid stocks in the fund's portfolio, weighted by the dollar
amount invested. Lag return is the buy-and-hold fund return over the past 12 months.
Return volatility is the standard deviation of the monthly fund return over the past 12
months.




where TNAi;t is the TNA at the end of year t, Ri;t is the fund's return for year t, and
MergeTNAi;t is the increase in the TNA due to mergers during year t.
Table I reports summary statistics on the mutual fund sample. Fund size mea-
sured by TNA has a mean of $1; 349:39 million and a median of $293:15 million,
suggesting a highly skewed distribution. The average one-year net ow into funds
is 12:9% of fund assets. The average fund has an annual portfolio turnover rate of
88:5% and an expense ratio of 1:3%. The average fund portfolio contains 62 stocks
(1=0:0162).
[Insert Table I about here]
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2.3.3 Stock Characteristics
I calculate mutual fund ownership (MFO) for a specic stock in a given quarter by
summing the reported holdings of the sample mutual funds and dividing by the total
shares outstanding for the rm. If a stock is not held by any reporting mutual fund,
then I set MFO to zero. The results are robust to the exclusion of stocks with zero
mutual fund ownership. Security characteristics data, such as stock returns, price, in-
dustry classication, and trading volume are gathered from the CRSP monthly stock
le. I obtain accounting information from CompuStat. All common stocks traded
on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with adequate CRSP/CompuStat data are included in
the analysis.
Following Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003),
I focus on four categories of stock characteristics: three measures of liquidity (rm
size, price, and turnover), two proxies for prudence (rm age and dividend yield),
three proxies for risk (return volatility, beta, and rm-specic risk), and one mea-
sure to capture momentum trading (lagged return). Firm size is measured as the
quarter-end market capitalization. Share price is measured as the quarter-end price
per share. Share turnover is dened as the average ratio of monthly volume to num-
ber of shares outstanding in the current quarter. Firm age is measured as the number
of months since a stock rst appears in CRSP monthly stock le. Dividend yield is
measured as the cash dividends for the scal year ending at least three months before
the current quarter-end, divided by size as of December 31 during that scal year.
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Return volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of monthly returns over the
previous two years. Beta is estimated as the sum of the coefcients in a regression
of the rm's monthly return on the contemporaneous and lagged one-month CRSP
NYSE/AMEX value-weighted index over the previous 24 60months. Firm-specic
volatility is measured as the three-month average of the Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu (2001) monthly rm-specic risk measure over the current quarter. Lag re-
turn is measured as the six-month cumulative gross returns prior to the beginning of
the quarter.
In addition to the three measures of liquidity described above, I use Amihud's








where Di;m is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in month
m, rt is the stock return on day t, and dvoli;t is the CRSP-reported dollar volume
for the stock on day t. The average is computed over all days with non-zero vol-
ume in the month for which return data are available. Intuitively, if a stock's price
moves a lot in response to little volume, the stock is illiquid, i.e., has a high value
of ILLIQ. Amihud (2002) shows empirically that the illiquidity ratio is positively
related to measures of price impact and xed trading costs. Similarly, Hasbrouck
(2006) reports that [a]mong the daily proxies, the Amihud illiquidity measure is
most strongly correlated with the TAQ-based price impact coefcient. The illiquid-
ity ratio is widely employed in the empirical literature as a liquidity measure, such
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as, Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Hou and Moskowitz (2005), and Avramov, Chor-
dia, and Goyal (2006). Following Acharya and Pedersen (2005), I use the normalized
Amihud illiquidity ratio,
ILLIQni;m = min(0:25 + 0:30  ILLIQi;m Mt 1; 30:00)
where Mt 1 is the ratio of the capitalization of the market portfolio at the end of
month t   1 to that of the market portfolio at the end of July 1962. The illiquidity
ratio is measured as the three-month average of the monthly normalized illiquidity
measure over the current quarter.
Table II presents summary statistics for mutual fund ownership and other stock
characteristics. The average MFO for stocks is 5:78%. Firm size measured by market
capitalization has a mean of $1; 694 million and a median of $196 million. The
year-by-year summary statistics (not reported) show some interesting patterns. For
example, mutual fund ownership of the average stock increases steadily over time,
and the liquidity of the average stock improves signicantly.44
[Insert Table II about here]
2.4 Why Should Fund Managers Care About Expected
Volatility?
The paper proposes a story where high expected market volatility could pressure
fund managers to increase their liquid stock holdings through: (1) the link between
44 For example, the normalized Amihud illiquidity ratio for the average stock at the end of the sample
period drops to half of its beginning of the period value, and turnover for the average stock increases
from 5.76% in 1990Q1 to 16.36% in 2006Q4.
87
expected volatility and fund outows, and (2) the link between expected volatility
and investment opportunities. As a starting point for the empirical work, this section
presents evidence on these links.
2.4.1 Expected Volatility and Mutual Fund Flows
To examine the relationship between the VIX and future fund ows, I calculate the
one-month-ahead mutual fund net ows at each quarter-end. Panel A in Figure II
plots the frequency distribution of mutual fund net ows following high versus low
VIX states. It appears that both tails are fatter for high VIX periods than for low ones.
There are at least two reasons why fund managers should care more about the left tail
(outows) than the right tail (inows). First, since fund managers are compensated
based on asset size and outows have a negative impact on their compensation, it
is reasonable that fund managers place greater emphasis on this downside risk than
upside gains. Second, sales (of existing holdings) driven by outows could be costlier
than purchases driven by inows since the pool of stocks is much smaller in the
outow case.
Focusing on the left side of the graph, we see that there are more realizations
of large negative outows following high VIX quarter-ends. For outows greater
than 2:5% of a fund's total net assets45, the cumulative density is 14:6% for high VIX
states versus 12:3% for low VIX states. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test easily rejects the
45 To put the number into some perspective, note that a typical fund's cash position is around 5% of
its TNA. Hence, a 2:5% redemption in one month is economically large.
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null hypothesis that the probability of these large redemptions across the two states
is the same with a p-value well below 0:01.
I also sort the one-month-ahead fund ows into deciles and examine the proba-
bility of falling into the bottom decile46 following high versus low VIX quarter-ends.
Panel B in Figure II shows that mutual funds enter disproportionately into the bot-
tom (outow) decile following periods of high expected volatility. The probability
of falling into the bottom decile is 10:9% for high VIX periods, while that for low
VIX periods is 8:9%. Again, the difference is statistically signicant. This presents
the rst evidence consistent with Vayanos' intuition that withdrawals are more likely
during times of high volatility.47
[Insert Figure II about here]
While I nd a positive relationship between outows and expected volatility, I
expect some heterogeneity in the strength of the correlation across funds. Since the
likelihood of underperformance and/or withdrawal can differ across funds, funds will
vary in their susceptibility to outows. In particular, the following fund characteris-
tics are expected to be associated with a stronger correlation between withdrawals
and volatility: low load, small fund family association, poor past performance, and
high return volatility.
46 The 10th percentile of the distribution for net ows is  3:08%.
47 In Vayanos (2004), withdrawals are more likely when realized volatility is higher. If I replace the
forward-looking VIX measure with realized volatility, the results still hold. This is not surprising,
given that implied volatility is a good predictor of future realized volatility.
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To examine the heterogeneity of the relationship across funds, I rst sort one-
month-ahead fund ows into deciles. I then sort funds into quartiles based on each
characteristic at each quarter-end. In particular, the bottom quartile (Q1) consists of
funds with the lowest values of a characteristic considered and the top quartile (Q4)
consists of funds with the highest values of the characteristic. For each quarter-end,
I calculate the cross-sectional mean statistics of the probability of entering into the
bottom fund ow decile across funds in Q1 and Q4 for each characteristic. Table
III reports the time-series average of these mean statistics across high and low VIX
quarters and the results of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the null hypothesis that the
probability of falling into the bottom fund ow decile is identical across high and low
VIX states for funds with a particular characteristic. The table also reports Wilcoxon
rank-sum test statistics resulting from a difference-in-difference test of whether the
difference between high and low VIX regimes is signicantly different across Q1 and
Q4 funds.
The difference-in-difference test shows that, relative to funds with opposite
characteristics, those from small fund families, low-load funds, and underperforming
funds are more likely to incur large outows during high volatility periods than dur-
ing normal periods. Interestingly, highly volatile funds are not signicantly different
from less volatile funds in terms of the ow-VIX relationship. In addition to these
four characteristics, I also consider investment style and fund turnover. The results
show that, relative to income funds, growth funds are less likely to have outows
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during high volatility periods, and high-turnover funds are not signicantly differ-
ent from low-turnover funds. Considering that growth funds and high-turnover funds
incur high price impact costs (Chan and Lakonishok, 1995), it is reasonable to as-
sume that these two types of funds incur high transaction costs in obtaining funds
(by selling their holdings) during high volatility periods when transaction costs for
their holdings shot up. Thus, growth funds and high-turnover funds are, to some ex-
tent, nancially constrained. Given that they face the same (or even less) pressure
from investor redemptions, this nancial constraint could potentially provide them
an incentive to hold more liquid stocks.
[Insert Table III about here]
2.4.2 Expected Volatility and Investment Opportunities
I use the realized stock return to examine the relationship between expected volatility
and future investment opportunities. More stocks experiencing positive abnormal
returns following a high VIX quarter-end than a low one may indicate that there
are more investment opportunities during volatile markets. I use three measures of
risk-adjusted stock returns: the CAPM alpha, the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor
alpha, and the Sharpe ratio of stocks. Both alphas are measured over the 6-month
period subsequent to a quarter-end. I use monthly returns over the previous 12   60
months to estimate betas. Sharpe ratio is computed for each stock as the average
of the monthly returns net of the risk-free rate during the 6 months subsequent to a
91
quarter-end divided by the standard deviation of the returns. I sort the six-month-
ahead alphas and the Sharpe ratio into deciles and examine the probability of falling
into the top decile following high versus low VIX periods.48
Figure III plots the frequency distribution of the CAPM alpha (Panel A), the
four-factor alpha (Panel B), and the Sharpe ratio (Panel C) following high and low
VIX quarters. Interestingly, there are greater chances of both positive and negative
alphas during volatile periods. Because only a very small fraction of mutual funds
sell short, positive alpha opportunities are more relevant for fund managers. For
both alpha measures and the Sharpe ratio, the probability of entering into the top
decile is signicantly higher following a high VIX quarter-end than following a low
one. For example, 12:3% of stocks deliver top decile four-factor alphas subsequent
to high VIX quarter-ends, compared to 7:5% following low VIX quarter-ends. The
difference is statistically signicant at the 1% level.49 The results using CAPM alphas
are even stronger. Turning to the Sharpe ratio, the probability of entering into the top
decile is 10:8% following a high VIX quarter-end, compared to 9:1% following a low
one. Again, the difference is 1% signicant. This evidence suggests that the greater
dispersion in alphas during high VIX times is not generated mechanically by the high
volatility, since volatility is in the denominator of the Sharpe ratio and high volatility
48 The 90th percentiles of the distribution for the CAPM alpha, the four-factor alpha and the Sharpe
ratio are 7:51%, 7:53%, and 0:67, respectively.
49 To get a sense of the statistical signicance, the 95% condence interval for the probability of
entering into the top decile in terms of the four-factor alpha is [12:1%, 12:5%] following a high VIX
period, compared to [7:3%, 7:6%] for a low VIX period.
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would work against nding high Sharpe ratios. Overall, the evidence lends support
to the notion that there are more investment opportunities during volatile markets.
[Insert Figure III about here]
Given that volatile markets are associated with attractive investment opportu-
nities, I expect fund managers with better stock-picking skills to capture these prof-
itable opportunities. Wermers (2000) and Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000)
show that high-turnover funds and growth funds have better stock picking talents,
thus these funds could take advantage of the alpha opportunities during volatile peri-
ods if they have sufcient liquidity.
In sum, fund managers react to expected volatility because higher expected
volatility periods are followed by: (1) a higher probability of fund outows and (2)
a greater proportion of stocks with positive alphas. I also show that funds with the
following characteristics are associated with greater outows or better investment
opportunities during highly volatile periods: funds from small fund families50, low-
load funds, poorly performing funds, funds with high return volatility, growth funds,
and high-turnover funds. As such, these funds should have stronger preferences for
liquid stocks during periods of high expected volatility.
50 An additional rationale for small-family funds to exhibit greater preference for liquid securities is
that they have higher costs in getting outside funds in the form of credit lines and fund-family borrow-
ing when in trouble. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) document that large mutual fund families have
greater latitude in allocating resources across their funds. Chen et al. (2004) argue that large fund
families have economies of scale associated with marketing, trading commissions, and stock lending
fee. Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) show that a fund family with lower correlation between fund re-
turns in the family, presumably large families, have a greater probability of producing stars, and there
exists a ow spillover within these fund families that possess a star fund.
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2.5 Changes in Liquidity Preferences of Mutual Funds
across Market States
This section examines the relationship between mutual fund liquid stock holdings
and expected volatility. I rst conduct tests on the fund level, examining how mu-
tual funds' liquid stock holdings vary with expected market volatility. Section 1:5:1
presents the results on fund-level analysis. I then switch to stock-level analysis. Sec-
tion 1:5:2 rst examines the liquidity characteristics of stocks bought and sold by
mutual funds during high versus low VIX innovation periods, followed by regression
results on the stock level.
2.5.1 Fund-Level Analysis
A. Liquid Stock Holdings of Mutual Funds: Univariate Analysis
In this subsection, I test whether the proportion of liquid stocks in a fund's assets is
related to expected volatility. I use both level-on-level and change-on-change tests.
The level-on-level test examines how the fraction of liquid stock holdings in mutual
funds' assets (termed liquidity weight hereafter) varies with the level of the VIX.
Specically, the liquidity weight is measured by the ratio of the total dollars invested
in liquid stocks to the total net assets. For this test, I calculate the liquidity weight for
each manager at each quarter-end, then calculating the mean weight across all funds
at each quarter-end. Panel A in Table IV reports the time-series average of the cross-
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sectional mean weight for high and low VIX quarters. I use three different cutoffs
for the Amihud illiquidity ratiobottom 1%, bottom 5%, and bottom 10%to identify
liquid stocks. For all three cutoffs, the average fund manager holds a signicantly
larger fraction of liquid stocks in the portfolio during high VIX times compared to
during low VIX times. For example, the top 5% liquid securities constitute 39:0%
of the average fund manager's total net assets during high VIX periods versus 33:7%
during low VIX periods. The difference between these two states is statistically and
economically signicant.
The change-on-change test examines how the change in the liquidity weight of
mutual funds varies with the change in the VIX. I calculate the change in the liquidity
weight for each fund at each quarter-end by subtracting the liquidity weight of the
previous quarter-end from that of the current quarter-end. The change in the VIX is
obtained as the residual in AR(3) regression of the VIX series. Similar to the level-
on-level test, I rst calculate the cross-sectional mean change in liquidity weights at
each quarter-end, and then compute the time-series average for high and low VIX
innovation quarters separately. Panel B in Table IV reports the results. The economic
magnitude of changes in liquidity weight is not as large as that observed in Panel A.
Nevertheless, when the 5% and 10% cutoffs are used to identify liquid stocks, we see
that mutual funds signicantly increase their liquid stock holdings during high VIX
innovation quarters relative to low VIX innovation quarters. In fact, they increase
their liquidity weight when the VIX increases, and decrease their liquidity weight
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when the VIX decreases. The result for the 1% cutoff is weaker, but in the same
direction.
[Insert Table IV about here]
B. Liquid Stock Holdings of Mutual Funds: Multivariate Analysis
While the univariate results are consistent with the hypothesis that fund managers tilt
their holdings toward liquid stocks during high VIX times, this tilting could also be
driven by other factors. Since the valuation of liquid stocks could be driven up during
periods of high volatility, the univariate test may just capture the relative valuation
effect of liquid stocks versus illiquid stocks. Alternatively, as documented by Busse
(1999), fund managers tend to time market volatility by decreasing market exposure
during times when market volatility is high. If liquid stocks tend to be low-beta
stocks, then the univariate analysis may just be picking up volatility timing. Thus, it
is important to control for the market exposure of liquid stocks. In addition, mutual
fund managers could be timing market liquidity as suggested by Cao, Simin, and
Wang (2007). That is, fund managers reduce market exposure in illiquid markets. If
high volatility periods are accompanied by market illiquidity and liquid stocks have
low betas, we could also nd a positive relationship between liquid stock holdings
and market volatility.
I explicitly control for these alternative possible inuence on mutual funds'
liquid stock holdings by estimating a xed-effect panel regression,51
51 In the baseline specication, I assume that time-specic effects are fully captured by fund-invariant
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LiqWti;q = + i + V IXq + MktLiqWtq + MktIlliqq + Xi;q + "i;q
where LiqWti;q is fund i's liquid stock holdings as a fraction of its total assets at the
end of quarter q, i is the unobservable fund effect, V IXq is the average VIX of the
last 21 trading days in the quarter, MktLiqWtq is the ratio of the capitalization of
liquid stocks to that of the market portfolio at the end of quarter q,MktIlliqq is the
value-weighted average Amihud illiquidity ratio of the market portfolio at the end
of quarter q, Xi;q is a set of fund characteristics measured at the end of quarter q
including fund size, fund family size, age, liquid stock beta, and so on. In particular,
liquid stock beta is measured as the principal-weighted beta of liquid stocks in a
fund's portfolio, which is used to control for Busse's (1999) volatility timing effect.
Panel A in Table V reports the results for all three cutoffs. The estimated impact of
VIX is statistically signicant at the 1% condence level in all specications, and
the economic magnitude is large as well. The results in Column 2 (for the top 5%
liquid stocks) suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the VIX (for example,
from 15 to 25) could increase the average mutual fund's liquidity weight by 0:6%
(for example, from 30% to 30:6%). The number is comparable to that in Panel B of
Table IV. When translated into dollar terms, this means that the mutual fund industry
reallocated $6:2 billion dollars to liquid stocks during high VIX quarters.52
variables including the VIX, market valuation of liquid stocks, and market illiquidity. The assumption
is admittedly quite strong. In Section 2.5.1.C, I relax this assumption by adding time xed effects and
focus on the interaction effects.
52 To get the number, multiply 0.6% by the average TNA ($1,331 million), then by the average
number of funds (775) at each quarter-end.
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Since a fund's position in liquid stocks is likely to be persistent over time and
fund managers might slowly adjust their positions to achieve the optimal liquidity, I
include lagged liquidity weights as controls and re-estimate the baseline regression.
For such panel-dynamic models, the least-squares dummy variable estimator is in-
consistent, but the maximum likelihood estimator is consistent for random-effects
models. Thus, I treat unobservable effects as random and estimate the model using
MLE. Panel B of Table V presents the results using 5% as the cutoff to identify liq-
uid stocks. The results for other cutoffs are qualitatively similar. The coefcients of
the lagged liquidity weights are highly signicant, suggesting persistence in a fund's
holdings of liquid securities. The coefcient for the VIX is still highly signicant,
and the magnitude is comparable to the baseline case.
Table V also reveals a number of other interesting ndings. Large funds favor
a high liquidity weight. This could be driven by their transaction cost considerations
because they hold large positions in individual stocks. Funds experiencing large out-
ows in the past year tend to maintain a high liquidity weight, which is reasonable
if past redemptions are a good proxy for future redemptions. Funds in which the
principal-weighted beta of liquid stocks is high tend to keep a high liquidity weight.
Thus the relationship between the VIX and liquidity weight is robust to the inclu-
sion of liquid stock betas as controls, suggesting that the results are not driven by
volatility timing. High-expense funds hold less liquid stocks. Mutual funds' asset
weights in liquidity stocks are signicantly positively related to the weight of liquid
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stocks in the market portfolio in the baseline specication. However, they change
signs and become insignicant when we control for lagged liquidity weights in the
dynamic specication. Similarly, fund managers' liquidity weight is signicantly
and negatively related to market illiquidity in the baseline specication, but it be-
comes positive in the dynamic specication. Two possible reasons for these changes
are that: (1) I do not assume fund xed effects in the dynamic model, and (2) the
lagged liquidity weight is correlated with these variables and thus absorbs some of
the effects.
[Insert Table V about here]
C. The Effect of Fund Characteristics
As discussed in Section 2:4, some fund characteristics are associated with outows or
investment opportunities during periods of high volatility. To gauge the effect of these
fund characteristics on precautionary liquidity holdings, I include an interaction term
combining the VIX and fund characteristic variables in the panel regression. Unlike
the baseline specication where time effects are assumed to be fully captured by
the fund-invariant variables, I include both fund and time dummies to focus on the
interaction effect. Time dummies are intended to capture any time specic effects
such as the VIX, market valuation of liquid stocks, market illiquidity, etc.
For the effect of fund family associations, I use a dummy for small fund fam-
ilies, which is dened as the bottom 90% in terms of family size measured by the
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TNA of all funds under the same management company at each quarter-end. I use the
investment objective code (ioc) provided by Thomson Financial to identify growth
funds and income funds. Funds with ioc = 2 and 3 are identied as growth funds and
funds with ioc = 4 are identied as income funds.53 I use the raw measure for the fol-
lowing characteristics: total loads, past returns, return volatility, and fund turnover.
For fund characteristics such as small family, high return volatility, high turnover, and
growth oriented, a signicant positive coefcient on the interaction term is evidence
that funds with these characteristics have a greater tendency to tilt their portfolios to-
ward liquid stocks during times when the VIX is higher. For funds with poor past
returns or low loads, a signicant negative coefcient on the interaction term is ex-
pected.
Table VI summaries the results with the bottom 5% stocks in Amihud illiq-
uidity ratio identied as liquid stocks. The results for other cutoffs are qualitatively
similar. The coefcients of our variable of interest, the interaction term, have the ex-
pected sign and are statistically signicant. The only exception is the interaction term
with total loads, which is insignicant and negative. In fact, this interaction term is
signicant and negative when the bottom 1% stocks in Amihud illiquidity ratio are
used to identify liquid stocks.
Among the characteristics considered, fund return volatility and investment
style have the largest impact. For a 10 percentage point increase in the VIX, funds
53 This classication is similar to Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000). The only difference is that
I do not include balanced funds in my sample.
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at the 75th percentile in return volatility increase their liquid stock holdings by 0:9
((5:11%  3:29%)  4:942  10) percentage points higher than funds at the 25th per-
centile in return volatility. Growth funds also tilt their portfolios to liquid stocks sig-
nicantly; the increase in liquidity weights for growth funds is 0:8 percentage points
higher than that for value funds. Other characteristics, such as poor past performance,
high turnover, and small family association, are associated with 0:2 to 0:3 percentage
point increases in their liquidity weights than funds with the opposite characteristics.
Recall that the same magnitude of changes in the VIX leads to a 0:6 percentage point
increase in the liquidity weight for the average fund. Thus, the effect of fund char-
acteristics on funds' precautionary liquidity holdings is economically signicant as
well.
[Insert Table VI about here]
2.5.2 Stock-Level Analysis
A. Mutual Fund Trading, Expected Volatility and Stock Character-
istics
The stock-level analysis starts out by examining the liquidity characteristics of stocks
traded by fund managers during high versus low VIX innovation periods. An impli-
cation of the precautionary story is that fund managers buy liquid stocks and sell
illiquid stocks during periods when expected volatility increases and vice versa. In
this subsection, I test whether stocks bought (versus sold) by mutual funds during
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high (versus low) VIX innovation times are more liquid. This is similar to a change-
on-change test on the stock level.
For this test, I infer mutual fund trading activity from the quarterly holdings
data. Following Gibson, Saeddine, and Titman (2000), for stock i in quarter q, the




shares owned of stock i by fund j at quarter q
shares outstanding of stock i at quarter q  
PN
j=1
shares owned of stock i by fund j at quarter q 1
shares outstanding of stock i at quarter q 1
whereN is the number of mutual funds that report their holdings of stock i at the end
of quarter q  1 plus the number of funds that initiate their holdings of stock i during
quarter q.
At each quarter-end, I sort stocks into deciles by the net change in mutual
fund ownership: the bottom decile (D1) consists of the most heavily sold stocks and
the top decile (D10) consists of the most heavily bought stocks by mutual funds. I
examine various liquidity characteristics of the bottom versus the top decile stocks
during high and low VIX innovation times. In particular, for each quarter-end, I
calculate the cross-sectional mean statistics of the four liquidity measures (price,
turnover, size, and Amihud illiquidity ratio) across stocks in D1 and D10 deciles
separately. Table VII reports the time-series average of these mean statistics across
high and low VIX innovation quarters and the results of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test of
the null hypothesis that the liquidity characteristics in the two deciles are identical.
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistic resulting from a difference-in-difference test of
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whether the difference between D1 and D10 is signicantly different across high and
low VIX innovation regimes is also reported.
For both rank (Panel A) and raw (Panel B) measures of liquidity, the difference-
in-difference test shows that the difference between D1 and D10 in regards to the
stock price, size, and Amihud illiquidity ratio is signicantly greater during the high
VIX innovation period than during the low VIX innovation period. The result seems
to be driven mainly by the liquidity difference of D1 and D10 stocks during high
VIX innovation periods. Specically, D10 (heavily bought) stocks have signicantly
higher prices, larger sizes, and lower Amihud illiquidity ratios than D1 (heavily sold)
stocks during high VIX innovation periods. This is consistent with fund managers
reallocating their portfolios toward more liquid assets during times when the VIX in-
creases. Turnover is the only variable that does not differ signicantly for D1 and
D10 stocks during both high and low states. One reason could be that turnover is
not an exogenous characteristic because mutual fund trading (purchasing and sell-
ing) contributes to higher turnover. A similar argument could be applied to price,
which is signicantly higher for D10 stocks than D1 stocks during both high and low
states. This could arise because mutual fund trading exerts price pressure on stocks
or because mutual fund trading is informative.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with fund managers reallocating assets to
liquid stocks during times when the market is expected to be more volatile.
[Insert Table VII about here]
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B. Mutual Fund Ownership of Liquid Stocks: Multivariate Test
In the stock-level multivariate test, I rst run cross-sectional regressions of mutual
fund ownership on stock liquidity (size, price, turnover, and Amihud illiquidity ra-
tio) and other characteristics, one for each quarter. If fund managers hold more liquid
stocks during periods of high expected volatility, the coefcients of the liquidity vari-
ables should be greater for high VIX periods than for low VIX periods.
Since the magnitude of an ordinary regression coefcient depends on the scale
of both the dependent variable and independent variables, which in this setting are
time-varying, we cannot directly compare the coefcients using the raw data.54 An-
other issue with regressing mutual fund ownership on rm characteristics is that the
relationshipship could be non-linear (Falkenstein, 1996). To tackle these problems, I
transform all of the independent and dependent variables into standardized percentile
ranks, ranging from 0 to 1.55 Specically, in each quarter, I rank stocks based on
the levels of a variable and assign percentile ranks to stocks, then dividing these per-
centile ranks by 100. In this way, all variables are transformed into values evenly
spread between 0 and 1, where 0 represents the minimum and 1 represents the maxi-
mum.
54 Consider an example where mutual funds have constant liquidity preference over different volatil-
ity states. If the average MFO during the high VIX state is twice as large as the average MFO during
the low VIX state and the liquidity characteristics of the average stock does not change, the coefcient
estimates from the regression of raw MFO on raw stock characteristics will simply double during the
high VIX state. Similarly, the independent variables in such regressions, i.e., the stock characteristics,
are also time-varying. This could also lead to time-series variation in raw coefcient estimates.
55 This is similar to Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996).
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As the rst step, I follow Gompers and Metrick (2001) and estimate a cross-
sectional regression of MFO on the stock characteristics for each quarter. The average
coefcients for 68 OLS regressions are reported in Table VIII. I use two specica-
tions. The rst specication (Panel A) uses price, turnover, and size as liquidity
measures. The second specication (Panel B) uses size and Amihud illiquidity ratio
as liquidity measures.56 The results show that, over the entire sample period, mutual
fund ownership is positively related to all three liquidity measures and negatively re-
lated to the illiquidity measure, the risk measures, and lagged returns. These results
are generally consistent with Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennett, Sias, and
Starks (2003), except those for volatility and specic risk.57
[Insert Table VIII about here]
To examine the hypothesis that mutual fund managers' preferences for liquidity
vary across market volatility states, I compare the aggregated coefcients of the liq-
uidity measures across high and low VIX periods using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
The results reported in Table IX show that all coefcients of the liquidity measures
are larger in the high expected volatility period than in the low expected volatility
period. In the rst two columns, I test the null hypothesis that the sum of the coef-
56 Gompers and Metrick (2001) suggest that failing to control for size could lead to serious omitted-
variable bias.
57 The two papers, by Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), show
positive coefcients for volatility and specic risk, while I nd signicantly negative coefcients. The
discrepancy could be due to: (1) the dependent variable in the two papers is institutional ownership,
not mutual fund ownership; (2) although Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) also examine mutual fund
ownership, their data source (13F) is different from that used in this paper and the sample period is
more recent in this paper; and (3) the two papers do not consider possible nonlinearity in the relation
between institutional ownership and the risk measures, while my paper takes this into account by
using the rank measure.
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cients of price, turnover, and size is not signicantly different across the two states.
In the last two columns, the null hypothesis is that the difference between the coef-
cients of size and Amihud illiquidity ratio (Size IlliquidityRatio) is not signicantly
different in the two states. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistics reject both nulls at
the 1% level. To get some sense of economic signicance, consider a stock moving
from the lowest liquidity centile (in terms of size and illiquidity ratio) to the high-
est liquidity centile. Controlling for other characteristics, the MFO rank of the stock
will move up by 60 out of 100 in the low expected volatility state, while it will move
up by 68 out of 100 in the high expected volatility state.
Table IX also presents evidence consistent with volatility timing by fund man-
agers. The coefcient on beta is signicantly smaller during high VIX times than
during low VIX times, which suggests that fund managers decrease their market ex-
posure during high volatility times.
[Insert Table IX about here]
C. The Effect of Fund Characteristics
To examine the effect of fund characteristics on the dynamic preference of mutual
funds, I rst divide funds at the end of a given quarter into high- and low-type groups
based on their characteristics. I then calculate mutual fund ownership measures for
each stock at each quarter, separately for high- and low-type funds. I use the stock-
level multivariate test to examine the heterogeneity of liquidity preferences for liq-
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uidity stocks across high- and low-type funds. Table X reports the results. To save
space, I only report the aggregated liquidity coefcient on size and the Amihud illiq-
uidity ratio (i.e., Size   IlliquidityRatio) along with the associated Wilcoxon test sta-
tistics.58 The results are generally consistent with the fund-level results. Specically,
difference-in-difference tests show that, relative to funds with opposite characteris-
tics, small-family, low-load, high-volatility, and growth funds increase their liquid
stock holdings signicantly during high VIX periods relative to low VIX periods.
The results for the other two fund characteristics, i.e., past performance and fund
turnover, are insignicant.
[Insert Table X about here]
To summarize, both fund- and stock-level tests show that mutual fund managers
tend to hold a large proportion of their assets in liquid securities under highly uncer-
tain market conditions. They achieve the desired liquidity level through purchasing
liquid stocks and selling illiquid stocks. This dynamic liquidity preference is more
prevalent for small-family, low-load, poorly-performing, high-volatility, growth-oriented,
and high-turnover funds. The evidence is consistent with the notion that the benet
of precautionary liquidity holdings is greater for these funds.
58 The unreported results using size, price, and turnover as liquidity measures are remarkably similar.
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2.6 Precautionary Liquidity Holdings and Fund
Performance
The evidence thus far shows that fund managers invest a larger fraction of their assets
in liquid stocks when expected market volatility is higher. A natural question to ask
is how this affects mutual fund performance. Since liquid stocks earn lower expected
returns than illiquid stocks on average, fund performance could be adversely affected
should managers hold more liquid stocks. However, there are at least two reasons
why this behavior could result in superior returns. First, the precautionary liquidity
holdings serve as shock absorber when large redemptions occur, thus mitigating the
adverse effect of liquidity service that a fund has to provide investors. Second, liquid
stock holdings provide dry powder for bargain hunting, which should show up in
abnormal fund returns if and when the price of those distressed stocks reverses.
To gauge the effect of precautionary liquidity holdings on fund performance, I
run multivariate panel regressions to examine whether precautionary liquidity hold-
ings predict abnormal fund performance in the subsequent period. I use four bench-
marks to adjust for fund performance, i.e., the CAPM, the Fama-French-Carhart four-
factor model, the Fama-French-Carhart model augmented with a liquidity factor by
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), and the conditional model proposed by Ferson and
Schadt (1996). The liquidity factor is constructed as the value weighted return of
a spread portfolio that is long the top decile stocks in liquidity beta and short the
bottom decile stocks in liquidity beta. The conditional model uses predetermined
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conditioning variables, including the dividend yield of the CRSP index, a Treasury
yield spread, a corporate bond yield spread, and a short-term Treasury bill rate, to
account for time-varying risk premiums and time-varying betas.
I adapt the approach of Chen et al. (2004) to estimate factor loadings. I rst sort
all funds into ve quintiles by lagged TNA at the beginning of each quarter. To take
into account the effect of liquid stock holdings on factor loadings, within each size
quintile, I sort funds into quintile portfolios ranked on liquidity weight. I then track
these 25 portfolios for one quarter and use the entire time-series of their monthly re-
turns to estimate the loadings to various factors for each of the 25 portfolios. For each
month, each fund inherits the loadings of one of these 5 5 size and liquidity portfo-
lios that it belongs to. The one-month-ahead expected fund return is then calculated
by using the above factor loadings along with the realized factor returns (including
return on the risk-free asset) for the next month. Finally, the risk-adjusted return is
calculated as the difference between the realized fund return and the expected fund
return.
To test the hypothesis that liquid stock holdings of mutual funds in high VIX
periods contribute to abnormal performance in the next period, I adapt the method-
ology used by Chen et al. (2004). Specically, I use a xed-effect panel model and
regress next month's abnormal fund net returns on the fund's liquidity weight, an
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interaction term combining the VIX and the liquidity weight, and other fund charac-
teristics measured at the end of the current quarter59:
ARi;q+1 = + i +  q + LiqWti;q + V IXq  LiqWti;q + Xi;q + "i;q
where ARi;q+1 is the abnormal net return for fund i in the rst month following
the end of quarter q, i is the unobservable fund effect,  q is the xed time effect,
V IXq is the average VIX of the last 21 trading days in the quarter, LiqWti;q is
the fraction of liquid securities in fund i's assets at the end of quarter q, Xi;q is a
set of fund characteristics measured at the end quarter q including fund size, fund
family size, age, lagged returns, return volatility, turnover, expenses, load fees, and
so on. The variable of interest is the coefcient of the interaction term, which is
a difference-in-difference estimate of whether the performance difference of funds
with high liquidity holdings versus low liquidity holdings is signicantly different
across high and low VIX periods.
Table XI reports the results. Notice that the coefcients in front of the inter-
action terms are positive and signicant across the four performance measures. The
coefcients are around 0:05   0:11 basis points with robust t-statistics (clustered by
fund) greater than 5. Notably, the results using the liquidity-augmented benchmark
(in Column 3) deliver a coefcient very close to that using Fama-French-Carhart
four factor benchmark. To the extent that the liquidity factor captures the premium
that liquid stocks earn during volatile times, the abnormal return after this adjustment
59 Since I also include year xed effects in the panel regression, all fund-invariant variables, such as
the VIX, are not identied and are thus omitted.
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should capture only the benets associated with fund ows and investment opportu-
nities. To get some economic sense, consider a fund manager who responds to a two
standard deviation shock of VIX by increasing her liquid stock holdings by two stan-
dard deviations. The abnormal return, net of fees and expenses, in the subsequent
month would increase by 36:4 basis points (0:05 times 13:4 times 54:0) based on the
most conservative estimate. This translates into a 4:4% increase in abnormal perfor-
mance in annualized terms. The evidence provides strong support for the notion that
liquid stock holdings during high VIX times contribute to signicant abnormal fund
returns in the subsequent period.
The table also shows several other interesting results. The coefcient in front
of liquid stock holdings (LiqWt) is signicantly negative, which is consistent with
liquid funds having lower returns than less liquid ones during normal times. Consis-
tent with Chen et al. (2004), fund size is a signicantly negative predictor of fund
performance, but fund family size is not signicant.




The paper examines how active mutual fund managers use liquid stocks to fulll their
liquidity needs during highly volatile times. A natural question to ask is: How are
cash holdings (the most liquid assets) related to the big picture?
Since information on quarterly cash holdings (fraction of a mutual fund's assets
in cash) is available from the CRSP starting fromMarch 2000, the following tests are
implemented with a sub-sample for which cash position data is available. The rst
test simply includes cash holdings as a control in the fund-level panel regressions.
The purpose is to see whether cash holdings affect fund managers' liquidity needs,
and in particular, whether cash holdings could mufe the effect of the VIX on their
liquid stock holdings. As it turns out (Column 1 of Table XII), cash holdings have
a negative and signicant impact on a fund's liquid stock holdings, suggesting that
the two are substitutes. Nevertheless, the effect of the VIX on liquid stock holdings
is still highly signicant when cash holdings are included. Note that, because the
test uses only the latter period of the sample where cash information is available, the
results are not directly comparable to those obtained using the baseline model and
the full sample.
A second test uses cash holdings as the dependent variable in a multivariate
panel regression to examine whether fund managers use cash to meet their liquidity
needs during high VIX periods. Interestingly, when cash holdings as a fraction of
total net assets are regressed on the VIX and other fund characteristics, the coef-
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cient in front of the VIX is insignicant (Column 2 of Table XII). This suggests that
fund managers do not adjust their cash positions in response to changes in expected
volatility during the post-2000 era.
The last test explores whether a large proportion of holdings in cash during
high VIX times leads to superior fund performance in the next period. In unreported
results where I replace liquid stock holdings with cash holdings in the performance
panel regression, the interaction term is insignicant. This indicates that cash hold-
ings in advance of market turmoil might not be as valuable as liquid stock holdings
for fund investors.
[Insert Table XII about here]
2.7.2 Excluding Flight-to-Liquidity Episodes
The paper shows that mutual fund holdings of liquid stocks increase during periods of
high expected volatility. One possibility is that fund managers anticipating liquidity
needs in the future respond by accumulating liquid stocks today. Another possibil-
ity is that the evidence is driven by some extreme episodes associated with ight
to liquidity.60 That is, fund managers rebalance their portfolios toward more liquid
securities when the market is actually (as opposed to being expected to be) in tur-
moil. However, the precautionary explanation and this alternative ight explanation
60 Flight to quality is not a big concern here because I controlled for risk (market betas) in the
stock-level cross-sectional regressions. If mutual funds ock to stocks with low betas during times of
market stress, this effect will be captured by a smaller coefcient in front of beta for high VIX periods.
This is exactly what is seen in Table X.
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are not mutually exclusive. The ight to liquidity behavior could be driven by fund
managers' expectation that the crisis still needs time to unfold, which gives them an
incentive to hold liquid securities for precautionary reasons. Nevertheless, to dis-
entangle these two explanations, I re-estimate the regressions in Section 2:5:1 after
excluding fund/quarter observations which are likely to be associated with ight-to-
liquidity episodes. Since ight-to-liquidity episodes are generally characterized by
market downturns and illiquid markets, I identify ight periods as quarters with high
VIX, low market returns, and high market illiquidity. There are 7 quarters in the
sample that have a higher-than-median VIX and market illiquidity, and a lower-than-
median market return. For example, the third quarter of 1998 is picked up, which is
an extreme episode of ight to liquidity with the collapse of Long-Term Capital Man-
agement. The results obtained when the observations associated with ight events are
excluded should capture only the precautionary effect.
Column 3 in Table XII reports the panel regression results using only fund/quarter
observations that are not ight-related. The coefcient in front of the VIX is still
highly signicant, and the magnitude is greater than in the baseline case, which sug-
gests that the ndings of precautionary liquidity preferences are not driven by ight
episodes.
I also use stock-level analysis to examine this alternative hypothesis. After
estimating the cross-sectional regressions, I compare the coefcients from the non-
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ight high VIX quarters with those from the low VIX ones. The results (not reported)
conrm the fund-level results.
2.7.3 Subperiod Results
Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) present evidence that institutional preferences have
changed over time. To ensure that the results presented here are not driven by mutual
funds' shift in preferences over time, I separate the full sample into two equal sub-
periods, each with 34 quarters. Again, I use both fund- and stock-level analyses for
each subperiod. The results for fund-level panel regressions are reported in Columns
4 and 5 of Table XII. Notice that, in both subperiods, the coefcients of the VIX are
highly signicant. The magnitude in the latter half of the sample is higher than in
the rst half. The results for stock level regressions, not reported, are qualitatively
similar to the full sample results.
2.8 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper is the rst in the literature to examine the dynamic liquidity preferences
of mutual funds and the impact of such preferences on fund performance. Consistent
with the precautionary view of liquidity preferences, I nd evidence that fund man-
agers tilt their holdings more heavily toward liquid securities when expected market
volatility is higher. The ndings are robust to a number of specication checks and
changes in the sample, such as the inclusion of cash holdings as controls, exclusion
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of ight-to-liquidity episodes, and different subperiods. Mutual fund managers tend
to buy liquid stocks and steer clear of illiquid stocks during times when innovation in
the VIX is high. Stock-level analysis also shows that mutual funds' preferences for
liquid stocks are signicantly greater during times when market volatility is expected
to be higher. This type of liquidity preference is more pronounced among small-
family funds, low-load funds, funds with unfavorable past performance, funds with
high volatility, growth funds, and high-turnover funds. I also show that these fund
characteristics are associated with withdrawals and investment opportunities during
times of high volatility. Thus, the evidence is consistent with the notion that the
benets of precautionary liquidity holdings tend to be greater for these fund types.
The paper also nds strong empirical evidence that funds with high liquid stock
holdings during times of high expected market volatility have better risk-adjusted
performance in the subsequent period. This provides the rst evidence that nancial
exibility, in the form of liquid asset holdings, under a highly uncertain environ-
ment, adds value. From the perspective of fund investors, this suggests that actively
managed funds could provide a valuable hedge against expected market volatility.
The study has several implications. First, if mutual fund managers' preferences
for liquid stocks are time-varying, liquidity-based asset pricing models where agents
are assumed to have time-invariant preferences for liquid stocks should be adjusted.
Second, it might appear that mutual funds are herding when they exhibit such dy-
namic preferences, i.e., trade the same type of stocks (liquid versus illiquid stocks)
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at the same time (high versus low expected market volatility). However, they are
actively managing their portfolio liquidity. Thus, it is important to control for the ef-
fect of dynamic liquidity holdings when examining mutual fund herding. Last, since
mutual funds are becoming a dominant force in the equity market, how their trading
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This figure plots the CBOE VIX series and the VIX innovation series (both in percentage points, 
left scale) from 1990Q1 to 2006Q4. The VIX of each quarter is calculated as the average VIX of 
the last 21 trading days in that quarter. The innovation in VIX is obtained as the residual in AR(3) 
regression of the VIX series. Panel A presents the VIX series, with the bars indicating high VIX 
quarters, i.e., quarters with higher than median VIX. Panel B presents the VIX innovation series, 
with the bars indicating high VIX innovation quarters, i.e., quarters with higher than median VIX 
innovations.  
 











































This figure presents the frequency distribution of one-month-ahead fund net flows at high versus 
low VIX quarter-ends. The horizontal axis shows fund flow bins, with the left tail representing 
outflows and vice versa. In Panel A, the distribution of fund net flows, as percentage of lagged 
NAV, is divided into discrete bins based on pre-specified cutoffs. In Panel B, the distribution is 
sorted into deciles where extreme outflows are in D1 and vice versa.  
 




























This figure presents the frequency distribution of the six-month-ahead abnormal stock return 
(Panel A and B) and Sharpe ratio (Panel C) at high versus low VIX quarter-ends. The horizontal 
axis shows decile bins based on stock performance, with the left tail representing loser stocks and 
vice versa. Abnormal returns are obtained using the CAPM (Panel A) and the Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor model (Panel B). Sharpe ratio is computed for each stock as the average of the 
monthly returns net of the risk-free rate during the 6 months subsequent to a quarter-end divided 
by the standard deviation of the returns. 
 
 











































Summary Statistics for Mutual Fund Sample 
 
The table presents summary statistics on the mutual fund sample obtained from the merged CRSP 
Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database and Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Mutual 
Fund Holdings Database. The sample consists of 1,962 distinct fund entities comprising 45,583 
fund-quarters. TNA is the total net assets of the fund. Family Size is measured as the log of one 
plus the cumulative TNA of the other funds in the fund’s family. Net Flow is the percentage new 
fund flow into the mutual fund over the past 12 months. Variance of Net Flows is measured as the 
variance of the monthly net flows over the past 12 months. Total Load is the sum of front-end 
load fees and rear-end load fees. Liquid Stock Beta is the average beta of the top 5% liquid stocks 
in the fund’s equity portfolio, weighted by the dollar amount invested. Portfolio Concentration is 
the inverse of the number of stocks held by the fund. Turnover is defined as the minimum of 
aggregate purchases or sales of securities during the year, divided by the average TNA. Age is the 
number of years since the initiation of the fund. Expense ratio is the percentage of total 
investment that shareholders pay for the fund’s operating expenses. Lagged Return is the buy-
and-hold fund return over the past 12 months. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the 
monthly fund return over the past 12 months. For each item, I first compute the cross-sectional 
statistics in each quarter from 1993 to 2006. The reported statistics are time-series averages of the 
cross-sectional figures.  
 







TNA ($million) 1,349.39 293.15 98.70 958.55 4,142.06 
Log(TNA) 5.73 5.62 4.55 6.79 1.57 
Log(FamSize) 8.04 8.52 6.80 9.92 2.90 
Variance(Net Flows) 40.74 7.98 5.50 18.52 158.89 
Net Flows (%) 12.89 -2.03 -14.00 19.19 56.22 
Liquid Stock Beta 1.02 1.02 0.78 1.29 0.59 
Portfolio Concentration (x100) 1.62 1.40 0.92 2.05 1.11 
Total Load (%) 2.31 1.38 0.00 4.76 2.39 
Turnover (%) 88.50 65.86 36.09 110.46 166.54 
Age (years) 13.31 9.04 5.86 16.74 10.50 
Expenses (%) 1.28 1.22 0.98 1.52 0.44 
Lagged Return (%) 11.18 10.08 3.46 17.54 12.32 
Return Volatility (%) 4.34 3.99 3.29 5.11 1.62 
 124
Table II 
Summary Statistics for Stock Sample 
 
The table reports summary statistics for the stocks in the sample. All common stocks traded on 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with adequate CRSP/CompuStat data are included in the sample. 
Mutual Fund Ownership (MFO) is calculated by summing the reported holdings of the sample 
mutual funds at each quarter-end and divide by the total shares outstanding for the firm. Amihud 
illiquidity ratio is the normalized Amihud illiquidity ratio as suggested by Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005). Firm size is measured as the quarter-end market capitalization. Share price is measured as 
the quarter-end price per share. Share turnover is defined as the average ratio of monthly volume 
to number of shares outstanding in the current quarter. Firm age is measured as the number of 
months since a stock first appears in CRSP monthly stock file. Dividend yield is measured as the 
cash dividends for the fiscal year ended at least three months before the current quarter-end, 
divided by size as of December 31 during that fiscal year. Return volatility is estimated as the 
standard deviation of monthly returns over the previous two years. Beta is estimated as the sum of 
the coefficients in a regression of the firm’s monthly return on the contemporaneous and lagged 
one-month CRSP NYSE/AMEX value-weighted index over the previous 24-60 months. Firm-
specific volatility is measured as the three-month average of the Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and 
Xu (2001) monthly firm-specific risk measure over the current quarter. Lagged return is measured 
as the six-month cumulative gross returns prior to the beginning of the quarter. For each item, I 
first compute the cross-sectional statistics in each quarter from 1990 to 2006. The reported 
statistics are time-series averages of the cross-sectional figures.  
 







MFO (%) 5.78 4.10 0.84 9.14 5.77 
Amihud Illiq. Ratio 5.90 0.95 0.31 7.28 9.20 
Price ($) 18.80 13.93 5.23 26.99 17.56 
Turnover (%) 10.97 6.95 3.49 13.43 12.12 
Size ($million) 1,693.58 195.89 51.76 854.71 5,245.63 
Log(B/M) -0.66 -0.56 -1.11 -0.12 0.80 
Beta 1.39 1.20 0.64 1.95 1.10 
Specific Risk 4.02 1.80 0.79 4.27 6.39 
Volatility 14.14 12.66 8.72 17.91 7.07 
Yield (%) 1.05 0.00 0.00 1.71 1.70 
Lagged Return (%) 9.23 7.04 -11.05 26.38 37.60 
Age (months) 199.07 135.43 78.63 257.63 174.19 
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     Table III  
The Effect of Fund Characteristics on the Relation between Expected Volatility and Fund 
Outflows  
 
The table presents the probability of falling into the bottom decile of fund flows subsequent to 
high versus low VIX periods for a number of fund characteristics. I first sort one-month-ahead 
fund flows into deciles. I then sort funds into quartiles based on characteristics at each quarter-
end. I consider the following fund characteristics: fund family size, total load, past returns, return 
volatility, investment style (growth versus value), and fund turnover. The bottom quartile (Q1) 
consists of funds with the lowest values of a characteristic considered and the top quartile (Q4) 
consists of funds with the highest values of the characteristic. For each quarter-end, I calculate the 
cross-sectional mean statistics of the probability of entering into the bottom fund flow decile 
across funds in Q1 and Q4 for each characteristic. The table reports the time-series average of 
these mean statistics across high and low VIX quarters, and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the 
null that the probability of entering into the bottom decile is identical following high and low VIX 
quarter-ends. The last row in each panel reports Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistics resulting from 
difference-in-difference tests of whether the difference between high and low VIX regimes is 
significantly different across Q1 and Q4 funds. 
 
 High VIX Low VIX z-statistic p-value 
Panel A: Fund Family Size 
Small Fund Family (Q1) 12.84% 9.07% 3.55 (0.00) 
Large Fund Family (Q4) 9.97% 9.09% 0.20 (0.84) 
Diff-in-Diff   2.39 (0.02) 
Panel B: Total Load 
Low Load (Q1) 12.81% 8.80% 3.13 (0.00) 
High Load (Q4) 7.57% 4.94% 1.21 (0.22) 
Diff-in-Diff   1.82 (0.07) 
Panel C: Past Returns 
Loser (Q1) 20.35% 14.25% 1.76 (0.08) 
Winner (Q4) 6.92% 6.48% 0.14 (0.89) 
Diff-in-Diff   1.76 (0.08) 
Panel D: Return Volatility 
Low Volatility (Q1) 8.59% 5.97% 1.48 (0.14) 
High Volatility (Q4) 14.94% 13.28% 0.47 (0.64) 
Diff-in-Diff   0.17 (0.87) 
Panel E: Investment Style 
Growth (Q1) 8.51% 10.15% -0.98 (0.16) 
Income (Q4) 13.97% 7.63% 3.81 (0.00) 
Diff-in-Diff   -3.98 (0.00) 
Panel F: Fund Turnover 
Low Turnover (Q1) 8.38% 5.69% 1.97 (0.05) 
High Turnover (Q4) 13.63% 12.79% 0.17 (0.86) 
Diff-in-Diff   0.93 (0.35) 
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Table IV 
Liquid Stock Holdings of Mutual Funds in High vs. Low VIX Quarters 
 
The table reports the summary statistics for mutual funds’ liquidity weights (liquid stock holdings 
as a proportion of TNA, in percentage). I use three cutoffs to identify liquid stocks, i.e., bottom 
1%, 5%, and 10% in Amihud illiquidity ratio. For each cutoff, I first compute the cross-sectional 
mean of liquidity weights (LiqWt) and changes in liquidity weights (∆LiqWt) in each quarter 
from 1993 to 2006. Panel A reports time-series averages of the cross-sectional means of liquidity 
weights for the full sample period (All), the high and the low VIX period. The last two rows in 
Panel A report the z-statistic of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the null hypothesis of no difference 
between liquid stock holdings during high versus low VIX quarters and the associated one-tail p-
values. Panel B reports time-series averages of the cross-sectional means of changes in liquidity 
weights for the full sample period (All), the high VIX innovation period, and the low VIX 
innovation period. The last two rows in Panel B report the z-statistic of the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test of the null hypothesis of no difference between changes in liquid stock holdings during high 
versus low VIX innovation quarters and the associated one-tail p-values. 
 
Panel A: Level-on-Level 
  LiqWt (1%) LiqWt (5%) LiqWt (10%) 
All 15.84 35.99 47.45 
High VIX 17.53 38.65 49.89 
Low VIX 14.20 33.42 45.10 
z-statistic 4.24 4.54 4.24 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Panel B: Change-on-Change 
  ∆LiqWt (1%) ∆LiqWt (5%) ∆LiqWt (10%) 
All 0.13 0.17 0.21 
High VIX Innovation 0.30 0.47 0.49 
Low VIX Innovation -0.05 -0.15 -0.09 
z-statistic 1.00 1.82 1.64 
(p-value) (0.16) (0.03) (0.05) 
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    Table V 
Liquid Stock Holdings of Mutual Funds and Expected Volatility: Multivariate 
Regressions 
 
The table reports the coefficients of the quarterly panel regressions using mutual funds’ liquidity 
weight (LiqWt, liquid stock holdings as a proportion of TNA, in percentage) as dependent 
variables. Market Weight is the ratio of liquid stock market capitalization to overall market 
capitalization. Market Illiquidity is the value-weighted average Amihud illiquidity ratio of all 
stocks in the market portfolio at a given quarter-end. See Table I for the definition of other 
variables. For the baseline regression (Panel A), I treat fund specific effects as fixed. The 
associated t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For the dynamic 
panel model with lagged dependent variables (Panel B), I use an MLE estimator with random 
effects for each fund. The t-statistics using bootstrapped standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Significance on a ten percent (*), five percent (**), or one percent level (***) is 
indicated. 
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VIX 0.041 0.059 0.069 
 (5.28)*** (5.46)*** (6.30)*** 
Var(Net Flows) (x100) 0.107 0.069 0.008 
 (2.83)*** (1.62) (0.19) 
Net Flows (x100)  -0.043  -0.381  -0.670 
 (0.55) (3.70)*** (6.36)*** 
Market Weight 0.424 0.671 0.825 
 (38.17)*** (43.09)*** (39.03)*** 
Market Illiquidity -8.311 -23.171 -18.517 
 (2.38)** (4.75)*** (3.65)*** 
Log(TNA) 0.290 0.517 0.175 
 (4.23)*** (5.62)*** (1.82)* 
Log(FamSize) 0.053 -0.086 -0.229 
 (1.30) (1.60) (4.25)*** 
Liquid Stock Beta 0.834 0.869 0.200 
 (13.41)*** (9.12)*** (1.87)* 
Portfolio Concentration 21.540 15.182 -24.177 
 (2.50)** (1.22) (1.78)* 
Turnover (x100) -0.005 -0.015 -0.002 
 (1.79)* (2.83)*** (0.40) 
Age 0.191 0.308 0.463 
 (5.85)*** (6.79)*** (9.68)*** 
Expenses -0.597 -0.968 -1.368 
 (2.13)** (2.49)** (3.48)*** 
Total Load (x100) 0.014 0.020 0.017 
 (0.84) (0.73) (0.47) 
Lagged Return -0.539 -0.869 0.196 
 (2.57)** (2.86)*** (0.61) 
Return Volatility -20.443 -20.219 -6.426 
 (7.77)*** (5.27)*** (1.56) 
Constant -0.819 -6.010 -15.446 
 (0.45) (2.33)** (5.43)*** 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41,691 41,691 41,691 




Panel B: Dynamic Random Effects (Dependent Variable = LiqWt (5%)) 
  
With 1 Lag 
(1) 
With 2 Lags 
(2) 
VIX 0.057 0.053 
 (7.61)*** (5.74)*** 
Var(Net Flows) (x100) 0.026 -0.030 
 (0.62) (0.68) 
Net Flows (x100) 0.104 0.215 
 (1.92)* (3.05)*** 
Market Weight -0.017 -0.015 
 (1.84)* (1.32) 
Market Illiquidity 5.874 8.846 
 (5.14)*** (7.17)*** 
Log(TNA) 0.021 0.016 
 (0.71) (0.53) 
Log(FamSize) -0.013 -0.007 
 (1.06) (0.50) 
Liquid Stock Beta 0.223 0.076 
 (4.27)*** (1.72)* 
Portfolio Concentration 3.219 2.624 
 (0.78) (0.60) 
Turnover (x100) -0.011 -0.080 
 (0.24) (2.18)** 
Age 0.005 0.007 
 (1.42) (1.98)** 
Expenses -0.301 -0.072 
 (3.49)*** (0.66) 
Total Load (x100) 0.781 -1.345 
 (0.45) (0.71) 
Lagged Return 0.298 0.411 
 (1.89)* (1.93)* 
Return Volatility -5.196 -5.249 
 (2.94)*** (2.48)** 
Lag(LiqWt) 0.980 0.787 
 (825.76)*** (57.03)*** 
Lag2(LiqWt)  0.199 
  (14.44)*** 
Constant -0.952 -2.262 
 (1.43) (2.77)*** 
Observations 27,636 22,631 
Log Likelihood -86,287.14 -69,642.03 
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Table VI 
The Effect of Fund Characteristics on the Relation between Liquid Stock Holdings of 
Mutual Funds and Expected Volatility: Multivariate Regressions 
 
The table reports the coefficients of the quarterly panel regressions using mutual funds’ liquidity 
weights (liquid stock holdings as a proportion of TNA) as dependent variables. Liquid stocks are 
defined as the bottom 5% in Amihud illiquidity ratios. Small Family is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the fund belongs to a family that is in the bottom 90% in terms of family size 
measured by the TNA of all funds under the same management company at each quarter-end. 
Growth is a dummy that equals 1 if the fund is classified as “aggressive growth” or “growth” by 
Thomson Financial. See Table I and V for the definition of other variables. The specification is 
similar to the baseline specification in Table V, except that year fixed effects are included and 
thus fund-invariant variables, such as the VIX, are excluded. All regressions include both fund 
dummies and time dummies. The associated t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VIX*SmallFamily 0.027      
 (3.43)***      
VIX*TotalLoad (x100)  -0.010     
  (1.07)     
VIX*LagReturn   -0.195    
   (3.02)***    
VIX*ReturnVolatility    4.942   
    (10.34)***   
VIX*Growth     0.076  
     (4.54)***  
VIX*Turnover (x100)      3.282 
      (2.33)** 
Var(Net Flows) (x100) 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.086 0.087 0.078 
 (2.07)** (2.06)** (2.08)** (2.03)** (2.07)** (1.90)* 
Net Flows (x100) -0.379 -0.376 -0.397 -0.409 -0.394 -0.372 
 (3.66)*** (3.63)*** (3.82)*** (3.94)*** (3.81)*** (3.59)***
Log(TNA) 0.660 0.629 0.619 0.669 0.650 0.628 
 (7.09)*** (6.80)*** (6.68)*** (7.22)*** (7.01)*** (6.79)***
Log(FamSize) -0.009 -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 -0.025 
 (0.16) (0.43) (0.43) (0.41) (0.41) (0.47) 
Liquid Stock Beta 0.943 0.947 0.949 0.985 0.955 0.953 
 (9.74)*** (9.77)*** (9.79)*** (10.17)*** (9.83)*** (9.83)***
Portfolio Concentration 14.577 15.103 15.183 16.036 15.361 15.193 
 (1.17) (1.22) (1.22) (1.29) (1.24) (1.22) 
Turnover (x100) -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.616 
 (2.99)*** (2.97)*** (2.99)*** (3.03)*** (2.97)*** (2.28)** 
Age 0.290 0.295 0.294 0.283 0.306 0.297 
 (2.55)** (2.60)*** (2.59)*** (2.50)** (2.69)*** (2.61)***
Expenses -1.476 -1.518 -1.491 -1.488 -1.488 -1.490 
 (3.73)*** (3.84)*** (3.77)*** (3.76)*** (3.76)*** (3.77)***
Total Load (x100) 0.038 0.192 0.039 0.043 0.038 0.039 
 (1.35) (1.44) (1.41) (1.58) (1.39) (1.41) 
Lagged Return -0.141 -0.141 4.286 0.720 -0.073 -0.121 
 (0.37) (0.37) (2.80)*** (1.84)* (0.19) (0.32) 
Return Volatility -19.295 -19.413 -21.633 -139.619 -21.308 -20.371 
 (4.70)*** (4.73)*** (5.19)*** (11.12)*** (5.17)*** (4.94)***
Constant 27.023 27.527 27.336 29.132 21.173 27.697 
 (10.78)*** (11.00)*** (10.92)*** (11.64)*** (15.14)*** (11.05)***
Fund/Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41,691 41,691 41,691 41,691 41,678 41,691 
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
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    Table VII 
Liquidity Characteristics of Stocks in the Top and Bottom Mutual Fund Net Buying 
Decile 
 
The table reports the liquidity characteristics of stocks most heavily bought and most heavily sold 
by mutual funds during high and low VIX innovation periods. I infer mutual fund trading from 
holdings data and sort stocks into deciles at each quarter-end by the net changes in mutual fund 
ownership. The lowest decile (D1) consists of the most heavily sold stocks and the highest decile 
(D10) consists of the most heavily bought stocks at each quarter-end by mutual funds. For each 
quarter-end, I calculate the cross-sectional mean statistics of the four liquidity measures (price, 
turnover, size, and Amihud illiquidity ratio) across stocks in D1 and D10 separately. The table 
reports the time-series average of these mean statistics across high and low VIX innovation 
quarters, and the results of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the null hypothesis that the liquidity 
measures in the two deciles are identical. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistic resulting from a 
difference-in-difference test of whether the liquidity difference between D1 and D10 is 
significantly different across high and low VIX innovation regimes is also reported. Panel A 
reports the results using the standardized percentile ranks of these liquidity measures. Panel B 





Panel A: Rank Liquidity Measures 
Net Buying Price Turnover Size Illiq. Ratio 
High VIX Innovation     
Sell (D1, n=34) 0.57 0.70 0.60 0.35 
Buy (D10, n=34) 0.63 0.70 0.64 0.32 
z-statistic -4.72 -0.06 -3.20 2.51 
 (0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.01) 
Low VIX Innovation     
Sell (D1, n=34) 0.58 0.70 0.62 0.33 
Buy (D10, n=34) 0.61 0.70 0.62 0.34 
z-statistic -3.31 0.07 -0.06 -0.71 
 (0.00) (0.95) (0.96) (0.48) 
Diff-in-Diff     
z-statistic -2.40 0.12 -2.31 2.13 
 (0.02) (0.91) (0.02) (0.03) 
Panel B: Raw Liquidity Measures 
Net Buying Price ($) Turnover (%) Size ($mil) Illiq. Ratio 
High VIX Innovation     
Sell (D1, n=34) 21.56 19.15 1383.95 2.14 
Buy (D10, n=34) 24.40 18.99 1363.62 1.50 
z-statistic -3.73 -0.67 -1.54 3.24 
 (0.00) (0.50) (0.12) (0.00) 
Low VIX Innovation     
Sell (D1, n=34) 23.94 20.02 1765.19 1.67 
Buy (D10, n=34) 24.96 19.67 1470.11 1.26 
z-statistic -3.98 -0.18 -0.85 3.23 
 (0.00) (0.86) (0.40) (0.00) 
Diff-in-Diff     
z-statistic -2.05 -0.08 -2.16 1.77 





Determinants of Mutual Fund Ownership: Full Sample (1990Q1-2006Q4) 
 
The table reports the results for the 68 cross-sectional regressions of the mutual fund ownership 
on stock characteristics. See Table II for a description of the independent variables. All variables 
are expressed in standardized percentile ranks between 0 and 1. The first two columns give the 
average coefficients and their t-statistics. In each cell in the third (fourth) column, the first 
number reports the number of significantly positive (negative) coefficients, at the 95% confidence 
level, and the second number gives the number of positive (negative) coefficients. Panel A reports 
results using price, turnover and size as liquidity proxies, while Panel B reports results using 









Panel A: Price, Turnover, and Size as Liquidity Proxies 
Price 0.238 20.48 67/68 0/0 
Turnover 0.211 54.41 68/68 0/0 
Size 0.361 23.61 67/68 0/0 
Log(B/M) 0.128 23.72 67/68 0/0 
Beta 0.083 16.12 64/67 0/1 
Specific Risk -0.067 -10.10 2/8 44/60 
Volatility -0.099 -13.75 0/4 53/64 
Yield -0.201 -26.20 0/0 68/68 
Lagged Return -0.086 -16.03 2/2 63/66 
Age 0.033 7.54 38/57 4/11 
Constant 0.201 22.94 68/68 0/0 
Panel B: Amihud Illiquidity Ratio and Size as Liquidity Proxies 
Illiquidity Ratio -0.381 -18.78 0/0 67/68 
Size 0.259 18.99 64/66 0/2 
Log(B/M) 0.116 21.41 67/68 0/0 
Beta 0.088 13.55 60/68 0/0 
Specific Risk -0.033 -4.62 9/18 30/50 
Volatility -0.139 -21.51 0/0 65/68 
Yield -0.216 -30.32 0/0 68/68 
Lagged Return -0.033 -5.78 6/18 39/50 
Age 0.007 1.42 18/40 22/28 




Dynamic Liquidity Preferences of Mutual Funds 
 
The table reports the results for the cross-sectional regressions of MFO on stock characteristics 
partitioned by expected market volatility states. See Table II for a description of the independent 
variables. All variables are expressed in standardized percentile ranks between 0 and 1. The first 
two columns give the average coefficients and their t-statistics (in parentheses) in the high and 
low VIX quarters using price, turnover, and size as proxies for liquidity. The last two columns 
report results using the normalized Amihud illiquidity ratio and size as proxies for liquidity. The 
last three rows report the aggregated liquidity coefficients, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test z-statistics 
and the associated p-values. The null hypothesis is that this aggregated liquidity coefficient is not 
different across the high and low states. In the first two columns, the aggregated liquidity 
coefficient is the sum of the coefficients of price, turnover, and size. In the last two columns, the 
aggregated liquidity coefficient is the difference between the coefficients of size and Amihud 
illiquidity ratio (βSize– βIlliquidityRatio). 
 
 
  High VIX Low VIX High VIX Low VIX 
Price 0.241 0.235   
 (13.52)*** (15.49)***   
Turnover 0.210 0.211   
 (32.32)*** (49.05)***   
Illiquidity Ratio   -0.401 -0.345 
   (14.01)*** (12.43)*** 
Size 0.391 0.331 0.275 0.257 
 (17.21)*** (16.98)*** (14.08)*** (13.70)*** 
Log(B/M) 0.141 0.114 0.128 0.103 
 (15.90)*** (21.50)*** (14.42)*** (19.29)*** 
Beta 0.064 0.103 0.067 0.109 
 (10.04)*** (15.36)*** (8.51)*** (12.12)*** 
Specific Risk -0.049 -0.085 -0.020 -0.049 
 (5.35)*** (9.82)*** (2.10)* (5.09)*** 
Volatility -0.105 -0.094 -0.143 -0.133 
 (11.51)*** (8.33)*** (18.75)*** (12.75)*** 
Yield -0.213 -0.189 -0.228 -0.205 
 (19.63)*** (17.79)*** (22.90)*** (20.57)*** 
Lagged Return -0.105 -0.066 -0.049 -0.017 
 (15.59)*** (9.56)*** (6.46)*** (2.28)** 
Age 0.041 0.026 0.013 0.001 
 (5.64)*** (5.24)*** (1.58) (0.27) 
Constant 0.193 0.208 0.675 0.637 
 (13.70)*** (19.98)*** (26.08)*** (23.01)*** 
Observations 137,684 123,168 137,684 123,168 
Avg R-squared 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.39 
Aggregated Liquidity Coeff. 0.84 0.78 0.68 0.60 
z-stats 4.08 3.21 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table X  
The Effect of Fund Characteristics on Dynamic Liquidity Preferences of Mutual Funds 
 
The table reports the aggregated liquidity coefficient of size and Amihud illiquidity ratio (i.e., 
βSize– βIlliquidityRatio) for the stock-level cross-sectional regressions partitioned by expected market 
volatility states and fund characteristics. I first split funds into a high- and a low-type group based 
on their characteristics. Then I calculate the fraction of shares held by each type of funds for each 
stock at each quarter-end. The dependent variable is the ownership by the type of funds specified. 
The first two columns give the aggregated liquidity coefficients for high VIX and low VIX times 
separately. The last two columns report the z-statistic (and the associated p-values) of the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test that the aggregated coefficients are identical across the high and low 
states for the fund type considered. The last row in each panel reports the Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
statistics resulting from difference-in-difference tests of whether the difference between high and 
low VIX periods is significantly different across fund types. 
 
  High VIX Low VIX z-stats p-values 
Panel A: Fund Family Size 
Small Family 0.54 0.43 4.00 (0.00) 
Large Family 0.74 0.70 2.09 (0.04) 
Diff-in-Diff   2.99 (0.00) 
Panel B: Total Load 
Low Load 0.53 0.41 3.10 (0.00) 
High Load 0.60 0.56 1.49 (0.14) 
Diff-in-Diff   2.28 (0.02) 
Panel C: Past Returns 
Loser 0.58 0.55 0.51 (0.61) 
Winner 0.54 0.43 2.65 (0.01) 
Diff-in-Diff   -1.41 (0.16) 
Panel D: Return Volatility 
Low Volatility 0.49 0.48 0.33 (0.74) 
High Volatility 0.59 0.44 3.64 (0.00) 
Diff-in-Diff   -3.41 (0.00) 
Panel E: Investment Style 
Growth 0.59 0.50 3.22 (0.00) 
Income 0.66 0.63 1.50 (0.13) 
Diff-in-Diff   3.39 (0.00) 
Panel F: Fund Turnover 
Low Turnover 0.54 0.41 3.24 (0.00) 
High Turnover 0.78 0.70 2.87 (0.00) 




Precautionary Liquidity Holdings and Fund Performance 
 
The table reports the coefficients of the quarterly panel regressions using mutual funds’ 
subsequent abnormal returns as dependent variables. The abnormal returns are obtained using the 
CAPM, the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, the Fama-French-Carhart model augmented 
with a liquidity factor, and Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional model. LiqWt is the fraction of 
liquid securities (bottom 5% in Amihud illiquidity ratios) in a fund’s assets. See Table I for the 
definition of other variables. All regressions include both fund dummies and time dummies. The 
associated t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered by fund are reported in parentheses. 











VIX*LiqWt (x100) 0.113 0.053 0.051 0.102 
 (11.60)*** (5.61)*** (5.44)*** (10.50)*** 
LiqWt -0.026 -0.012 -0.012 -0.025 
 (11.74)*** (5.64)*** (5.69)*** (11.17)*** 
Log(TNA) -0.393 -0.322 -0.325 -0.400 
 (16.39)*** (15.25)*** (15.37)*** (16.77)*** 
Log(FamSize) -0.003 -0.009 -0.009 -0.004 
 (0.24) (0.71) (0.72) (0.28) 
Net Flows (x100) 1.451 3.904 3.808 0.722 
 (0.39) (1.15) (1.12) (0.19) 
Turnover (x100) 0.033 -0.036 -0.038 0.031 
 (0.28) (0.37) (0.39) (0.27) 
Age -0.063 -0.039 -0.039 -0.068 
 (2.21)** (1.43) (1.43) (2.39)** 
Expenses 0.011 2.898 3.132 0.676 
 (0.00) (0.35) (0.38) (0.07) 
Total Load 4.420 4.986 4.904 4.226 
 (2.52)** (3.09)*** (3.03)*** (2.45)** 
Lagged Return -3.234 -3.356 -3.368 -3.136 
 (18.86)*** (20.52)*** (20.66)*** (18.42)*** 
Return Volatility -3.960 -5.181 -5.097 -3.688 
 (2.18)** (2.79)*** (2.76)*** (2.04)** 
Constant 3.460 1.741 1.730 3.453 
 (11.50)*** (6.33)*** (6.28)*** (11.54)*** 
Fund/Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49,508 49,508 49,508 49,508 
R-squared 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.11 
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     Table XII 
Robustness Tests 
 
The table reports the coefficients of the quarterly panel regressions using mutual funds’ liquidity 
weights (liquid stock holdings as a proportion of TNA) as dependent variables. Liquid stocks are 
defined as the bottom 5% in Amihud illiquidity ratios. Column (1) reports results controlling for 
cash holdings. Column (2) reports results using cash holdings as a fraction of total net assets as 
the dependent variable. Both models are estimated using the post-2000 subsample for which 
quarterly cash holding information is available. Column (3) reports results excluding fund/quarter 
observations that are associated with flight-to-liquidity episodes. Columns (4) and (5) report sub-
period results. For each model, I use the baseline specification in Table V and treat fund-specific 
effects as fixed. All regressions include fund dummies. I assume that year-specific effects are 
fully captured by fund-invariant variables, such as the VIX, market weight of liquid stocks, and 
market illiquidity. The associated t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VIX 0.139 -0.004 0.089 0.045 0.114 
 (10.04)*** (0.47) (6.12)*** (2.44)** (8.20)***
Var(Net Flows) (x100) 0.065 0.034 0.076 0.017 0.081 
 (0.95) (1.01) (1.62) (0.28) (1.19) 
Net Flows (x100) -0.833 0.907 -0.455 -0.835 -0.845 
 (5.83)*** (11.91)*** (4.07)*** (5.91)*** (5.72)***
Market Weight 0.362 17.481 0.660 0.948 0.449 
 (7.08)*** (5.01)*** (35.74)*** (18.44)*** (8.39)***
Market Illiquidity -32.711  -22.110 5.390 -59.123 
 (5.11)***  (4.18)*** (0.74) (8.90)***
Log(TNA) 3.216 0.365 0.618 0.435 3.234 
 (24.16)*** (4.06)*** (6.35)*** (2.32)** (22.49)***
Log(FamSize) 0.008 -0.043 -0.076 -0.274 -0.052 
 (0.09) (0.78) (1.32) (2.54)** (0.53) 
Liquid Stock Beta 0.450  0.827 0.330 0.479 
 (4.18)***  (8.19)*** (2.56)** (4.30)***
Portfolio Concentration 0.758 99.918 20.234 49.910 -18.234 
 (0.04) (2.56)** (1.50) (2.25)** (0.88) 
Turnover (x100) -0.010 0.004 -0.014 -0.197 -0.009 
 (2.06)** (1.36) (2.63)*** (0.81) (1.92)* 
Age -0.287 -0.033 0.296 -0.373 -0.512 
 (2.31)** (0.87) (5.83)*** (2.01)** (3.81)***
Expenses -0.360 0.807 -0.976 -1.615 -0.659 
 (0.73) (2.94)*** (2.33)** (2.49)** (1.25) 
Total Load (x100) 10.125 -14.742 4.423 -9.028 11.959 
 (1.38) (2.89)*** (0.68) (0.63) (1.55) 
Lagged Return -1.205 -0.283 -0.468 5.188 -3.214 
 (3.14)*** (1.34) (1.41) (10.90)*** (7.46)***
Return Volatility -17.197 2.713 -22.097 -34.108 -26.194 
 (3.92)*** (1.00) (5.38)*** (4.82)*** (5.40)***
Cash -0.077     
 (5.49)***     
Constant 8.442 -5.347 -6.811 -24.047 16.532 
 (1.50) (2.49)** (2.44)** (5.68)*** (2.73)***
Fund/Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,064 26,064 37662 17,381 24,070 






Do Stock Splits Increase Information
Production? Evidence from Institutional
Trading
3.1 Introduction
The benets of stock splits for rms and investors are controversial. While it is well
known that stock splits do not, by themselves, affect a rm's operating cash ows,
several interesting effects have been documented in the nancial markets around
stock splits: two of these are positive abnormal announcement effects (see, e.g.,
Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984), Lamoureux and Poon (1987), or Brennan
and Copeland (1988)) and positive abnormal long-term stock returns (see, e.g., Desai
and Jain (1997) or Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002)). Two leading explanations that
have been proposed for the economic effects of stock splits are the optimal trading
range hypothesis and the information production hypothesis. The optimal trading
range hypothesis suggests that stock splits bring the splitting rm's share price to a
preferred price range (see, e.g., Copeland (1979) or McNichols and Dravid (1990)),
thereby improving the liquidity and marketability of the stock. In contrast, the in-
formation production hypothesis (see Brennan and Hughes (1991)) argues that stock
splits increase the incentive of brokers (and afliated analysts) to produce informa-
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tion about the splitting rm, thereby ensuring that the rm's stock is correctly priced.
The empirical literature has so far predominantly focused on the trading range hy-
pothesis, which primarily applies to trading by retail investors around stock splits.
The objective of this paper is to directly test, for the rst time in the literature, the
information production hypothesis about the motivation behind stock splits by an-
alyzing whether stock splits indeed increase the extent of information production
about the splitting rm.
Institutional trading is a particularly appropriate context to analyze the eco-
nomic rationale underlying stock splits for two reasons. The rst reason is that the
optimal trading range hypothesis applies primarily to retail rather than institutional
investors. This is because, unlike retail investors, institutional investors do not face
signicant wealth constraints. Further, institutions face trading costs that are different
from that of retail investors to the extent that institutions typically trade much larger
positions, so that a lower stock price could cost institutions more in terms of broker-
age commissions and other trading costs. In other words, this transactions cost aspect
of splits will, if anything, make stocks less desirable for institutional investors after a
split. The second reason is that the information production hypothesis applies primar-
ily to institutional rather than retail investors. As discussed before, the information
production hypothesis of Brennan and Hughes (1991) argues that the dependence of
the brokerage commission rate on share price increases the incentive of brokerage
rms to produce information about rms after a split (since the split increases com-
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missions paid to the brokerage rm), thus ensuring that the splitting rm's stock is
priced closer to intrinsic value. Given that institutional investors have a long-term re-
lationship with brokerage rms, institutional investors are likely to have signicantly
better access to the information produced by brokerage rms compared to retail in-
vestors. Further, given that they possess economies of scale in the analysis and use of
this information, institutional investors are likely to have better incentives and ability
to process the above information appropriately compared to retail investors. Thus,
an important prediction of the information production theory is that institutional in-
vestors will possess superior information compared to retail investors after a stock
split.
We test an extended version of the Brennan and Hughes (1991) information
production hypothesis, explicitly incorporating the role of institutional investors (see
Section 3.2 for a detailed discussion). There are four sets of interesting empirical re-
search questions arising from the above hypothesis. The rst set of research questions
pertains to whether brokerage commissions paid by institutional investors (commis-
sions paid per dollar of trading as well as total commissions paid per period) indeed
go up after a stock split. A related question is whether the volume of trading by
institutional investors increases or decreases after a stock split: this is an empiri-
cal question, since, given that the brokerage commissions paid by them on a stock
may increase after a split, the trading volume in the stock by institutions may in fact
decrease after a split. The second set of research questions relates to whether insti-
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tutions possess an informational advantage relative to retail investors after a split. If
so, is the informational advantage possessed by institutional investors after a split
greater in stocks that generate higher brokerage commissions, as implied by the in-
formation production theory of Brennan and Hughes (1991)? A related question is
whether institutions that pay higher brokerage commissions have a greater informa-
tional advantage (since they may obtain better access to the information produced by
the brokerage rm and its analysts). The third set of research questions relates to the
protability of institutional trading in a stock after a split. In particular, are institu-
tions able to realize superior prots net of brokerage commissions from trading in a
stock post-split? This is an empirical question given that the informational advantage
(if any) possessed by institutional investors post-split may potentially be dominated
by any increase in the brokerage commissions and other trading costs paid by them.
Further, do institutions paying higher brokerage commissions outperform or under-
perform those paying lower commissions? Clearly, this is also an empirical question,
for reasons similar to those discussed earlier. The fourth set of research questions re-
lates to the impact of the information possessed by institutional investors (if any) and
their trading in the rm's equity on the information asymmetry faced by the rm in
the equity market. In particular, is this information asymmetry lower after a stock
split? If so, is the reduction in information asymmetry after the split greater for the
equity of rms generating a greater increase in brokerage commissions after the split,
as implied by the information production theory?
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In this paper, we make use of a large sample of transaction-level institutional
trading data to answer many of the above questions. Our data include transactions
over a seven-year period from January 1999 to December 2005. After proper lters,
there are 601 sample institutions. For an average sample split, our sample institutions
collectively account for 11 percent of total trading volume reported by CRSP within
the rst three months post-split. Notably, brokerage commissions for each transac-
tion are recorded in this dataset. This enables us to directly study the information
production theory of Brennan and Hughes (1991), in which brokerage commissions
play a central role in stock splits, for the rst time in the literature. We are able
to compare brokerage commissions paid by institutional investors before and after
a split, and relate the informativeness of institutional trading to brokerage commis-
sions paid. We are also able to compute realized institutional trading protability net
of brokerage commissions.61
Our paper provides a number of new results on the information production hy-
pothesis and on the role of brokerage commissions and institutional investors in stock
splits. We organize our empirical tests and results into four parts, corresponding to
the four sets of research questions outlined above. First, we document, for the rst
time in the literature, that the commissions paid by institutional investors increase af-
ter a stock split. This is true regardless of whether the commissions are measured
61 In addition to brokerage commissions (which explicitly reduce realized prots), implicit trading
costs such as implementation shortfall (Perold (1988)) could further reduce investors' realized prots.
Our results account for both explicit and implicit trading costs, since we use actual transaction prices
to calculate institutional investors' realized prots.
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on a per dollar traded basis, or in terms of total amount of commissions paid. Fur-
ther, the volume of trading by institutional investors (both the number of trades and
dollar volume) increases after a stock split, despite the above increase in brokerage
commissions.
Second, we study, for the rst time in the literature, the informativeness of in-
stitutional trading immediately (one month) after the split about the rm's subsequent
long-term (6 months and 1 year) abnormal stock return performance. We nd that in-
stitutional trading immediately after a split indeed has considerable predictive power
for the rm's subsequent long-term stock return performance. Further, this predictive
power of institutional trading is concentrated in stocks which generate higher com-
mission revenues for brokerage rms and in institutions that pay higher brokerage
commissions. These results are robust to controlling for various variables capturing
publicly available information, such as the split factor. The above results are consis-
tent with the information production hypothesis, since they indicate that brokerage
rms (and their afliated analysts) produce more information about stocks generat-
ing larger commissions for them after a split, and that this information is passed on
to institutional investors, especially those paying higher brokerage commissions.
Third, we study the realized protability of institutional trading after a split,
using actual transaction prices and net of brokerage commissions. We nd that insti-
tutions make positive abnormal prots during the post-split period even after taking
brokerage commissions and other trading costs into account. This indicates that the
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informational advantage possessed by institutional investors after a split dominates
the increase in brokerage commissions paid by them. Further, institutions paying
higher commissions (measured in terms of commissions paid per dollar of trading
principal) signicantly outperform those paying lower commissions. This indicates
that institutions paying higher commissions obtain better access to the information
produced by analysts at brokerage rms, resulting in higher protability even after
accounting for the higher commissions paid by them.
Fourth, we study the impact of the information possessed by institutional in-
vestors and their trading in the rm's equity post-split on the information asymmetry
faced by the rm in the equity market. We nd that the information asymmetry faced
by the rm decreases signicantly after a split. In particular, the number of analysts
covering the rm increases, and the analyst forecast error decreases, after a split,
supporting the predictions of the information production theory. Further, our multi-
variate analysis indicates that the greater the increase in brokerage commissions after
a split, the greater the reduction in the information asymmetry faced by the rm. The
above results again support the predictions of the information production theory.
As discussed before, the existing empirical literature on stock splits mainly
focuses on the optimal trading range hypothesis. Baker and Gallagher (1980) suggest
that companies split shares to lower the prices so that retail investors could afford to
buy round lots. McNichols and Dravid (1990), Dyl and Elliott (2006), and Fernando,
Krishnamurthy, and Spindt (2004) provide empirical evidence consistent with the
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above conjecture. Angel (1997) and Schultz (2000) argue that the increase in the
relative spread subsequent to a stock split provides an incentive for brokers to make
markets and promote the splitting stock to retail investors. In particular, Schultz
nds that trading costs increase, costs of market making decrease, and the number of
small buy orders increases following a split. Since the optimal trading range theory is
more applicable to retail investors, it does not have clear implications for the trading
behavior of institutional investors and the informativeness of institutional trading.
A signaling model for stock splits was rst proposed by Brennan and Copeland
(1988). They develop a signaling model of stock splits in which stock splits serve
as costly signals of managers' private information because trading costs increase as
stock prices decrease. They, however, do not have any role for information produc-
tion by outsiders. As discussed before, the theoretical paper most closely related to
ours is Brennan and Hughes (1991), who develop a model in which stock split in-
crease the incentive for brokers and their afliated analysts to produce information
about splitting rms, by increasing the amount of brokerage commissions paid by in-
vestors trading in the stock of these rms. Throughout this paper, we refer to their
theory as the information production hypothesis. We discuss this theory and related
hypothesis in detail in Section 3:2. Brennan and Hughes (1991) also provide some
empirical evidence that the number of analysts following a rm is negatively related
to its share price. However, there is no direct empirical evidence on the information
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production theory in the literature.62 Our paper therefore provides the rst direct em-
pirical evidence on the information production theory, and in particular, the role of
brokerage commissions and institutional investors in stock splits.63
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3:2 discusses related
theories and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3:3 describes the data and sample
selection procedures. Section 3:4 presents our empirical tests and results. Section 3:5
concludes with a discussion of our results.
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, we rst briey discuss the information production hypothesis rst
put forward by Brennan and Hughes (1991) and extend it to incorporate the role
of institutional investors in stock splits. While our objective in this paper is not to
directly test any theoretical model, we base many of our testable hypotheses on the
implications of the above theory. Brennan and Hughes (1991) develop a model in
which the dependence of the brokerage commission rate on share price increases the
incentive of brokerage rms (and afliated analysts) to produce information about
rms after a split, since the split increases the commissions paid to brokerage rms
62 In a paper distantly related to ours, Chen, Nguyen, and Singal (2005) show that stock splits accom-
panied by the greatest increase in the breadth of institutional ownership at the announcement quarter
experience signicantly higher post-split abnormal returns than those with the greatest decrease in the
breadth of institution ownership.
63 Our paper is also related to the extensive literature on the role of institutional investors around
various corporate events: Chemmanur, He, and Hu (2008), and Gibson, Saeddine, and Sonti (2004)
study the role of institutional investors around SEOs; Chemmanur and Hu (2008) study the role of
institutional investors in IPOs; Gillan and Starks (2003), Cornett et al (2007) and a number of other
empirical papers study the relationship between institutional ownership and rm performance.
150
by investors and these commissions serve to compensate brokerage rms for their
cost of information production. In this context, managers of higher intrinsic value
rms facing information asymmetry in the equity market have an incentive to split
their rm's shares in order to induce a greater amount of information production by
brokerage rms about their rm, thus ensuring that their rm's equity is priced closer
to its intrinsic value.
Even though Brennan and Hughes (1991) do not make such a distinction, we
extend their theoretical argument by distinguishing between institutional and retail
investors in the above setting. Given that institutional investors have a long-term re-
lationship with brokerage rms, institutional investors are likely to have signicantly
better access to the information produced by brokerage rms compared to retail in-
vestors. Further, given that they possess economies of scale in the analysis and use of
this information, institutional investors are likely to have better incentives and ability
to process the above information appropriately compared to retail investors. Thus,
an important prediction of this extended version of the information production the-
ory is that institutional investors will possess superior information compared to retail
investors after a stock split. Figure 1 graphically illustrates this extended version of
the information production theory.64
64 One question that may arise in the context of the Brennan and Hughes (1991) information produc-
tion hypothesis is whether, instead of inducing increased information production through a stock split
and the resulting increase in brokerage commissions, institutions can directly pay brokers to produce
more information. Such a direct-payment scheme may not work in practice, due to the two well-
known problems associated with information production. First, it may be hard to verify in the short
run that the information produce is accurate (veriability). Second, it may be hard for the institu-



















Split shares to induce increased
information production
Figure 1: An Extension of Brennan and Hughes (1991)
Our rst set of hypotheses deals with the brokerage commissions paid and trad-
ing volume by institutional investors around a split. In particular, does the commis-
sion rate (commissions per dollar traded) paid by institutional investors indeed in-
crease after split, as assumed by the information production theory of Brennan and
Hughes (1991) (H1)? As for trading volume, on the one hand, an increase in the
commission rate and other trading costs may decrease the dollar trading volume by
institutional investors after the split, absent other considerations (H2A). On the other
hand, the increase in the informational advantage possessed by institutional investors
after a split may dominate the effect of a higher commission rate and other trading
costs, resulting in an increase in the dollar trading volume by institutional investors
Leland and Pyle (1977) or Admati and Peiderer (1988) for a discussion of the above issue. In con-
trast to such direct-payment schemes, stock splits and the resulting increased brokerage commissions
seem to be an implicit mechanism to generate a long run equilibrium where brokers are compensated
for an increase in information production.
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after a split (H2B). Finally, the combined effect of the commission rate and trading
volume may result in either an increase (H3A) or a decrease (H3B) in the total dollar
amount of commissions paid by institutional investors after a split.
Our second set of hypotheses deals with the informational advantage (if any)
possessed by institutional investors after a split. The information production theory
predicts that brokerage rm analysts will produce more information about the rm
after a stock split becomes effective (since the commission rate increases on this
day). This, in turn, implies that institutional investors will possess an informational
advantage about the splitting stock, so that institutional trading after the split ex-
date will have predictive power for the long-term returns of the stock (H4). Further,
the information production theory implies that the above informational advantage
of institutional investors should be greater for stocks generating higher brokerage
commissions, since the incentives of brokerage rms to produce information about
such stocks are greater (H5). Finally, we expect institutions paying higher brokerage
commissions to have better access to the information produced by brokerage rms
and their analysts, so that their informational advantage after a split will be greater
(H6).
Our third set of hypotheses deals with the realized protability of institutional
trading after a split. We would expect institutional investors to realize abnormal prof-
its if the informational advantage they possess dominates any increase in the broker-
age commissions and other trading costs paid by them after a split (H7). Further, if
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the greater informational advantage of institutions paying higher commissions domi-
nates the effect of their higher commission cost, we would expect them to outperform
institutions paying lower commissions (H8).
Our fourth and nal set of hypotheses deals with the information asymmetry
faced by the rm in the equity market after a split. Given the increase in information
production about the splitting rm and trading by institutional investors using this
information, the information production theory implies that the extent of information
asymmetry faced by the rm will be lower after a split (H9). Further, since brokerage
rms have greater incentives to produce information about stocks generating higher
commissions, we would expect the above reduction in information asymmetry to be
greater for the equity of rms generating a greater increase in brokerage commissions
(H10).
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, we describe our data and sample selection procedures, and present
summary statistics of our data. Section 3:1 describes our stock split sample and
presents summary statistics. Section 3:2 describes our institutional trading data and
presents summary statistics.
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3.3.1 Stock Split Sample
We retrieve NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stock splits announced during the period from
January 1999 to December 2005 from CRSP daily les. We require the split event
to have a distribution code of 5523 and the splitting shares to be ordinary common
shares (share code equals 10 or 11). There are 2122 splits retrieved from CRSP tape,
of which 131 have a missing announcement date. We manually collect the announce-
ment date by searching Factiva.65 The sample with announcement date available has
2052 splits. After merging with Compustat, we have 1825 observations for which ac-
counting information is available. Restricting that rms have positive book equity in
the scal year before the announcement reduces the sample size to 1775. Our nal
sample includes 1701 splits for which the stock is traded by our sample institutions
during the three-month period before the split announcement date.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the 1701 splits traded by sample insti-
tutions. The most frequent type of split is 2 for 1 split. More than half of the splits
are by rms with their stocks traded on NASDAQ. The median days between the
announcement date and the ex-date is 33 calendar days.
65 We also double check the accuracy of split announcement dates that are reported by CRSP. There
are some cases that the announcement date reported by CRSP is inconsistent with that by Factiva. For
example, CRSP reports January 21, 1999 as the split declaration date for Emmis Communications
Corp. (PERMNO: 80297), but the rst date that the news appear in Factiva is December 21, 1999 in
Associated Press Newswires. We correct these errors.
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3.3.2 Institutional Trading Data
We obtain transaction-level institutional trading data from the Abel/Noser Corpo-
ration, a leading execution quality measurement service provider for institutional
investors. The data are similar to those used by several microstructure studies on in-
stitutional trading costs, for example, Keim and Madhavan (1995), Conrad, Johnson,
and Wahal (2001), and Jones and Lipson (2001). Recent studies such as Chemma-
nur, He, and Hu (2008) and Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2008) make use
of the Abel/Noser data. This is the rst paper to use institutional trading data to study
institutional investors' trading behavior in stock splits.
The data cover equity trading transactions by a large sample of institutions
from January 1999 to December 2005. For each transaction, the data include the
date of the transaction, the stock traded (identied by both symbols and CUSIPs),
the number of shares traded, the dollar principal traded, commissions paid by the in-
stitution, and whether it is a buy or sell by the institution. The data are provided
to us under the condition that the names of all institutions are removed from the
data. However, identication codes are provided enabling us to separately identify
all institutions. Sample institutions are either investment managers or plan sponsors.
Investment managers are mutual fund families such as Fidelity Investments, Putnam
Investments, and Lazard Asset Management. Examples of pension plan sponsors
include the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, and United Airlines.
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In order to be included in our sample, an institution has to have trading data
for at least 13 consecutive months around the split Ex-date. Also sample institu-
tions must have traded in at least one sample split during the 13 months surrounding
splits. 601 sample institutions satisfy the above criteria, 109 of which are investment
managers and the remaining are plan sponsors.
Summary statistics of the institutional trading sample are presented in Table
2. The average Total Principal Traded is $62.75 billion, the average Total Shares
Traded is 1.95 billion, and the average Total Commissions Paid is $65.80 million.
For an average split, our sample institutions collectively account for 11.25 percent of
total trading volume reported in CRSP within the rst three months post-split.
3.4 Empirical Tests and Results
In this section we discuss the empirical methodology used to test our hypotheses
and report our results. Section 3:4:1 describes the pattern of institutional trading and
brokerage commissions before and after the split. In Section 3:4:2, we present our
empirical tests regarding the relationship between post-split institutional trading and
the subsequent abnormal returns. We also link the predictability of institutional trad-
ing to brokerage commissions. Section 3:4:3 studies the protability of institutional
trading, net of commissions, after the split Ex-date. Section 3:4:4 examines the in-
formation asymmetry faced by the rm after a split and the relationship between
changes in information asymmetry and changes in total commissions.
157
3.4.1 Pattern of Institutional Trading and Brokerage Commissions
Before and After the Split
The information production model relies on the assumption that the aggregate bro-
kerage commission increases after splits, which gives rms with favorable private
information an incentive to split their shares to induce information production. As
the rst step of our empirical analyses, we examine the pattern of institutional trading
and brokerage commissions before and after the split.
We use the three-month period before the split announcement date as the bench-
mark and compare institutional trading and brokerage commissions in the three-
month period after the split ex-date with those in the pre-split period. Table 3 reports
the summary statistics of total commissions, as well as other commission measures
and trading measures. Consistent with H1, we nd that the average commission rate
(commissions per dollar traded) paid by institutions increases signicantly from 6.58
basis points in the pre-split period to 10.65 basis points in the post-split period. Inter-
estingly, the per share institutional commission increases only moderately from 2.55
basis points per share before splits to 2.89 basis points per share after splits. This
pattern is also illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that the frequency distributions of
per share institutional commissions before and after splits are very similar.
Further, the number of trades and the dollar trading volume by institutional
investors also goes up signicantly after the split. The average dollar trading volume
increases from $343.51 million in the pre-split period to $407.10 million in the post-
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split period. Figure 3 shows the pattern of institutional trading in the 12-months
period around splits. In the 6 months after the split is accomplished, institutions
collectively continue to trade large volumes, both on split-adjusted share basis and
dollar basis. This evidence is inconsistent withH2A, but consistent withH2B, which
suggests that informational effects might dominate transaction costs considerations
for institutional trading.
The total dollar amount of commissions paid by institutional investors also
increases dramatically after the split. The average total dollar amount of commissions
in the post-split period is $252.12 thousand versus $139.94 thousand in the pre-split
period. Given that there are 1701 splits in our sample, this means that, in total,
brokerage rms increase their brokerage revenue by $190 million in the rst three
months after splits. Our evidence lends support to H3A, where the combined effect
of the commission rate and trading volume results in an increase in the total dollar
amount of commissions paid by institutional investors after a split, but refutes H3B.
Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution of total commissions in the pre-split
period versus that in the post-split period. In particular, we compute total commis-
sions for each splitting stock during the three-month period before the announcement
of the split and during the three-month period after the split Ex-date. The Figure
shows that the distribution of total commissions during the pre-split period is tilted
toward low commissions, whereas that during the post-split period is heavily tilted
toward high commissions. For example, during the post-split period, 7.72% of the
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splitting stocks generate commission revenues higher than $800,000, compared to
4.27% during the pre-split period.
The evidence that institutions continue to trade large amounts in splitting stocks
after splits when trading costs have shot up signicantly poses an interesting ques-
tion: Do they trade for informational reasons? This is the focus of our empirical
effort, to which we now turn.
3.4.2 Predictability of Institutional Trading
Under the information production story, the premium access to the information pro-
duced by brokerage houses and the superior information processing ability of institu-
tions imply that institutional trading after the split ex-date have predictive power for
the subsequent long-run returns of the stock (H4).
We aggregate institutional trading activities in the rst month after the ex-date
and test whether it has predictability for subsequent abnormal returns.66 We consider
two holding horizons, 6 months and 1 year, both starting from the rst day imme-
diately after the rst month (21 trading days) following the split ex-date. We use
both CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model to estimate benchmark expected
returns.67 The risk-adjusted buy-and-hold return is calculated as the difference be-
66 Interestingly, we do not nd signicant predictability of institutional trading before the ex-date for
subsequent returns. This strengthens our story that institutions receive information from brokerage
analysts, who start to produce information after the split is accomplished and increases in brokerage
commissions are realized.
67 Market beta and Fama-French three-factor betas are estimated using a one-year window that ends
3 months before the split announcement date.
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tween the realized buy-and-hold return and the expected return.68 We control for a
number of rm characteristics in the multivariate regression, such as split factors,
rm size, book-to-market ratio, and dummies for nancial rms, utility rms, tech-
nology rms, and rms with stock traded on NASDAQ.
Table 4 Panel A reports the predictability results for all institutions. Our in-
terested variable is the coefcient in front of Net Buying, which is the aggregated
trading of all institutions during the post-split rst month. Notice that the coefcient
obtained using either CAPM-adjusted returns or three factor-adjusted returns is pos-
itive and statistically signicant, especially for the 1-year horizon. The economic
impact of institutional trading is large as well. One standard deviation of institutional
net buying in the rst month after splits is 1.43. Thus, a two-standard deviation in-
crease in institutional net buying during the post-split rst month would predict a 9.23
(6.25) percentage point increase in abnormal returns adjusted by CAPM (3 factors).
The evidence is consistent with institutions possess superior information during the
post-split period (H4).
Panel B and Panel C summarizes the predictability results for investment man-
agers and plan sponsors, respectively. An interesting pattern is that trading by invest-
ment managers has more predictive power for subsequent returns than plan sponsors.
The coefcient of net buying by investment managers is positive and 1% signicant
in regressions using subsequent 1-year returns, either adjusted by CAPM or 3 factors,
68 There are 53 rms that become delisted in the 1-year period following the end of post-split rst
month, of which 45 are merger related. If a stock is delisted during a particular year, we ll the
remaining months with the same size decile portfolio's returns.
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as the dependent variable. In contrast, the coefcient of net buying by plan sponsors
is negative and insignicant in most cases.
Given that, on average, institutions possess some information during the post-
split period, we divide our sample in three different ways to further examine the
information production theory. First, we divide our sample stocks into a high- and a
low-commission-generating group and examine whether institutional trading is more
informative in the group of stocks which generate higher brokerage commissions
(H5). Second, we divide our sample institutions into a high- and a low-commission-
paying group and examine whether institutions paying higher commissions are bet-
ter informed than their counterparts (H6). Last, we interact the two groups of stocks
with the two groups of institutions and examine whether the high-commission-paying
institutions are more informed about stocks that generate higher brokerage commis-
sions.
Specically, for the rst test, we sort stocks into two groups by the percentage
increase in the commission rate (commissions per dollar traded) in the post-split rst
month compared to pre-split period. Stocks with higher than the median increase
in the commission rate are high-commission-generating stocks, and those below the
median are low-commission-generating stocks. We lost some observations, because
some stocks generate zero brokerage commission during the one-month period be-
fore the split. We test the hypothesis that institutional trading in high-commission-
generating stocks is more informed than that in low-commission-generating stocks
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by pooling stocks into the two groups and running regressions for each group of
stocks. Table 5 reports the results using subsequent 1-year risk-adjusted returns as
the dependent variable. Results using subsequent 6-month abnormal returns are qual-
itatively similar. Consistent with H5, institutional trading is a signicant predictor of
subsequent 1-year abnormal returns for high-commission-generating stocks, whereas
it becomes insignicant for low-commission-generating stocks.
For the second test, we divide our sample institutions into two groups based on
the commission rate in the post-split rst month that institutions pays for trading split-
ting stocks: institutions with higher than the median per dollar commissions are high-
commission-paying institutions, and those below the median are low-commission-
paying institutions.69 Here, we use the full sample of splitting stocks, but the Net
Buying variable is aggregated over the high- and the low-commission-paying institu-
tion group separately. Table 6 shows the results using both subsequent 6-month and
1-year risk-adjusted returns as the dependent variable. For high-commission-paying
institutions (Panel A), their trading is signicant in predicting both 6-month and 1-
year abnormal returns, whereas trading by low-commission-paying ones (Panel B)
show either no predictive power (for 6-month horizon), or negative predictive power
(for 1-year horizon), for subsequent abnormal returns. This evidence is consistent
with H6 that institutions that pay higher commissions have better access to the infor-
69 Using total commissions to partition institutions could potentially capture the effect of institutions'
size because large institutions trade large quantities and pay more commissions. Thus, we only re-
port results for classication using per dollar commissions. The results using total commissions are
qualitatively similar.
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mation produced by brokerage analysts, and thus their trading is more informative
than those that pay low commissions.
To test whether high-commission-paying institutions trading in high-commission-
generating stocks have the most predictive power for subsequent returns, we rst ag-
gregate the trading of high- and low-commission-paying institutions in each stock,
then sort stocks into a high and a low group based on the percentage increase in
the commission rate in the post-split rst month compared to pre-split period. Ta-
ble 7 summaries the results for the double sorting on institutions and stocks using
subsequent 1-year risk-adjusted returns as the dependent variable. Results using sub-
sequent 6-month abnormal returns are qualitatively similar. Panel A shows that net
buying by high-commission-paying institutions is positive and statistically signi-
cant in predicting subsequent abnormal returns for high commission stocks, while
their net buying is positive but insignicant in predicting those for low commission
stocks. For low-commission-paying institutions (Panel B), their trading has no pre-
dictive power for either high or low commission stocks. The evidence strengthens
our ndings about H5 and H6.
To summarize, our predictability results offer strong evidence that institutional
trading is informative during the post-split period. The predictive power mainly
comes from stocks with big increases in brokerage commissions and institutions that
pay high commissions.
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3.4.3 Protability of Institutional Trading
In this subsection, we examine whether institutional investors realize abnormal trad-
ing prots in the post-split period after taking into account of commission costs (H7).
This could arise when the informational advantage they possess dominates the in-
crease in the commissions and other trading cost paid by them after a split. Further,
we expect that institutions that pay higher commissions outperform institutions that
pay lower commissions (H8), which provides an incentive for institutions to trade
more, pay more commissions and in turn receive more information.
We track institutional trading in splitting stocks during the rst month and rst
three months post-split to examine the protability of secondary market trading. We
calculate two return measures for post-split institutional trading, namely, return on
buy principal and return on maximum investment. Return on buy principal is a sim-
ple and conservative measure, which is calculated by dividing total trading prots
(raw or in current dollars) by total buy principal (raw or in current dollars). Return
on maximum investment adjusts total investment (the denominator) by allowing the
use of selling proceeds for later buying transactions instead of counting it as new in-
vestment. This measure more closely reects the investment return from post-split
institutional trading. To compute abnormal prots, we use Fama-French three fac-
tor model to adjust prots and investment amounts. Three factor-adjusted prots are
calculated by discounting the raw prot back to the day before the split ex-date using
the benchmark return from Fama-French 3 factor model; and the 3 factor-adjusted re-
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turn on buy principal equals 3 factor-adjusted prots divided by 3 factor-adjusted buy
principal. Similarly, the 3 factor-adjusted return on maximum investment equals the
3 factor-adjusted prots divided by the 3 factor-adjusted on maximum investment.
To test whether institutions that pay higher brokerage commissions end up with
making more trading prots, for each split, we partition all institutions trading in
the splitting stock into a high- and a low-commission-paying group based on the
commission rate they pay. Table 8 presents results on the protability of post-split
institutional trading for all institutions, and for high- and low-commission-paying
institutions as well. The unit of observation is split/institution pairs. Panel A shows
the results for institutional trading during the rst month after the split Ex-date. An
average institution invests $3.35 million in purchasing each splitting stock during the
rst month following split ex-date and the raw return, net of commissions, is 1.51%.
After adjusting for Fama-French 3 factors, the abnormal return on buy principal is
1.83%. Thus, institutions still make abnormal prots even after accounting for the
commissions they paid. Interestingly, when we divide institutions into a high- and
a low-commission-paying group, high-commission-paying institutions signicantly
outperform their low commission counterparts. For example, they outperform by 58
basis points in raw returns, and 35 basis points in abnormal returns, using maximum
investment as the denominator. Notice also that high-commission-paying institutions
also trade more than low ones ($4.7 million versus $2.1 million in raw buy principal),
even though they incur much higher commissions (15.0 bps versus 4.2 bps per dollar
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principal traded). The three-month results (Panel B) are similar to the one-month
results.
In summary, the protability of post-split institutional trading suggests that,
overall, institutional investors have superior information about splits. In particular,
institutions which trade more, pay higher commissions per dollar amount traded, out-
perform those with low commissions. The results are consistent with our hypotheses,
H7 and H8, that the informational advantage that institutions possess outweighs the
increase in transaction costs and the more commissions they pay, the more trading
prots they make.
3.4.4 Information Production by Brokerage Firms and Brokerage
Commissions
Amajor prediction of the information production theory is that information asymme-
try faced by the rm will decrease following a split (H9) and the change in informa-
tion asymmetry is negatively associated with the change in brokerage commissions
(H10). Brennan and Hughes test the latter prediction using change in split factor as
a proxy for the increase in commissions and nd that change in split factor is indeed
a positive and signicant predictor of increases in analyst coverage (an inverse mea-
sure of information asymmetry). In this subsection, we make use of our commission
data to directly test this prediction. In addition, we consider information production
from both quantity and quality perspectives. On the quantity side, there will be more
analysts producing reports for the splitting stock after splits, because the commission
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increase enables brokerage rms to hire more analysts. On the quality side, we ex-
pect analysts to produce higher quality research about the rm after splits, especially
for rms that experience a greater increase in commissions. This arises because the
increase in commissions could potentially provide monetary incentives for analysts
to do a better job.
To test the relation between commission changes and the change in informa-
tion environment after splits, we retrieve analyst earnings forecast data from I/B/E/S.
Specically, for each split event, we retrieve analyst earnings forecasts for the previ-
ous and the next scal year-end. If the next annual earnings announcement is within
6 months of the split Ex-date, we jump ahead to the following scal year. If the previ-
ous annual earnings announcement is within 6 months of the split Ex-date, we jump
backward to the preceding scal year. We employ four measures for analyst fore-
casts. The rst measure is the number of analysts following the rm. The following
three measures are intended to capture the quality of analysts' information produc-
tion. The second measure is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. Our third
measure is the error in the earnings forecast. We measure forecast error as the ab-
solute difference between the average forecasted earnings and the actual earnings per
share divided by the price per share at the end of the scal year. Our fourth mea-
sure is the coefcient of variation of analyst forecasts, which is dened as the ratio of
standard deviation to the absolute value of the average of analyst forecasts. All mea-
sures are constructed using analysts' one-year ahead earnings forecast in the last six
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months of each scal year. We calculate the change in each measure by taking log of
the ratio of the post-split value to the pre-split value of the measure.
Table 9 shows the univariate results on the informational measures in the pre-
split period and the change. Notice that number of analysts increases by 31% after
splits, and forecast errors decrease by 21%, both of which are consistent with our hy-
pothesis (H9) that by splitting their shares, rms reduce the information asymmetry
they face. The other two informational measures, standard deviation and coefcient
of variation, have the opposite direction of change. This could be the case if the un-
derlying (actual) earnings process of a rm becomes more volatile, thus making it
harder for analysts to predict. Accordingly, we also consider a measure of histori-
cal earnings stability (i.e., standard deviation of quarterly earnings over the past two
years). As the low row of Table 9 shows, historical earnings stability increases by
43% after the split, suggesting that actual earnings become more volatile and harder
to predict after splits. This suggests that it is important to control for the stability of
actual earnings in the multivariate tests.
As a direct test of the effect of increases in commissions on information produc-
tion, we regress changes in the information measures on changes in the total dollar
amount of commissions paid by institutions and changes in historical earning stabil-
ity. Table 10 reports the results. For changes in number of analysts, the coefcient in
front of changes in total commissions is positive and highly signicant. This suggests
that the increase in commission revenues enables brokerage rms to put more ana-
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lysts to work. For information quality measures, the coefcient in front of changes
in total commissions is negative, and statistically signicant in most cases. This pro-
vides direct evidence that the reduction in information asymmetry is greater for the
equity of rms generating a greater increase in brokerage commissions (H10).
The information production results, combined with our predictability results
shown in previous subsections, demonstrate that the increase in brokerage commis-
sions after splits induces analysts to produce more information and more precise in-
formation about the stock, which in turn help institutions to trade more actively and
make more trading prots.
3.5 Discussion of Results and Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the role of brokerage commissions and institutional
investors in stock splits, using a large sample of transaction-level institutional trad-
ing data. Making use of broker commissions recorded in the data, we were able to
directly examine an extended version of Brennan and Hughes' (1991) information
production theory of stock splits for the rst time in the literature. We were able
to compare brokerage commissions paid by institutional investors before and after
a split, and relate the informativeness of institutional trading to brokerage commis-
sions paid. We were also able to compute realized institutional trading protability
net of brokerage commissions and other trading costs.
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Our results can be summarized as follows. First, both commissions paid and
trading volume by institutional investors increase after a stock split. Second, institu-
tional trading immediately after a split has predictive power for the rm's subsequent
long-term stock return performance. Further, this predictive power is concentrated in
stocks which generate higher commission revenues for brokerage rms and is greater
for institutions that pay higher brokerage commissions. Third, institutions make pos-
itive abnormal prots during the post-split period even after taking brokerage com-
missions and other trading costs into account. Further, institutions paying higher
commissions signicantly outperform those paying lower commissions. Fourth, the
information asymmetry faced by the rm decreases after a split. Further, the greater
the increase in brokerage commissions after a split, the greater the reduction in infor-
mation asymmetry.
Overall, our results are consistent with the information production theory rst
proposed by Brennan and Hughes (1991), in which brokerage commissions play a
central role in stock splits.
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Figure 2: Per Share Institutional Commissions Before and After Stock Splits 
 
This figure presents the frequency distribution of per share institutional commissions (in cents) in 
the three-month period before split announcements (blue bars) versus that during the three-month 
period after split Ex-dates (purple bars). All commissions per share are rounded to the nearest 




































Figure 3: Pattern of Institutional Trading Around Splits 
 
This figure presents the pattern of institutional trading around splits. For each month during the 
six-month period before the split announcement and the six-month period after the split Ex-date, 
we plot the split-adjusted share volume (in millions, upper panel) and dollar volume (in $ 
millions, lower panel) by sample institutions. The horizontal line is the month relative to the split 
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Figure 4: Institutional Commissions Before and After Splits 
 
This figure presents the frequency distribution of total commissions paid by our sample 
institutions in the three-month period before split announcements (blue bars) versus that during 
the three-month period after split Ex-dates (purple bars). The horizontal line is the bins for total 




































Table 1: Stock Splits by Year, Split Factor and Exchange 
 
The table reports the number of stocks in the sample, by year and split factor (Panel A) and by 
year and stock exchange (Panel B) that announced a stock split from 1999 to 2005. All firms with 
common stocks traded on NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq and traded by our sample institutions before the 
split announcement are included in the sample.  
 
Panel A. By Year and Split Factor 
Year <2-for-1 2-for-1 >2-for-1 Total 
1999 118 215 16 349 
2000 90 242 25 357 
2001 98 64 2 164 
2002 94 72 4 170 
2003 111 75 7 193 
2004 117 125 6 248 
2005 96 122 2 220 
Total 724 915 62 1701 
Panel B. By Year and Stock Exchange 
Year NYSE Amex Nasdaq Total 
1999 111 9 229 349 
2000 102 8 247 357 
2001 60 2 102 164 
2002 64 8 98 170 
2003 65 9 119 193 
2004 98 10 140 248 
2005 97 6 117 220 
Total 597 52 1052 1701 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Institutional Trading Sample 
 
This table presents summary statistics of the institutional trading sample. We obtain institutional 
trading data from the Abel/Noser Corporation for the period of January 1999 to December 2005. 
There are 601 institutions in our sample. Sample mean, standard deviation, 25 percentile, median, 
and 75 percentiles are presented. Total Principal Traded, Total Shares Traded, and Total 
Commissions Paid are computed based on all U.S. domestic equity traded by institutions from 
January 1999 through December 2005. For these three variables, sample statistics are based on 
cross sections of sample institutions. For a given split, Fraction of Total Post-Split Trading is 
computed as the aggregate shares traded by sample institutions divided by the aggregate CRSP 
volume (NASDAQ volumes are adjusted for double counting by dividing CRSP reported 
volumes by two) within the first year post-IPO. For Fraction of Total Post-Split Trading, sample 
statistics are based on the cross section of sample IPOs. 
 
 Mean Std 25% Median 75% 
Total Principal Traded ($ million) 62,750.66 392,497.80 1,027.88 3,311.91 12,115.88
Total Shares Traded (million) 1954.75 11182.71 34.3 108.5 389.55
Total Commissions Paid ($ million) 65.80 379.05 1.26 3.71 13.51
Fraction of Total Post-Split Trading (%) 11.25 8.27 5.32 9.74 15.19
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Institutional Trading and Brokerage Commissions Before 
and After Splits 
 
The table presents mean statistics for the trading activities of 601 institutional investors around 
splits. The pre-split period is the three-month period immediately before the split announcement 
and the post-split period is the three-month period immediately after the split ex-date. We first 
compute the mean statistics for each split. The table reports the cross-split average number of 
trades, turnover (shares traded divided by CRSP reported shares outstanding), share volume 
(shares traded), dollar volume (shares traded multiply closing price), per-dollar commission 
(dollar commission divided by dollar volume), total-dollar commission, and per-share 
commission (dollar commission divided by number of shares traded) during each three-month 
period. The last column reports t-statistics of the null that there is no difference between the pre-
split and the post-split period. Significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% level (***) is indicated. 
 
 
 Pre-Split Post-Split t-statistics 
Number of Trades 793 1031 5.00*** 
Share Volume (1,000s) 8,609.41 8,971.56 0.56 
Dollar Volume ($ million) 343.51 407.10 2.11** 
Turnover (%) 6.16 6.46 1.37 
Per-Dollar Commission (0.01%) 6.58 10.65 5.86*** 
Total Commission (1,000$) 139.94 252.12 6.44*** 
Per-Share Commission (0.01$) 2.55 2.89 2.14** 
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Table 4: Institutional Trading After the Ex-Date and the Subsequent Abnormal Returns 
 
The table reports regression results using abnormal buy-and-hold returns as the dependent 
variable. We consider four holding horizons: 6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years. The abnormal 
buy-and-hold return is calculated using CAPM (first two columns) and Fama-French three-factor 
model (last two columns). We present predictability results separately for all institutions, 
investment managers, and pension sponsors. Net Buying is the institutional net buying in the first 
month immediately after the Ex-date. Split factor is the CRSP factor to adjust shares outstanding. 
Size is the market value of the equity of the splitting firm measured two months before the split 
announcement. Log(B/M) is the log of the ratio of book value of common equity to market value 
of common equity measured two months before the announcement. Financial is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999). Utility is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999). Hi-Tech is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
firms in the high-tech industry (first two digits of SIC code: 35, 36, 38, 73, 87). Nasdaq is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for firms with stocks traded on Nasdaq. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. Significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% level (***) is indicated. 
 
Panel A. All Institutions   
 CAPM-Adjusted 3 Factor-Adjusted 
 6-month 1-year 6-month 1-year 
Net Buying 1.160 3.228 0.663 2.184 
 (1.65)* (3.07)*** (1.04) (2.20)** 
Split Factor 0.600 2.509 -0.339 2.090 
 (0.27) (0.74) (0.16) (0.65) 
Size -0.444 0.092 1.009 2.724 
 (0.61) (0.09) (1.52) (2.65)*** 
Log(B/M) -0.427 3.021 -0.950 0.385 
 (0.31) (1.47) (0.76) (0.20) 
Financial -2.067 -4.589 0.007 -1.477 
 (0.75) (1.11) (0.00) (0.38) 
Utility -1.696 -5.983 -0.472 -3.745 
 (0.26) (0.62) (0.08) (0.41) 
Hi-Tech 0.453 -1.047 1.777 0.412 
 (0.18) (0.28) (0.78) (0.12) 
Nasdaq 3.257 4.149 4.370 8.660 
 (1.34) (1.15) (1.98)** (2.53)** 
Constant 5.315 8.250 -9.736 -22.373 
 (0.95) (0.99) (1.91)* (2.83)*** 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1701 1701 1701 1701 
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 
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Panel B. Investment Managers 
 CAPM-Adjusted 3 Factor-Adjusted 
 6-month 1-year 6-month 1-year 
Net Buying 1.467 3.986 0.916 2.955 
 (1.98)** (3.60)*** (1.36) (2.82)*** 
SplitFactor 0.596 2.496 -0.338 2.093 
 (0.26) (0.74) (0.16) (0.66) 
Size -0.448 0.081 1.008 2.720 
 (0.62) (0.07) (1.52) (2.65)*** 
Log(B/M) -0.402 3.085 -0.932 0.443 
 (0.29) (1.50) (0.74) (0.23) 
Financial -2.104 -4.681 -0.023 -1.567 
 (0.76) (1.13) (0.01) (0.40) 
Utility -1.801 -6.245 -0.556 -4.001 
 (0.28) (0.65) (0.09) (0.44) 
Hi-Tech 0.422 -1.108 1.741 0.308 
 (0.17) (0.30) (0.77) (0.09) 
Nasdaq 3.269 4.187 4.376 8.680 
 (1.35) (1.16) (1.99)** (2.54)** 
Constant 5.382 8.438 -9.698 -22.249 
 (0.96) (1.01) (1.91)* (2.81)*** 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1701 1701 1701 1701 
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03  
Panel C. Plan Sponsors 
 CAPM-Adjusted 3 Factor-Adjusted 
 6-month 1-year 6-month 1-year 
Net Buying -3.513 -7.800 -3.543 -10.432 
 (1.06) (1.57) (1.18) (2.23)** 
SplitFactor 0.479 2.202 -0.431 1.806 
 (0.21) (0.65) (0.21) (0.57) 
Size -0.495 -0.033 0.969 2.603 
 (0.68) (0.03) (1.46) (2.53)** 
Log(B/M) -0.461 2.913 -0.959 0.346 
 (0.33) (1.41) (0.77) (0.18) 
Financial -1.961 -4.285 0.062 -1.290 
 (0.71) (1.03) (0.02) (0.33) 
Utility -1.381 -5.090 -0.306 -3.186 
 (0.21) (0.52) (0.05) (0.35) 
Hi-Tech 0.909 0.148 2.095 1.414 
 (0.37) (0.04) (0.93) (0.40) 
Nasdaq 3.353 4.385 4.449 8.902 
 (1.38) (1.21) (2.02)** (2.60)*** 
Constant 5.612 8.958 -9.472 -21.580 
 (1.00) (1.07) (1.86)* (2.73)*** 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1701 1701 1701 1701 
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03  
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Table 5: Institutional Trading after the Ex-Date and the Subsequent 1-Year Buy-and-
Hold Abnormal Returns: High Commission vs. Low Commission Stocks 
 
The table reports regression results using 1-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns as the dependent 
variable. The sample splits are partitioned into two groups based on commissions paid by the 
institutions. If the ratio of commissions in the first month immediately after the ex-date to that in 
the most recent month immediately before the announcement day is above median, then the split 
is in the High group, else it is in the Low group. We use two commission measures: one is the 
commission per dollar and the other is the total dollar amount of commissions. Net Buying is the 
institutional net buying in the first month immediately after the Ex-date. Split factor is the CRSP 
factor to adjust shares outstanding. Size is the market value of the equity of the splitting firm 
measured two months before the split announcement. Log(B/M) is the log of the ratio of book 
value of common equity to market value of common equity measured two months before the 
announcement. Financial is a dummy variable that equals 1 for financial firms (SIC code 6000-
6999). Utility is a dummy variable that equals 1 for financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999). Hi-
Tech is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in the high-tech industry (first two digits of SIC 
code: 35, 36, 38, 73, 87). Nasdaq is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms with stocks traded 
on Nasdaq. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 
1% level (***) is indicated. 
 
 CAPM-Adjusted 3 Factor-Adjusted 
 Low-Comm High-Comm Low-Comm High-Comm 
Net Buying 1.651 5.047 1.516 2.772 
 (1.09) (3.36)*** (1.10) (1.88)* 
Split Factor -0.305 3.272 -0.649 3.102 
 (0.04) (0.83) (0.09) (0.80) 
Size 1.826 -1.786 3.869 1.922 
 (1.05) (1.15) (2.44)** (1.26) 
Log(B/M) 2.310 5.109 -3.444 4.433 
 (0.72) (1.81)* (1.17) (1.60) 
Financial -0.281 -11.858 3.488 -8.789 
 (0.04) (1.98)** (0.60) (1.49) 
Utility 10.246 -17.111 1.653 -11.221 
 (0.56) (1.43) (0.10) (0.95) 
Hi-Tech 1.256 -5.276 3.107 -4.122 
 (0.22) (1.02) (0.60) (0.81) 
Nasdaq 6.926 5.248 10.701 10.132 
 (1.26) (1.04) (2.13)** (2.04)** 
Constant -7.294 28.428 -37.476 -8.660 
 (0.56) (2.24)** (3.17)*** (0.69) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 809 810 809 810 
R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.03 
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Table 6: Institutional Trading After the Ex-Date and the Subsequent Abnormal Returns: 
High-Commission vs. Low-Commission-Paying Institutions 
 
The table reports regression results using abnormal buy-and-hold returns as the dependent 
variable. We consider four holding horizons: 6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years. The abnormal 
buy-and-hold return is calculated using a market model. We aggregate the total dollar amount of 
commissions paid by each institution in the first month immediately after the ex-date and divide 
the sample institutions into two groups: institutions with a higher than median total commissions 
are the high-commission-paying institutions and those blow the median are the low-commission-
paying ones. Net Buying is the institutional net buying in the first month immediately after the 
Ex-date. Split factor is the CRSP factor to adjust shares outstanding. Size is the market value of 
the equity of the splitting firm measured two months before the split announcement. Log(B/M) is 
the log of the ratio of book value of common equity to market value of common equity measured 
two months before the announcement. Financial is a dummy variable that equals 1 for financial 
firms (SIC code 6000-6999). Utility is a dummy variable that equals 1 for financial firms (SIC 
code 4000-4999). Hi-Tech is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in the high-tech industry 
(first two digits of SIC code: 35, 36, 38, 73, 87). Nasdaq is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
firms with stocks traded on Nasdaq. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Significance on a 






Panel A. High-Commission-Paying Institutions Panel B. Low-Commission-Paying Institutions 
 CAPM-Adjusted 3 Factor-Adjusted CAPM-Adjusted 3 Factor-Adjusted 
 6-month 1-year 6-month 1-year 6-month 1-year 6-month 1-year 
Net Buying 1.284 3.489 0.789 2.429 -8.767 -17.128 -9.688 -17.414 
 (1.81)* (3.29)*** (1.22) (2.42)** (1.33) (1.74)* (1.62) (1.87)* 
Split Factor 0.597 2.498 -0.338 2.086 0.462 2.184 -0.454 1.825 
 (0.26) (0.74) (0.16) (0.65) (0.20) (0.65) (0.22) (0.57) 
Size -0.442 0.099 1.012 2.73 -0.468 0.025 0.996 2.679 
 (0.61) (0.09) (1.53) (2.66)*** (0.64) (0.02) (1.51) (2.60)*** 
Log(B/M) -0.425 3.023 -0.946 0.389 -0.512 2.808 -1.013 0.223 
 (0.31) (1.47) (0.76) (0.20) (0.37) (1.36) (0.81) (0.11) 
Financial -2.084 -4.627 -0.009 -1.51 -1.976 -4.311 0.044 -1.308 
 (0.75) (1.12) (0.00) (0.39) (0.71) (1.04) (0.02) (0.33) 
Utility -1.714 -6.01 -0.498 -3.782 -1.222 -4.771 -0.133 -2.84 
 (0.26) (0.62) (0.08) (0.41) (0.19) (0.49) (0.02) (0.31) 
Hi-Tech 0.429 -1.089 1.749 0.365 0.853 0.005 2.047 1.174 
 (0.17) (0.29) (0.77) (0.10) (0.34) (0.00) (0.91) (0.33) 
Nasdaq 3.26 4.161 4.37 8.666 3.348 4.361 4.449 8.837 
 (1.35) (1.15) (1.98)** (2.53)** (1.38) (1.20) (2.02)** (2.58)*** 
Constant 5.298 8.211 -9.749 -22.405 5.349 8.387 -9.742 -22.313 
 (0.95) (0.98) (1.91)* (2.83)*** (0.96) (1.00) (1.91)* (2.82)*** 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1701 1701 1701 1701 1701 1701 1701 1701 
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03  
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Table 7: Institutional Trading after the Ex-Date and the Subsequent 1-Year Buy-and-
Hold Abnormal Returns: Double Sorting 
 
The table reports regression results using 1-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns as the dependent 
variable. The sample splits are partitioned into two groups based on commissions paid by the 
institutions. If the ratio of commissions in the first month immediately after the ex-date to that in 
the most recent month immediately before the announcement day is above median, then the split 
is in the High group, else it is in the Low group. We use two commission measures: one is the 
commission per dollar and the other is the total dollar amount of commissions. Net Buying is the 
institutional net buying in the first month immediately after the Ex-date. Split factor is the CRSP 
factor to adjust shares outstanding. Size is the market value of the equity of the splitting firm 
measured two months before the split announcement. Log(B/M) is the log of the ratio of book 
value of common equity to market value of common equity measured two months before the 
announcement. Financial is a dummy variable that equals 1 for financial firms (SIC code 6000-
6999). Utility is a dummy variable that equals 1 for financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999). Hi-
Tech is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in the high-tech industry (first two digits of SIC 
code: 35, 36, 38, 73, 87). Nasdaq is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms with stocks traded 
on Nasdaq. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 







Panel A. High-Commission-Paying Institutions Panel B. Low-Commission-Paying Institutions 
 CAPM-Adjusted 3 Factor-Adjusted CAPM-Adjusted 3 Factor-Adjusted 
 Low-Comm High-Comm Low-Comm High-Comm Low-Comm High-Comm Low-Comm High-Comm 
Net Buying 2.007 5.382 1.716 3.073 -22.068 -5.759 -28.029 -4.249 
 (1.33) (3.51)*** (1.25) (2.03)** (0.63) (0.35) (0.87) (0.33) 
Split Factor 0.051 2.736 1.149 2.119 -5.062 9.515 -2.598 9.772 
 (0.01) (0.70) (0.16) (0.54) (0.52) (1.18) (0.29) (1.53) 
Size 1.631 -1.373 3.997 2.169 0.188 -2.369 3.034 0.967 
 (0.92) (0.90) (2.48)** (1.43) (0.08) (1.19) (1.39) (0.61) 
Log(B/M) 3.088 4.604 -2.504 3.824 4.846 3.055 -1.684 2.749 
 (0.95) (1.65)* (0.85) (1.39) (1.20) (0.79) (0.45) (0.90) 
Financial -0.005 -10.998 3.742 -7.637 2.771 -2.351 4.152 -3.536 
 (0.00) (1.85)* (0.64) (1.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.50) (0.51) 
Utility 11.068 -16.507 2.624 -10.648 9.464 -4.018 12.536 -12.607 
 (0.59) (1.40) (0.16) (0.91) (0.46) (0.25) (0.66) (0.98) 
Hi-Tech 1.497 -4.939 3.613 -4.233 5.949 3.654 6.587 0.948 
 (0.26) (0.96) (0.70) (0.83) (0.81) (0.60) (0.98) (0.20) 
Nasdaq 7.916 4.643 12.384 8.772 8.766 9.381 11.763 13.203 
 (1.42) (0.93) (2.44)** (1.78)* (1.19) (1.48) (1.74)* (2.64)*** 
Constant -5.814 25.016 -39.375 -10.297 8.141 19.845 -30.937 -13.31 
 (0.44) (1.99)** (3.31)*** (0.83) (0.44) (1.21) (1.83)* (1.02) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 808 808 808 808 520 521 520 521 
R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05  
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Table 8: Profitability of Institutional Trading after Split Ex-Date 
 
The table reports univariate results of the profitability of institutional trading in the three-
month period post split Ex-date. For each stock split, we divide institutions that trade the 
stock during the three-month period into a high-commission-paying group and a low-
commission-paying group based on per dollar commissions, i.e., the ratio of brokerage 
commissions to dollar principal. We use two measures to proxy the amount invested for post-
split trading, namely, the Buy Principal and the Maximum Investment. Raw Buy Principal is 
the sum of the actual dollar amount of all the buy transactions including commissions spent 
by sample institutions during the 3-month post split. Raw Maximum Investment is the 
maximum dollar amount committed to trading the split firms’ shares during the 3-month post 
split by sample institutions. Raw Profit is the total raw profit earned by institutions using 
actual transaction prices net of commissions, with the net position marked to market at the 
end of the three-month period. Raw Return is defined as the Raw Profit divided by the Raw 
Amount Invested. We use Fama-French three factor model to adjust profits and investment 
amount. For example, 3 Factor-Adjusted Profit is computed by discounting the raw profit 
back to the day before the split ex-date using the benchmark return from Fama-French 3 
factor model; and 3 Factor-Adjusted Return on Buy Principal equals 3 Factor-Adjusted Profit 
divided by 3 Factor-Adjusted Buy Principal. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
 










Panel A1: Amount Invested         
Number of Observations 47,789 23,365 24,441  
Per-Dollar Commission (0.01%) 11.69 15.03 4.18 10.86 
    (17.89) 
Raw Buy Principal ($ million) 3.35 4.69 2.07 2.63 
    (11.70) 
Raw Maximum Investment ($ million) 3.05 4.20 1.95 2.26 
    (10.90) 
3 Factor-Adjusted Buy Principal ($ million) 3.37 4.74 2.05 2.69 
    (11.87) 
3 Factor-Adjusted Max. Inv. ($ million) 3.06 4.24 1.94 2.30 
    (11.07) 
Panel A2: Profit         
Raw Return on Buy Principal (%) 1.51 1.79 1.24 0.55 
 (21.98) (18.17) (12.97) (3.97) 
Raw Return on Maximum Investment (%) 1.57 1.87 1.29 0.58 
 (22.35) (18.44) (13.20) (4.09) 
3 Factor-Adjusted Return on Buy Principal (%) 1.83 1.99 1.67 0.32 
 (29.91) (22.37) (19.92) (2.62) 
3 Factor-Adjusted Return on Max. Inv. (%) 1.90 2.08 1.72 0.35 














Panel B1: Amount Invested         
Number of Observations 76,667 38,259 38,436  
Per-Dollar Commission (0.01%) 14.59 16.36 4.73 11.63 
    (21.72) 
Raw Buy Principal ($ million) 5.60 7.58 3.63 3.95 
    (12.25) 
Raw Maximum Investment ($ million) 4.76 6.28 3.24 3.04 
    (11.06) 
3 Factor-Adjusted Buy Principal ($ million) 5.77 7.83 3.71 4.12 
    (12.06) 
3 Factor-Adjusted Max. Inv. ($ million) 4.86 6.43 3.30 3.13 
    (10.88) 
Panel B2: Profit         
Raw Return on Buy Principal (%) 1.63 2.13 1.14 0.99 
 (21.67) (20.28) (10.54) (6.59) 
Raw Return on Maximum Investment (%) 1.83 2.35 1.30 1.05 
 (23.14) (21.16) (11.63) (6.66) 
3 Factor-Adjusted Return on Buy Principal (%) 2.55 3.00 2.11 0.90 
 (37.36) (31.45) (21.54) (6.56) 
3 Factor-Adjusted Return on Max. Inv. (%) 2.86 3.36 2.36 0.99 





Table 9: Information Production around Splits and Institutional Trading 
Commissions: Univariate Results 
 
The table reports univariate results for information production and institutional commissions 
around splits. For each split event, we retrieve analyst earnings forecasts for the previous and 
the next fiscal year-end. If the next annual earnings announcement is within 6 months of the 
split Ex-date, we jump ahead to the following fiscal year. If the previous annual earnings 
announcement is within 6 months of the split Ex-date, we jump backward to the preceding 
fiscal year. We employ four measures for analyst forecasts. The first measure is the number of 
analysts following the firm. The second measure is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. 
Our third measure is the error in the earnings forecast. We measure forecast error as the 
absolute difference between the average forecasted earnings and the actual earnings per share 
divided by the price per share at the end of the fiscal year. Our fourth measure is the 
coefficient of variation of analyst forecasts, which is defined as the ratio of standard deviation 
to the absolute value of the average of analyst forecasts. All measures are constructed using 
analysts’ one-year ahead earnings forecast in the last six months of each fiscal year. We 
calculate the change in each measure by taking log of the ratio of the post-split value to the 
pre-split value of the measure. Δlog(Total Commission) is the natural logarithm of the total 
commissions paid by institutions in the fiscal year following the split ex-date divided by the 
total commissions in the fiscal year preceding the Ex-date. Historical Earnings Stability is 
measured as the volatility (standard deviation) of quarterly earnings over the past two years. 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Significance on a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% level 
(***) is indicated. 
 
 Pre-Split Log Change (%) t-statistics 
Number of Analysts 9.52  31.34  16.80*** 
Standard Deviation (%) 2.59  53.40  13.57*** 
Forecast Error (%) 0.27  -21.03  -3.11*** 
Coefficient of Variation 0.07  7.04  1.54 
Commissions (1,000$) 352.35  141.29  27.25*** 




Table 10: Information Production around Splits and Institutional Trading 
Commissions: Multivariate Results 
 
The table reports regression results using change in different measures of analyst forecasts as 
the dependent variable. For each split event, we retrieve analyst earnings forecasts for the 
previous and the next fiscal year-end. If the next annual earnings announcement is within 6 
months of the split Ex-date, we jump ahead to the following fiscal year. If the previous annual 
earnings announcement is within 6 months of the split Ex-date, we jump backward to the 
preceding fiscal year. We employ four measures for analyst forecasts. The first measure is the 
number of analysts following the firm. The second measure is the standard deviation of 
analyst forecasts. Our third measure is the error in the earnings forecast. We measure forecast 
error as the absolute difference between the average forecasted earnings and the actual 
earnings per share divided by the price per share at the end of the fiscal year. Our fourth 
measure is the coefficient of variation of analyst forecasts, which is defined as the ratio of 
standard deviation to the absolute value of the average of analyst forecasts. All measures are 
constructed using analysts’ one-year ahead earnings forecast in the last six months of each 
fiscal year. We calculate the change in each measure by taking log of the ratio of the post-
split value to the pre-split value of the measure. Δlog(Total Dollar Commission) is the natural 
logarithm of the total commissions paid by institutions in the fiscal year following the split 
ex-date divided by the total commissions in the fiscal year preceding the Ex-date. Historical 
Earnings Stability is measured as the volatility (standard deviation) of quarterly earnings over 
the past two years. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Significance on a 10% (*), 5% 
(**), or 1% level (***) is indicated. 
 
 Δlog(# Analysts) Δlog(Std.Dev.) Δlog(Forecast Err) Δlog(Coeff. of Var.) 
Δlog(Commissions) 0.093 0.118 -0.050 -0.028 -0.120 -0.167 -0.067 -0.062 
 (8.24)*** (9.37)*** (1.96)** (0.98) (2.78)*** (3.41)*** (2.24)** (1.82)* 
Δlog(Hist.E.Stab.) 0.041 0.043 0.422 0.386 0.485 0.473 0.242 0.200 
 (1.50) (1.58) (6.92)*** (6.40)*** (4.68)*** (4.51)*** (3.36)*** (2.77)*** 
Constant 0.155 0.118 0.423 0.409 -0.244 -0.172 0.061 0.073 
 (6.15)*** (4.46)*** (7.65)*** (7.09)*** (2.49)** (1.66) (0.94) (1.06) 
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 912 912 809 809 867 867 809 809 
R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 
 
 
 
 
